MANU-SMṚTI

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THE LAWS OF MANU WITH THE BHĀṢYA OF MĒDHĀTITHI

Translated by

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
Vol. I

Part I

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PREFATORY NOTE

On the 8th July, 1916, the Faculty of Law of the Calcutta University resolved that "Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gangānātha Jhā be invited to undertake an English translation of the Commentary of Mēdhātithi on the Institutes of Manu, ...the details of the scheme to be settled by a Committee composed of the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., the Hon'ble Justice Sir John Woodroffe, Kt., and the Hon'ble Sir S. P. Sinha, Kt." This resolution, when confirmed by the Senate, was communicated to me by the Registrar on the 12th September, 1916. The necessary sanction of the Government of the United Provinces was secured by G. O. No. 1678/XV-83, dated the 21st November, 1917.

At first it was thought that since the Commentary of Mēdhātithi had already been printed twice, having been edited in the first instance by V. N. Mandlik and subsequently by G. R. Gharpure, there would not be many textual difficulties. At the very outset, however, I was sadly disillusioned. Mandlik's edition is avowedly defective, and Gharpure's work also is not much better than a cleaner "Copy" of the same. It was soon found that without the aid of more manuscripts it would not be safe to proceed with the work of translation. Application for manuscripts was accordingly made to the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, the Deccan College, Poona, the India Office Library, London, and also to the authorities in charge of the Sanskrit Library at Nagpur. A full account of the manuscripts obtained from these places will be given in the Introduction. For the present, it would suffice to say that with the help of all these manuscripts, some sort of an intelligible text was evolved and the work of translation begun.

Much has got to be said on the work of Mēdhātithi and the causes that have contributed to the hopeless muddling of its text. All these remarks, however, have to be reserved for the final introduction.

The first two volumes of the translation, comprising the first four discourses, are in the press. Four years having elapsed since the resolution of the Senate, it has been thought desirable to send out to the world of scholars the first part of the first volume with a view to show that the person entrusted with the task has not been idle. It is estimated that the translation of Mēdhātithi, which is now ready in manuscript, will occupy four volumes, and the notes, which it has been advisedly decided to print separately, will, it is hoped, fill, at least, two more volumes. The notes will be divided into three parts: Part I—*Textual*—dealing with the readings of the texts and allied matters; Part II—*Explanatory*—containing an account of the various explanations of Manu's text, provided not only by its several commentators, but also by the more important of the legal digests, such as the Mitākṣarā, the Mayūkha, and the rest; Part III—*Comparative*—setting forth what the other Smṛtis—Āpastambha, Bodhāyana, etc., have got to say on every one of the more important topics dealt with by Manu. Under this head, the writer expects to trace some sort of a historical sequence in the evolution of Hindu Law, at least up to the point reached by the Institutes of Manu.

I take this opportunity, to offer my heartfelt thanks to the above-mentioned authorities who have lent me the manuscripts and to my friend Babu Govindadasa of Benares, the 'walking encyclopedia' of bibliographic lore, whose experienced advice has been constantly and ungrudgingly given. To the Hon'ble Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, I am specially beholden, not only for the constant encouragement that I have received from him, but also for the active interest that he has taken in the present undertaking, which has turned out to be more stupendous than I had imagined, and which I expect to be able to complete only through his guidance. To him, and also

through him to his colleagues on the above-mentioned Committee of the Senate, I tender my humble thanks.

The first part of Vol. II also is expected to be ready before the end of the year.

With this short prefatory note, I lay my work at the feet of those to whom I owe all that I am and ever shall be—

पित्रोस्तीर्थलतातीर्थनाथयोः पादयोरिदम्
भ्रातुः श्रीविन्ध्यनाथस्यार्पितं लक्ष्मीश्वरस्य च ॥

SANSKRIT COLLEGE,
BENARES:
October 21 (Vijayā) 1920.

GANGĀ-NĀTHA JHĀ.

DISCOURSE I

Origin of the Work.—Creation of the World.—Summary of Contents of the Book.

I. Question of the *Sages*

VERSE I

THE GREAT SAGES, HAVING APPROACHED MANU, PAID THEIR RESPECTS TO HIM IN DUE FORM, AND FINDING HIM SEATED WITH MIND CALM AND COLLECTED, ADDRESSED HIM THESE WORDS—(1).

Bhāṣya

Salutation to the Supreme Brahman! His real character can be known only from the Vedānta texts; He is the cause of the three worlds; and He destroys all evil.

The first four verses describe the fact of the treatise being the work of a highly qualified author, and of its providing instructions bearing upon such ends of man as are not knowable by means of any other source of knowledge; and this is done for the purpose of indicating its importance (and raising it in the estimation of men). When a treatise has secured high position in the estimation of men, its author obtains fame, and also heaven; and both these continue to exist as long as the world exists. A scientific treatise has its position established only when people engage in studying, in listening to lectures on, and in pondering over, it. Intelligent persons cannot undertake the said study, etc., until they have satisfied themselves as to the purposes served by them. It is for this reason that the Teacher has composed the four verses with a view to point out that the Treatise is put forth for the purpose of making known the means of accomplishing the ends of man.

It would not be right here to argue as follows:—"Even without the purpose of the Treatise being stated at the very outset, we could easily ascertain what that purpose is, by examining the several parts of the Treatise going to be propounded; what then is the use of making an effort to describe that purpose? Further, even if the purpose is stated at the very outset, one cannot be sure of it until he has fully examined the subsequent portions of the Treatise; as a matter of fact, all the assertions that a man may make do not always bring conviction. Nor is it necessary that every undertaking must be preceded by the knowledge of purposes served by it; for instance, we find pupils undertaking the study of the Veda, without knowing beforehand the purposes to be served by that study. In the works of human authors also, the practice of stating the purpose is not always followed. For instance, the revered Pāṇini begins his Sūtras with the words 'Now follows the teaching of words,' without having stated the purpose to be served by his treatise."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—Unless people have ascertained the purpose served by a particular Treatise, they would not, in the first place, take it up at all; and unless they take it up, how could they examine the whole of it? Then again, that same idea which is got at by the examination of the entire Treatise, becomes more easily comprehended if it has been briefly indicated in the beginning. It is with reference to this that there is the assertion that—'in ordinary experience, the learned always consider it desirable to carry ideas in their minds briefly as well as in greater detail.'

As regards the argument that—"even when the purpose has been stated there can be no certainty about it, for the simple reason that we do not derive conviction from the words of human beings,—in whose case the idea that we have is that this man knows the matter as he says, and not that the fact is really as he asserts,"—our answer is that we do not quarrel over the question as to whether the words of human

beings do, or do not, bring about conviction; because discussion over this question would swell the size of our work. But as a matter of fact, even though it is possible for a man to have recourse to a certain course of action, even when he is in doubt as to the exact purpose served by it,—yet until there is some statement as to the purpose served by a particular action, even doubts could not arise in regard to it. In fact, if some statement had not been made in regard to the purpose to be served by the present Treatise, the doubt that would arise in men's minds would be (not as to whether or not it was going to serve any useful purpose, but) as to whether it is a treatise on Law or on Economics, or an aimless attempt in the nature of an examination of such subjects as the 'Crow's teeth' and the like. On the other hand, when the aim of the work has been stated, the idea arising in our minds is—'the author of this work asserts that he is going to show us the path leading to our welfare,—there is no harm done by our undertaking the study of the work,—well, let us look into it'; and forthwith we take up the work.

Next as regards the case (cited by the opponent) of pupils taking up Vedic study (without being told of the exact purpose to be accomplished thereby),—the fact of the matter is that the action of the pupil is due to his being urged to it by his Teacher, and not to his recognition of the fact that if behoves him to take up the study (for the accomplishment of any purpose of his own); in fact being quite a child at the time (of beginning Vedic study), it is not possible for him to have any idea as to his being entitled to the study (by virtue of his having an aim that could be served only by that study); and his activity, therefore, is brought about entirely by the direction of another person (his Teacher); who does not bewilder him by pointing out to him that he is entitled to take up the study; and when once the boy has taken up Vedic study (entirely under advice of his Teacher), the motive for further study is provided by the desire to know the meaning of the Vedic texts studied; and thus the

study continues to be carried on. [This is the case with the study of the Veda.] As regards the study of the present Treatise (on Law), only such persons are entitled to it as have already studied the Veda, as is clearly indicated by the text—'the twice-born person who, without having studied the Vedas, devotes his energies to other subjects [becomes a Shūdra]' (Manu, 2.168); and by that time the pupil has his intelligence aroused, and consequently seeks to know what purpose is to be served by any further action that he is going to undertake.

As regards the revered Pāṇini, his aphorisms are extremely brief; so that there is no possibility of their having any other meaning (or serving any other purpose) than the one directly expressed by them; and further, the fame of Pāṇini is well known to even the smallest boy; so that the purpose served by his work is too well known to need reiteration. The present treatise (of Manu) on the other hand is on an extensive scale, abounding in several (commendatory and condemnatory) 'Descriptions,' and it helps in the accomplishment of all human ends; so that if its aim is stated in easily intelligible words, there is no harm done.

Of enquirers (and students) there are two classes,—one following reasoning, and another following tradition. The former of these take up the study of Manu; because they know the importance and greatness of the author and his work from such texts as—'whatever Manu said is wholesome' (*Kāṭhaka*, 11.5), and 'Manu has said all that has been said in the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda and the Mantras of the Atharva, as also by the Seven Great Sages.' And those of the latter class undertake it merely under the influence of the tradition, the source of which they have carefully investigated—that the treatise has been composed by Prajāpati himself. And for the sake of such persons, the mentioning of the name of the Author also is a factor leading to action (towards study).

It is for these reasons that we have here the laying out of the aim of the Treatise, in the form of question and

answer : The Great Sages are the questioners, Prajāpati is the expounder, and the subject is *Dharma*, which being not amenable to the ordinary means of knowledge, can be known only from the *Shāstras* (Scientific Treatises),—it is so difficult that even the Great Sages have doubts in regard to it. That Prajāpati is the actual expounder is indicated by the words of the text itself, which says—'*He*, being questioned by them,' and not '*I*, being questioned by them' ; and of himself again Manu speaks (12.123) as being the natural image (representative) of Brahmā. Thus an effort is necessary for the expounding of the Law. Such is the sense of the first four verses.

In what manner the present Treatise is made up of Instructions bearing upon the ends of man we shall show by the interpretation of the words of the text.

Now, in the text we have the declarations—(1) 'the Great Sages, having approached Manu, said to him—do please expound to us the Duties of Man,' and (2) 'being thus questioned by them, He said—*listen*' ; and these two—the question and its answer—in their import, are expressive of the one idea that *the Treatise expounds the Dharmas* ; the word 'Dharma' is in common parlance used in the sense of that means of accomplishing one's good which is not cognisable by any of the ordinary means of knowledge, with the sole exception of 'word.' Hence when it is said 'listen to Dharma,' what is meant is that what is going to be expounded is conducive to the fulfilment of the higher ends of man.

'*Manu*' is the name of a particular person known in long-continued tradition, as having studied several Vedic texts, as knowing their meaning and as practising the precepts therein contained ;—'*Having approached*' him, *i.e.*, having gone forward near him, intentionally, giving up all other actions, and not by mere chance, having met with him ;—the special effort made by the Sages to get near Manu shows the importance of the subject-matter of their question, as also the authoritative and trustworthy character of the expounder ; a man who is not capable of rightly expounding a subject is never questioned by persons going up to him for that purpose.

—'*Whose mind was calm and collected*'—'*Seated with mind calm and collected*,'—*i. e.*, whose mind was in a tranquil state; and it does not mean that he was actually seated upon a mat, or some such seat; as there would be no point in stating this; in fact the word 'seated' merely connotes *calmness*; it is only when one's mind is calm that he is capable of answering questions.—'*Having approached*'—has for its object simply 'Manu'; '*seated with mind calm and collected*' being an adverbial clause modifying the act of 'questioning' (by the sages). The sense of the sentence thus is—'they said to him the following words, on finding, from the manner in which he engaged into conversation with them in making enquiries about their welfare, that his mind was not preoccupied, but calm and collected, and he was therefore attentive to their questioning.'

The term '*ēkāgra*,' by ordinary usage, connotes *immobility*; what is meant by the term is *steadiness of the mind*, it being concentrated upon the contemplation of the knowledge of truth, following upon the cessation of all doubts and illusions of the person in whom the contact of all defects of passion and the like is set aside by inhibition. It is only when one has his mind in this condition that he is capable of apprehending sound and other objects that lie within reach of his senses; which is not the case when he is in doubt as to the object being a real entity or otherwise.—Or, etymologically the term '*agra*' denotes the *mind*, by reason of the fact that in the act of apprehending things it is the Mind that *goes before* (*agragāmi*) the Eye and other sense-organs; and in ordinary parlance that which *acts first* or *goes ahead*, is called '*agra*';—so that the compound '*ēkāgra*' is to be expounded as 'he who has his *agra*, or Mind, fixed upon one perceptible object'; there being nothing incongruous in a Bahuvrīhi compound being taken, if its sense demands it, as referring to things that are not co-existent. By this explanation also '*ēkāgra*' connotes *absence of distraction*.

'*Having paid their respects in due form*'—'Due form' stands for the rule prescribed in the scriptures; and they did

not transgress any such rule; the scriptures have laid down the rule that on first approaching his Teacher, the pupil should offer his obeisance, attend upon him, and so forth; and it was in this prescribed manner that the sages *paid their respects* to Manu; which means that they showed due devotion and respect.

The great sages.—The word '*ṛṣi*' means the *Veda*; and the word '*ṛṣi*' is applied also to a person, by virtue of his possessing excellent knowledge of the Veda and all that is prescribed therein and acting up to these. The *Ṛṣis*, sages, who approached Manu, were *great*; the said persons become 'great,' when the above-mentioned qualities become developed in them to a very high degree; just as Yudhiṣṭhira is called the 'greatest of the Kurus' (because he possessed, in a very high degree, the qualities that distinguished the members of the Kuru-race).—Or the *sages* may be regarded as 'great,' by virtue of their superior austerities, or of the great respect and fame enjoyed by them.

'*They addressed these words.*'—'*Vacana*' is *that by which something is spoken of*; this refers to the question formulated in the second verse; these being the *nearest* 'words' are what are referred to by the pronoun 'these.' Some people have held that the pronoun 'this' always refers to something directly perceived at the time; for these people also the question may be regarded as 'perceived,' on account of its being present in the mind.—Or '*vacana*,' may mean *that which is spoken of*; and in that case it would stand for the *subject-matter questioned about*. If it be taken as referring to the *sentence* (and, not to the subject-matter), then the meaning would be that 'they pronounced this sentence.'—If the term '*vacana*' means *that which is spoken of*, the sense is that 'they asked the following question'; and in that case the verb '*abruvan*,' 'addressed,' would have two objects,—'Manu' being the indirect object. In fact, Manu is the object of all the three verbs in the sentence (*approach*, *pay respects to* and *address*).—(1).

VERSE II.

MAY THOU, O BLESSED ONE, EXPLAIN TO US, IN DUE FORM AND IN PROPER ORDER, THE DUTIES OF ALL CASTES AND INTERMEDIATE CASTES!—(2).

Bhāṣya.

The second verse describes what the sages said to Manu, after having approached and worshipped him.

The term '*bhaga*,' 'blessings,' is used for *superiority*, *magnanimity*, *fame*, *strength* and so forth; and '*bhagavān*' is he who possesses all this; that is (in the present context) *Manu*; hence it is he who is addressed by the term 'O blessed one.'

The term '*caste*' is applied to the three castes, '*Brāhmaṇa*,' '*Kṣattriya*,' and '*Vaishya*';—the term 'all' has been added for the purpose of including the '*Śūdra*'; if this was not done, then, the question, emanating from the Great Sages (who represent only the three higher castes), would be restricted to the three castes only.

'*Intermediate*' means *middle*; from the mixture of two castes there arises another imperfect caste; those that are born out of those imperfect unions are the 'intermediate castes,' born in the natural order or the reverse; those known under the names '*Mūrdhāvasikta*,' '*Ambaṣṭha*,' '*Kṣattṛ*,' '*Vaidēhika*' and so forth (*Vide*, Manu 10.7 *et. seq.*), these could not be classed under the caste either of the mother or that of the father; just as the Mule born out of the union of the Horse and the Ass is a distinct species, it is neither the 'horse' nor the 'ass';—on this ground these would not be included under the 'castes'; hence they have been mentioned separately.

Objection—"But the offspring of the union of castes mixed in the natural order is regarded as belonging to the caste of the mother."

It is not so, we reply. From what is said under 10.6 as to these castes being 'similar,' it is clear that they are only 'similar' to the caste of the mother, and not quite the same as this latter. The functions of these intermediate castes also are such as can be learnt only from scriptures; they cannot be ascertained entirely from their natural inclinations (as in the case of lower animals); and in as much as these functions cannot be ascertained by the help of any other source of knowledge, they fall under the term '*Dharma*,' 'duties,' and as such deserve to be expounded in the scriptures. Of the intermediate castes born of unions in the reverse order, such duties as 'not harming others' and so forth are going to be described (by Manu himself under 10.63). When they are spoken of as being 'without any duties,' the 'duties' meant are such as Observances, Fasts and so forth.

'*Yathāwat*,' '*in due form*.'—The suffix '*vati*' denotes *propriety*; the meaning being—'in the form in which performance would be proper.' This 'propriety' also includes such details as—'this is compulsory, that is optional,' 'this is primary, that is secondary,' as also rules relating to substance, place, time, agent and so forth.

'*Anupūrvashah*,' '*in due order*.'—'Order' means *sequence*; the meaning is—'please explain also the order in which the several duties have to be performed.' The order meant is such as—after the performance of the 'Birth-rite,' come respectively 'Tonsure,' 'Initiation' and so forth. The phrase 'in due form' implies completeness in regard to subject-matter; 'order' does not form part of the subject-matter, hence the qualification 'in due order' has been added separately.

The word '*dharma*,' '*duty*,' is found to be used in reference to—(1) the injunction of what should be done, (2) the prohibition of what should not be done,—both these bearing upon transcendental purposes,—and also (3) action in accordance with the said Injunctions and Prohibitions. Whether the denotation of the term applies equally to both, or it applies primarily to one only, and to another only secondarily,—this we do not discuss on the present occasion; and we have already

discussed this in detail in another work (the *Smṛtivivēka*), and it has no direct bearing on the present context. In any case, when it is declared that 'the *Aṣṭakās* should be performed,' what is clearly understood is the *propriety of performing* in relation to the *Aṣṭakās*; and when it is declared that 'the meat of the animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be eaten,' what is clearly understood is the *impropriety of performing* in relation to the eating of the said meat. Whether the *action of the Aṣṭakā* is regarded as '*duty*,' or the *propriety of performing that act*,—it does not make any difference in the ultimate result. And when the form of 'duty' has been duly expounded, that is contrary constitutes '*Adharma*' (sin) follows naturally by implication. Thus what is meant is that '*Dharma*,' 'Duty,' as also '*Adharma*,' 'sin,' both form the subject-matter of the scriptural treatise : the *performance* of the 'Aṣṭakā' is a *Duty*, as also is the *avoidance* of Brahmanā-murder'; the *non-performance* of Aṣṭaka' is a *sin*, as also is the *performance* of Brahmana-murder'; such is the distinction (between 'Duty' and 'Sin' as described in the scriptures).

'*Arhasi*,' '*may you*'—indicates *ability* in the shape of possessing the requisite capacity; and as such expresses the fact of the teacher being a fit and proper person for the expounding the duties; the sense being—'in as much as you are fully able to expound the Duties, hence you are a fit and proper person for that work,—as such you are entreated by us to explain to us the said Duties'; it follows by implication that when a man is a fit and proper person for doing a certain act, that act should be done by him. The term of entreaty 'do please explain to us' is supplied from without.—(2)

VERSE III

THOU ALONE, O LORD, ART CONVERSANT WITH WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, WHICH FORMS THE TRUE IMPORT OF THIS ENTIRE VEDA—WHICH IS ETERNAL, INCONCEIVABLE AND NOT DIRECTLY COGNISABLE.—(3)

Bhāṣya.

At this stage the following question arises—"It has been said that the term 'Duty' is used in the sense of only that activity which tends to accomplish a transcendental purpose; and such activity may consist in the *performing of the Aṣṭakā*, as also in *bowing to Chaityas* and such other acts (prescribed in the heterodox scriptures); and what sort of Duties is going to be expounded in the present Treatise?"

In answer to this we have the third verse, which serves the purpose of pointing out what Duties are going to be expounded and also of further indicating the aptitude of Manu already mentioned.

'*Thou alone*'—without any one to help you; without a second.

'*Sarvasya vidhānasya kāryatattvārthavit.*'—The term '*Vidhāna*,' meaning that by which acts are enjoined, stands for the *scripture*;—it is called '*svayambhu*' in the sense that it is eternal, not a product, not the work of man; and its name is '*Vēda*';—'*entire*' *i.e.*, including the text which is directly found in the Veda, as also that the exact words of which are only inferred; for instance, (*a*) in the text—'*one should perform the Agnihotra, it pertains to thousand men,*—by means of this verse one should worship the Āhavanīya'—we have the Veda directly enjoining what is to be done; the term 'by means of this,' ending as it does with the instrumental case-termination, serving to point out the employment of the mantra-text directly quoted;—(*b*) while in the case of the injunction 'the Aṣṭakās should be performed,' which is found

in the *Smṛti*, we infer, on the strength of this *Smṛti*, the corresponding Vēda text;—similarly, when we read the Mantra-text, 'I am chopping grass, the seat of the Gods,' we at once infer, on the basis of the indicative power of the words of that text, the Vēdic injunction that 'the said text is to be employed in the chopping of grass;' this Mantra is found in that section of the Vēda which deals with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa sacrifice*, and the *chopping of grass* is laid down as to be done in course of that sacrifice; but there is no such direct injunction as that 'the chopping should be done with such and such a Mantra;' and the above-mentioned Mantra-text is found to be capable, by its very form, of indicating the *chopping of grass*; while as regards its being connected in a general way, with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, this follows the fact of its occurring in the same 'context' as the injunction of that sacrifice; and it is by virtue of its own indicative force that it comes to be employed in the chopping of grass. The idea arising in the mind of the student (on noticing the above facts) is as follows:—'From the context it follows that the Mantra-text in question should be used in the performance of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices;—how is this to be done?—well, the natural answer is that it is to be used in the manner in which it is capable of being used; the capacity of a thing, even though not directly mentioned, always helps in determining its use;—what then is the Mantra-text capable of doing?—it is capable of indicating the *chopping of grass*;—hence from the context, and from the capability of the Mantra itself, it follows that it should be employed in the chopping of grass';—as soon as this idea has been arrived at, the corresponding words, 'by this Mantra the chopping of grass should be done,' present themselves to the mind; because as a matter of fact, every concrete conception is preceded by the corresponding verbal expression. The said verbal expression, thus presenting itself to the mind, is called the '*inferred* Vedic text.' The Text thus inferred is regarded as 'Veda,' by virtue of the fact that it owes its existence to the force of two other

Vedic texts—*viz.*, the text laying down the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* and the *Mantra-text* referred to above. Such is the opinion of Kumārila.

Or, the term '*vidhāna*' may be taken as equivalent to '*vidhi*', meaning actual *operation*, the *accomplishment of purpose*; this is called '*svayambhu*' in the sense that it is *eternal*, *i.e.*, handed down by beginningless tradition,—or that *it is prescribed in the eternal Veda*;—'*entire*'—*i.e.*, what is prescribed in the directly available verbal texts, and what is only implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the texts. The Vedic injunction is of two kinds:—(*a*) There is one kind of injunction which is directly expressed by the words; *e.g.*, 'desirous of Brahmic glory, one should offer the *Saurya-Charu*'; here what is expressed is that one who desires Brahmic glory is the fit and proper person to offer the *Saurya-Charu*; and when one proceeds to secure Brahmic glory by means of the said offering, he learns that the procedure of the offering is analogous to the *Āgnēya* offering (which is the archetype of all *Charu-offerings*). In both these cases the idea got at, being derived from the words of the texts, is regarded as 'derived directly from words;' though the former is derived directly from the words and the latter from what is 'expressed by the worlds,' yet, this difference, due to the removal of the latter by one step, does not deprive it of the character of 'being derived from words.' For instance, when the water in the pool is struck by the hand, and it in its turn strikes against some other place; and yet this latter place is regarded as being struck by the hand, though not directly; similarly when pieces of rubber are thrown down, they rise and fall, and all the subsequent acts of rising and falling are the indirect effects of the first downward impulse imparted to them. Exactly analogous is the case of the injunctions in question: Every ectypal sacrifice is related to a particular form of procedure (borrowed from its archetype). Similarly when we meet with the injunction 'one should perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice,' we argue that no injunction is possible except in reference to

a fit and proper person capable of (and having a motive for) performing it, and hence come to the conclusion that the person so capable is one who desires Heaven; this idea being thus implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the text. It is in view of this two-fold character of injunctions (and enjoined acts) that we have the term 'entire.' In fact the purpose of adding the epithet 'entire' is to indicate that *Smṛtis* have their source in the Veda. This we shall explain under Discourse II.

An objection is raised:—"As a matter of fact, *Viḍhi* is something in the form of what should be done, expressed by the injunctive and such other verbal expressions; and this, in all cases, must be directly expressed by actual words; under the circumstances, what do you mean by saying that there are two kinds of injunction,—that the term 'one should offer' denotes something to be done, and the procedure of the offering is indicated by implication in the manner described above?"

There is no force in this objection. As a matter of fact, in the case of the injunctive words '*nirvapēt*,' 'should offer,' '*yajēta*,' 'should sacrifice' and the like, even though what is expressed by the verbal root itself may be comprehended, the full conception of *what is to be done* is not obtained until we have comprehended the other factors,—such as the character of the person fit for the performance, the procedure to be adopted, and the actual details of the act to be performed; it is only as equipped with all these factors that the Injunction becomes comprehended in its complete form. In view of this fact, there is nothing incongruous in regarding the said factors also as denoted by the Injunctive word.

This is what the text means by the epithet '*achintya*,' '*inconceivable*'—which means 'not directly perceptible.' What is directly perceived is said to be 'apprehended,' and not 'conceived,' or 'remembred' [so that if the Veda were something directly perceived, the epithet 'inconceivable' would have no force; things like the Veda can only be *conceived of*, and the Veda isnot even that].

'*Not directly cognisable;*'—*i.e.*, that which has got to be assumed or inferred, as forming the source of several assertions made in the *Smṛti;* as a matter of fact, such Vedic texts are not *perceived*, hence it is called 'not directly cognisable.'—Or '*not directly cognisable*' may be taken in the sense of *incapable of having its extent exactly defined*, by reason of its being very extensive; the Veda being divided into several rescensions, cannot be exactly defined by all persons; and on this account also it may be called '*inconceivable;*' even in ordinary parlance, people are found to say—'what to say of others; this cannot be even conceived of.' The mind can conceive of all things; but the Veda is so extensive that it cannot be conceived of even by the mind. Thus the two epithets ('inconceivable' and 'not directly cognisable') serve to indicate that the Veda is beyond the reach of the internal as well as the external organs of perception; *i.e.*, it is very extensive; and this mention of the extensiveness of the Veda serves as an inducement to the Teacher; the meaning being—'it is you alone who have learnt the Veda which is so extensive, hence you alone are *conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of the said Veda.*'

The term '*Kārya*,' 'what ought to be done,' stands for *the act to be performed*; in reference to which the man is prompted to be the *performer*, (in such terms as)—'this should be done by you,' 'this should not be done by you,' 'the Agnihotra should be performed' 'the eating of the flesh of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be done.' *Avoidance* also is a kind of 'acting;' *e.g.*, the 'non-doing of Brāhmaṇa-murder' constitutes the 'performance' or 'acting' of the *avoidance* (of Brāhmaṇa-murder). *Activity* is 'acting;' so is also 'desisting from activity;' and the name 'acting' is not restricted to only that which is accomplished by means of instruments and agents set in motion; in fact, when such 'acting' is possible, if one desists from it, this *desisting* also is 'acting.' For instance, when it is asserted that 'the man who takes wholesome food lives long,' what is meant is that the man who takes his food at the proper

time, and who *does not eat* at the improper time; as *desisting from eating* is also 'wholesome.'

Or, the word '*Kārya*' may be taken as indicating the Injunction and the Prohibition; as these alone form the essence of the Veda; the other parts of it, which are merely descriptive of certain happenings,—such passages for instance as 'he wept, and because he wept, he became known as *Rudra*,'—are not *true*; they are not meant to be taken in their literal sense, they are meant to be construed along with an injunctive passage and serving the purpose of commending what has been laid down in that injunctive passage. For instance, the descriptive passage just quoted—beginning with 'he wept' and, ending with ' there is weeping in his house within a year'—is to be construed with the injunctive passage—'Therefore silver should not be placed on the grass;' and being deprecatory of the *placing of silver*, it serves the purpose of commending the prohibition of that placing of silver. This is what is meant by the dictum—'the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to *what has to be accomplished*, and not *what is already accomplished;*' and what is mentioned in the *Arthavāda* or Descriptive Passages is what is already accomplished; and what is already accomplished cannot be cognised as *something to be done*; what however is cognised is that the description is supplementary to some injunction; if then it were taken to be true in its own literal sense, it could not be supplementary to any injunction; and this would militate against the syntactical connection between the two passages—descriptive and injunctive; and so long as two passages can be taken as syntactically connected and constituting a single compound sentence, it is not right to take them as two distinct sentences. [The reverse process of taking the injunction as supplementary to the description would not be right; for] as a matter of fact, what is yet to be accomplished could not be subservient to what is already accomplished; specially because, if this were so (and the injunction itself were not literally true), then the Veda would contain no injunction of anything at all; and it would thereby cease to be an authoritative

source of knowledge. This would involve the further incongruity, that we would have to deny the well-recognised fact of the injunctive and other words denoting *injunction*. It is with a view to all this that the revered Manu has declared 'something to be done' as the 'essence' of the Veda. Jaimini also in the *Pūrvamīmānsā-Sūtra* (1.1.2)—'Duty is that desirable thing which is prescribed by the Vedic injunction'—has distinctly declared that the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to *what is to be done*.

The term of address 'Lord' has been used on the understanding that the personage addressed is well-known to be possessed of the capacity to expound duty,—such capacity being due to his being endowed with a high degree of knowledge of all things. The meaning thus is—'O Lord, may you, who are fully able to expound Duty, explain the Duties to us.'

Being thus questioned by means of the first three verses, he promised, in the following verse, what he was asked to do. (3)

II. Manu's Answer

VERSE IV

BEING THUS QUESTIONED BY THE HIGH-SOULED GREAT SAGES, HE, POSSESSED OF ILLIMITABLE VIGOUR, RECEIVED THEM WITH REVERENCE, AND WITH PROPER COURTESY ANSWERED THEM—'LISTEN.'—(4)

Bhāṣya.

'*He*'—Manu—'*possessed of illimitable vigour, being thus questioned by the high-souled Great Sages, answered them—"Listen."*'

'*Thus*'—in the aforesaid manner; the word 'thus' which denotes *method,* includes the *matter* as well as the *manner* of the question; hence '*thus questioned*' means 'thus questioned, *i.e.,* questioned about Duties—he answered.'

Or, the word 'thus' may be taken as denoting *manner* only. As a matter of fact, however the word '*questioned*' already brings to the mind the details (matter as well as manner) of what has been questioned about; hence the meaning is—'what he was questioned about, that he answered;' thus the *question* and the *answer* come to have the same objective.

Under this explanation the word 'thus' becomes superfluous, and only serves the purpose of filling the gap in the metre. Under the former explanation however, the word 'thus' itself serves the purpose of showing that the 'questioning' and the 'answering' have both the same objective.

The word '*Samyak,*' '*with proper courtesy,*' qualifies the *answering*: 'he answered with proper courtesy'—*i.e., gladly,* not with anger or any other form of displeasure.

'*Possessed of illimitable vigour*'—with undiminished power of speech; he whose 'vigour,' power, capacity of exposition, is 'illimitable,' infinite.

The epithet '*high-souled*,' serves to show that there is no incompatibility in the persons being 'Great Sages,' and at the same time 'questioners' (as if they themselves did not know what they were asking about); hence it is said 'he answered the Great Sages.' It is the philanthropic person that is called 'high-souled,' hence the meaning is that though they themselves knew all about Duties,—otherwise they would not be 'Great Sages,'—yet they questioned Manu for the benefit of other people; the idea in their minds being as follows—'Manu is a Sage whose authoritative character is better known,—what he says is always respected by people,—he is always approached with trust and confidence,—hence for the expounding of the treatise, we shall make him our Teacher,—and when he is questioned by us, he will be regarded by the people as still more trustworthy.'

It is this explanation that justifies the statement in the text regarding Manu having *received them with reverence*.' If it were not as we have explained, what would be the meaning of the 'reverence' shown by the Teacher to the Pupil? The word of the text which means 'having received with reverence' must be explained as a participle formed of the root '*arch*' (to worship)with the prefix '*ā*' and the participial affix '*lyap*' [as without the prefix, the form would be '*archayitvā*']. Another reading (which removes the difficulty) is '*archayitvā tān*.'

In connection with the present verse, the following question has been raised—"If the whole of this Treatise has been composed by Manu himself, it is not right to attribute it to another person, as is done in the statement—'being questioned by them, *he* answered'; the proper form would have been—'being questioned by them, *I* answered.' If, on the other hand, someone else is the author of the Treatise, then why should it be called '*Mānava*' (of Manu)?"

There is no force in this objection. In the first place, it is a well known fact that in most cases the authors of Treatises state their own views as if emanating from other persons,—making use of such expressions as—'in this connection *they say*' or '*they* meet this argument thus,' and so forth; and the form 'being questioned by them *I* answered' would not be in keeping with such usage; the reason underlying this fact is that the older the person the more authoritative he is regarded to be by the people; it is for this reason that we find Jaimini (1.1.5) stating his own view as emanating from 'Bādarāyaṇa.'

Or (another explanation is that) the Treatise is a compilation made and related by Bhṛgu; and since the original *Smṛti* [which is, in the present Treatise related by Bhṛgu] was compiled (from teachings received directly from Prajāpati) by Manu,—it is styled '*Mānava*' (of Manu).

He answered the great sages;—what was the answer? —'Listen to what I have been questioned about.' (4).

III. Origin of the World

VERSE V

THIS (WORLD) WAS IN EXISTENCE IN THE FORM, AS IT WERE, OF DENSE DARKNESS,—UNPERCEIVED, UNDIFFERENTIATED, INCOGITABLE, (HENCE) INCOGNIZABLE; AS IT WAS WHOLLY MERGED IN DEEP SLEEP. (5).

Bhāsya.

At the very outset there arises an objection—"Where we began and whereto we are carried! Manu was asked to expound the duties laid down in the scriptures, and he promised to expound them; under the circumstances, the description of the world in its undifferentiated state (with which the present verse begins) is wholly irrelevant and purposeless. In fact it becomes a true case of the well-known proverb—'Being questioned about mangoes, he describes the Kovidāra tree.' Further, there is no authority in support of what is here described; nor is any useful purpose served by it. So the whole of this First Discourse need not be studied at all."

Our answer to the above is follows:—What the First Discourse does is to describe the fact of the Treatise having an extensive scope; so that what is described here is the whole range of the cosmic process, beginning with Brahman down to the inanimate objects, as forming the basis of *Dharma* and *Adharma*, Right and Wrong; for instance, verse 49 describes the vegetable objects as 'wrapped in manifold Darkness, the result of their own acts' [which shows that plants also are related to, and affected by, Right and Wrong]; and later on, again in Discourse 1 , verse 23, it will be stated that 'having recognised, by

means of his intellect, these transitions of the individual soul, through merit and demerit, (Right and Wrong), one should fix his attention upon the Right.' From all this it follows that Right is the cause of superiority (in the scale of existence) and Wrong of the reverse; thus the present treatise, expounding the exact nature of Right and Wrong, serves an extensive purpose, and as such should be studied. Such is the purport of the First Discourse.

The authority for what is declared in the present verse consists of *Mantra*, *Arthavāda* and *Inference*. As for the *Mantra* we have the following (in *Ṛgveda*, 10.129.3)—'Darkness existed, enveloped in darkness, uncognised in the beginning; this whole existed in a fluid state; the gross was contained in the subtile; the one entity that existed came to be born, by virtue of austerities.' The meaning is as follows:—'At the Universal Dissolution, the Sun, the Moon, the Fire and other sources of light having been destroyed, there existed Darkness alone;—this (subtile) Darkness was 'enveloped,' wrapped, in Darkness in the gross form; at this time there was no cogniser; hence, there being no one to cognise things, there was no *cognition* of anything; therefore Darkness is described as enveloped in darkness;—'in the beginning,' *i.e.* before elemental creation, it was 'uncognised,' unknown; 'this whole existed in the fluid state,' *i.e.* every active or mobile object was motionless; the 'gross,' the larger, 'was contained in the subtile,' the smaller; *i.e.* every differentiated object was resolved into its original evolvents; this indicates the undifferentiated state of the world; and the last foot of the Mantra describes the earliest stage of evolution; that 'one entity' which 'existed' 'came to be born, by virtue of austerities,' *i.e.* by the force of austerity it became manifested in differentiated forms; *i.e.* under the influence of past acts, it came into existence again; or, it may mean that under the conditions described, Hiraṇyagarbha, came into existence by himself, by virtue of his austerities; as described later on (verse 6)—'Thereupon the self-born &c. &c.'

The possibility of Universal Dissolution is proved by Inference: That which has been found to be destroyed in one part is also found to be destroyed in its entirety; *e.g.* at one time a single house is found to be burnt, and at another time the entire village is burnt (this is the Major Premise); all such things as are produced by active agents,—such for instance, as houses, palaces and the like are found to be liable to destruction (this is the second step in the inferential process);—this world, consisting of rivers, oceans, mountains &c., is the work of an active agent (this is the third step);—hence it follows that, like the house &c., the whole world will come to destruction (this is the final conclusion). It will not be right to argue that the fact of the world being the work of an active agent is itself not yet established;—for that fact also is deduced from the fact of the world having, like the house and such things, a particular shape;—all this constitutes the Inference (upon which the statements in the present verse are based).

We do not make any attempt either at clarifying (discussing and strengthening) the said proofs, or at refuting (the counter-arguments); because the present treatise does not deal with proofs and reasonings; and reasonings could not be fully grasped until they have been fully stated and examined; and if all this were done, the work would become a treatise on 'Reasonings,' not on 'Law;' and further, it would become too prolix.

This subject (of Creation and Dissolution) in its details shall be found described (in verses 7 *et seq.*) and the process described shall be in some places in accordance with the Purāṇas and sometimes in accordance with the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines. But the knowing or not knowing of those details does not make any difference in *Right* and *Wrong*; hence we are not going to deal with it in detail. If any person stands in need of the detailed account of the process, he should search for it in the said sources of information. What we undertake to do is to construe

and explain the words of the text, and this is all that we shall do. A brief exposition of the purport of the Discourse we have already given.

'*This*,' world, '*was in existence*,' '*in the form of dense Darkness*'—*i.e.* as if it were dense darkness; the term '*bhūta*,' which has several meanings, is here used to denote *similarity*; just as in the statement '*yat tad bhinnēṣvabhinnam chhinnēṣvachhinnam sāmānyabhūtam sa shabdaḥ*' ('that which remains the same even though the things denoted by it are diverse; which remains undestroyed even when the things denoted are destroyed, *which is, as if it were, a Generality*, this is the Word'), the word '*samānyābhūtaḥ*' means 'as if it were a generality.'

"What is it that constitutes the similarity of the World to Darkness?"

The answer is given by the next word '*unperceived*;' in as much as all the products with their diverse differentiated forms are at the time resolved in the Evolvent Original, the world is *not perceived*.

It might have been cognised by means of Inference; but that also is not possible; as it is '*undifferentiated*'; the 'differential' meant is that character which distinguishes one thing from another; and this also is dissolved at the time; for the simple reason that all products, with their distinguishing features, have been destroyed.

'*Incogitable*'—that form in which the World existed was not capable of being even thought of, in that form; 'cogitation' here stands for all forms of Inference; the meaning being that at the time there was no kind of Inference—neither from generals to particulars, nor from particulars to generals—available, by means of which the World could be cognised.—For these reasons it was also '*incognizable*.'

From all this it might follow that the World did not exist at all, and it was only a non-existent World that came into existence (subsequently); with a view to preclude

this, the text adds—'*as if wholly merged in deep sleep.*' As a matter of fact, the *existent* can never come into existence out of the *non-existent*; it has been declared in the Upaniṣads (the *Chhāndogya*)—'O dear one, this was, in the beginning existent; how could the existent be born out of the non-existent?'—All that is meant is that the World is incognizable by the instrumentality of the ordinary means of cognition, which operate through, and bear upon, only differentiated things; that such is its condition is known from the scriptures, which also are as transcendental in their character as the ante-natal condition of the World.

'*As if merged in deep sleep,*'—'deep sleep' stands fo rthat condition of repose which is beyond the conditions of waking and dreaming; and it has been cited only by way of illustration; the meaning being—'just as the soul, in the condition of deep sleep, remains entirely unconscious of any thoughts or sufferings, and free from all notions of diversity,—and yet it cannot be said to be non-existent, because on waking, it is recognised as being the same that was asleep, as shown by the idea *I have slept soundly*,—exactly the same is the case with the World, as is shown by the scriptures that describe things as they have actually existed, and also proved, for those who depend upon reasonings, by what appear to be sound Inferences.'

'*Was in existence*'—the past tense has been used, because the condition described can never be known by any person; hence it is that it has been described as 'incognizable.'

'*Wholly*'—this shows that the dissolution is not *partial* but *total*. (5)

VERSE VI

THEREAFTER, THE SUPREME BEING HIRAṆYAGARBHA, SELF-BORN, UNMANIFEST AND BRINGING INTO VIEW THIS (UNIVERSE), APPEARED,—DISPELLING DARKNESS AND HAVING HIS (CREATIVE) POWER OPERATING UPON THE ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES AND OTHER THINGS. (6)

Bhāṣya.

After the above described Great Night;—the '*Self-born,*' he who comes into existence by himself; *i.e.* who takes up a body by his own will, his taking the body not being dependent upon his past acts, as it is in the case of beings undergoing births and deaths.

'*Unmanifest,*'—not cognizable by people devoid of ability to contemplate and other powers produced by the practice of *yoga*. Or, it would be better to read '*avyaktam*' (in the Accusative), making it an epithet of '*idam,*' 'this;' the meaning being 'this universe which was in its unmanifest condition.'

'*Bringing into view*'—making it perceptible in the form of the grosser products; that is, he by whose wish the World comes into existence.

'*Appeared*'—the term '*Prāduḥ*'—denotes *visibility.*

'*Dispelling darkness,*'—'darkness' stands for the state of dissolution; he dispells, sets aside, that state; he creates the World afresh and is therefore said to 'dispel darkness.'

'*Elemental Substances,*' earth and the rest.

'*Other things*'—refers to Sound and other qualities of the said substances;—he has his 'power' *i.e.* creative power—'operating,' acting, upon the said substances &c. The Elemental Substances by themselves are incapable of producing the World; when however the requisite potency is instilled into them by him, they become transformed into the shape of trees and other things. The term 'Elemental Substances' here does not stand for the substances, which at the beginning of 'creation,'

exist in the form of potencies lying latent in Primordial Matter.

Another reading is '*mahābhūtānuvṛttaujāḥ*;' '*anuvṛttam*, meaning *bent upon*; the meaning of the epithet remains the same as before. (6)

VERSE VII

HE,—WHO IS APPREHENDED BEYOND THE SENSES, WHO IS SUBTILE, UNMANIFEST AND ETERNAL, ABSORBED IN ALL CREATED THINGS AND INCONCEIVABLE,—APPEARED BY HIMSELF. (7)

Bhāṣya.

'*He, who*'—these two pronouns refer to something well-known, that is (in the present context) the 'Supreme Brahman,' he who is described, in the Vedānta texts as also in other philosophical systems, in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as having the qualities going to be described in the present verse.

'*He appeared by himself*'—*i.e.* took a body for himself; the root '*bhā*,' having several meanings, is here used in the sense of *coming into existence*; or, it may be taken in its usual sense of *shining*; the meaning being that he was self-effulgent, and did not need the light from the sun or other sources.

'*Atīndriya*' means that which is *beyond the senses*, the compound being taken as an *Avyayībhāva*; the compound '*atīndriyagrāhyaḥ*' being included under the general rule of compounds formulated in Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 2.1.4; the meaning being that *he is apprehended beyond the senses*, he never comes within range of the senses; it is an entirely different kind of cognition, the intuitive cognition of the *yogin*, by which he is apprehended. Or, the compound '*that which is beyond the senses*,' may be taken as standing for the *Mind*, which, being imperceptible, is not perceived by the senses; it is for this reason that the *Vaishēṣikas* have held Mind to

be 'cognisable by means of Inference,' as stated in the *Nyāya-sūṭra* (1.1.16)—'The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously is indicative of the Mind.' And it is by means of this Mind alone that the said Being is apprehended. Says the revered Vyāsa also—'He is not perceptible by the eye, nor by the other senses; he is apprehended by means of the clear Mind, by persons endowed with subtle powers of cognition';—*i.e.* not sullied by the defects of passion &c.;—by persons who have acquired the powers of subtle perception, by virtue of their being entirely devoted to the worship of the said Being.

'*Subtile*'—*i.e. as if* he were 'subtile,' small; inreality he is not the substratum of any such finite or concrete predications or concepts as 'large' or 'small;' he is, in fact, beyond all such predications; as is declared in the following passage—'He is free even from the semblance of all predications; he has been variously conceived of on the strength of scriptures and inference, he is beyond all taint of duality, beyond affirmation and denial, beyond sequentiality and non-sequentiality, beyond reality and unreality; he is the very soul of the universe, and becomes cognised only by means of discriminative wisdom.'

Because he is 'subtile,' he is '*unmanifest, eternal*;' being of subtile nature, he is endowed with beginningless and endless puissance. Some people have held that the position of 'Hiraṇyagarbha' is attained by (ordinary beings) through (meritorious) acts; according to these people also he is 'everlasting,' in the sense that, though he has beginning, he has no end; because his condition, which consists in being the experiencer of the fruits emanating from his original act of bringing about creation, never comes to an end.

He is described as '*absorbed in all created things*', in the sense that he is the very soul of things, having his mind intent upon the idea that 'all things are to be created' by me;' when for instance, the jar made of clay, having its body built out of clay, is said to be 'absorbed in (consisting of) the clay;' similarly when a certain person ponders too

much over a thing, he is described figuratively, as 'absorbed' in that thing; as we find in such expressions as—'this person is absorbed in women,' 'he is absorbed in the Ṛgvēda,' 'he is absorbed in the Yajurvēda,' and so forth. Or, it may be in view of the *Advaita*, 'Nondualistic,' Philosophy, by which sentient as well as insentient things have no existence apart from Hiraṇyagarbha, all being his illusory modifications; so that these modifications consisting of the created things, and these being non-different from him, it is only right that he should be described as 'absorbed in (consisting of) created things.'—

"But how can the single entity undergo illusory modifications? It would be inconsistent with its unity."

The answer given by the upholders of the theory of 'illusory modifications' is as follows:—When the surface of the sea is struck by the winds, high waves rise out of it, and these waves are not entirely apart from the sea, nor are they totally absorbed in it; and they cannot be described as either 'different' or 'non-different' from it; exactly similar is the case with the 'illusory modifications' of Brahman.

The term 'also' may also be supplied to the words of the text; the sense being—'even though, in his own pristine form, he is imperceptible, he becomes perceptible in the form of the 'modifications;' similarly with the epithet '*subtile*;' the implication of 'also' being that he is gross in the form of the grosser modifications; similarly, he is '*unmanifest*' and *also* 'manifest,' 'eternal' and *also* 'not eternal,' '*absorbed in created things*' and *also* 'free from their forms (and limitations);' all this being in reference to him in the condition of 'modifications.'

'*Inconceivable*'—*i.e.* his character is marvellous, he being possessed of remarkable powers.—(7)

IV. Creation of Water

VERSE VIII

DESIRING TO CREATE THE SEVERAL KINDS OF CREATED THINGS, HE, IN THE BEGINNING, BY MERE WILLING, PRODUCED, OUT OF HIS OWN BODY, WATER; AND IN THAT HE THREW THE SEED.—(8)

Bhāṣya.

'*He*'—who,—by virtue of the qualities described in the preceding verse, and also by virtue of such Vedic texts as 'In the beginning there appeared Hiraṇyagarbha &c.' (Ṛgvēda 10.121.1)—acquired the title of '*Hiraṇyagarbha.*'

'*Several kinds of created things*'—things possessed of various forms.

'*Desiring to create,*'—wishing to bring into existence.

'*In the beginning,*' first of all—'produced,' called into being—'*water*;' '*out of his own body,*' *i.e.*, the body assumed by himself (on manifestation). Or, according to the Advaita Philosophy, 'Primordial Matter' is the 'body' of Hiraṇyagarbha here spoken of; it is '*his own*' in the sense that it follows his wish, and is the cause of the production of all bodies.

The next question that arises is—"When he created the body of all living beings, did he do so by means of some physical act, such as digging with the spade and so forth (as the potter does in the making of the Jar)?"

The answer is *no.*—"How then?"—'*By mere willing*'—by the mere act of wishing 'let water be produced.'

The following further question is raised—"Since the Earth and other things were non-existent at the time, what was the receptacle or standing ground of the water that was produced?"

The question is addressed to the winds! [*lit.*, it is as good as addressed to others!]. It might just as well be asked—what is the receptacle or standing ground for the Supreme Lord himself when he has assumed a body. If it be explained that so far as the powers of the creator himself are concerned, no questions arise, for the simple reason that he is possessed of unique powers,—then the same may be said in regard to water and the other products also, which may be regarded as having similar unique powers.

In that, water, *he threw*, scattered, *the seed*, the semen. (8)

V. Birth of Brahmā

VERSE IX

THAT BECAME THE GOLDEN EGG, RESPLENDENT LIKE THE SUN; IN THAT (EGG) HE (HIRAṆYAGARBHA) HIMSELF WAS BORN AS BRAHMĀ, THE 'GRAND-FATHER' OF THE WHOLE WORLD.—(9)

Bhāṣya.

First of all Primordial Matter develops in the form of Clay; *i.e.*, on account of the contact of Hiraṇyagarbha's 'seed,' it become solidified; and this is what is described as having become an '*egg*.'—'*Golden*,' of gold, made up of gold; *i.e.*, in its brilliance it resembled the thing made of gold.

"But this statement (that the egg was of gold) is contained in the scriptures, and we do not find any such term as 'like' or 'resembling' (which would have justified the interpretation of 'golden' as *ressembling gold*),—how then can we, in the absence of any other authority, explain the term figuratively?"

Our answer to the question is as follows:—Later on we find the statement—'by means of the two forces, he created Heaven and Earth' (Verse 13); and as a matter of fact, this Earth is found to consist of clay, and not of gold entirely; and it is in view of this fact that we have taken the epithet 'golden' figuratively.

'*Sahasrāmshuḥ*,' lit. 'thousand-rayed,' is the Sun;—'*amshu*' means *rays*; and the resplendence of the egg was like that of the rays of the Sun.

'*In that egg he himself was born*,' came into existence, *as Brahmā*,'—Brahmā is Hiraṇyagarbha himself;—the exact

signification of the term 'himself' has already been explained; the meaning is that he had originally (as Hiraṇyagarbha) assumed a body by the force of occult powers, he gave up that body and entered within the egg.—Or, it may be that when he created water, Hiraṇyagarbha had no body, hence he took up a body within the egg.—Or again, the being spoken of as 'he who' (in verse 7) was different from the Brahmā who is described here as being born in the egg; this would be in keeping with what is going to be stated (in verse 11) in regard to the latter being 'created by him,' *i.e.*, created by the Supreme Lord (described in verse 7).

"But (under this last explanation) how could he be said to be 'himself born?'—and the text apparently speaks, as 'Brahmā,' of him who was '*himself born*' (in the egg)."

This does not affect the position; the son is often called by the name of the Father, when he is described as the 'self being born out of itself.'

The fact of the matter however is that what the Teacher has asserted is based upon scriptural texts, which have no bearing upon the matter at all [for being mere *Arthavāda*, they are not meant to describe what is directly expressed by the words]; so that we need not lay stress upon what is said (in the text) in this connection; specially because, so far as the expounding of Duties is concerned, it does not matter at all whether Hiraṇyagarbha himself was born in the egg, or he created some other being.

'*The grand-father of the whole world*'—is a proper name, applied figuratively. That it has to be taken so is proved by the fact that the Being described is not literally the 'Grandfather' of the people; what the attributing of this proper name is meant to indicate is that the being described is an object of great reverence, the term 'Grand-father' being chosen, because the Grand-father commands greater reverence than even the Father. (9).

VI. Meaning of the term 'Nārāyaṇa'

VERSE X

WATER IS CALLED 'NARA,'—WATER BEING THE OFFSPRING OF NARA; SINCE WATER WAS THE FIRST THING CREATED BY (OR, THE ORIGINAL RESIDENCE OF) THAT BEING, HE IS, ON THAT ACCOUNT, DESCRIBED AS 'NĀRĀYAṆA.'—(10)

Bhāṣya.

The Being just described is the same who, here and there in the scriptures, is described under the name '*Nārāyaṇa*,' as possessed of a superior degree of creative and cognitive powers, and hence being the Personal Creator of the world; the mere difference in names does not necessarily imply difference in the things denoted; so that the Beings described under the names '*Brahmā*,' '*Nārāyaṇa*' and '*Mahēshvara*' are one and the same; though they form the objects of diverse forms of worship, yet they do not differ among themselves; as we shall show under Discourse XII.

How this is (*i.e.* how *Brahmā* is the same as '*Nārāyaṇa*') is explained now:—'*Water is called Nara*,'—described under the name of,—'*Nara*.'

In answer to the objection—"There is no such usage current among experienced persons; nor is it generally known that water is called *Nara*,"—the Author adds:—'*Water being the offspring of Nara*,'—the supreme Being (Hiraṇyagarbha, described in verse 8 as having created water) might well be known under the name '*Nara*,' *Person*; and water is his '*offspring*;' hence water is spoken of as 'Nara,' the name of the father is often applied to the child, *e.g.*, the 'sons of Vashiṣṭha,' the revered sages *Tāvabhru, Maṇḍu and Lomaka*, are spoken of as '*Vashiṣṭhāḥ*'; and such usage is based upon the

figurative identification of the child with the father.—'*Since*' because—'*Water,*' known as '*Nara,*' was '*the first thing created by*'—or it was his *container* when he lay in the womb (egg)—'*he is, on that account, described as Nārāyaṇa.*'

In the sense of '*he whose container is Nara*' the compound should be '*narāyaṇa;*' but the first vowel may be taken as lengthened according to Pāṇini's Sūtra 6.3.134, which justifies such lengthening in several other cases also,; just as we have in the word '*pūruṣa*' (which is a variant for '*puruṣa*');—or we may have the lengthening due to the affix '*aṇ*' in the sense of 'mass' [so that *nāra* would be 'mass of water,' and 'he who has this mass of water as his *container, ayana,*' would be '*nārāyaṇa*']. (10).

VII. Nature of Brahmā

VERSE XI

THAT WHICH IS THE CAUSE—UNMANIFEST, ETERNAL AND PARTAKING OF THE NATURE OF THE EXISTENT AND THE NON-EXISTENT,—THE BEING PRODUCED BY THAT (CAUSE) IS DESCRIBED AMONG PEOPLE AS 'BRAHMĀ.'—(11)

Bhāṣya.

The '*cause*' spoken of here is one who is always the *cause*, never the *product;* the formation of his body is not dependent upon the will of any other being; he is endowed with a natural supremacy all his own;—'*unmanifest and eternal*' as already explained (under verse 7);—'*pertaking of the nature of the existent and the non-existent*';—'*sadasat*' stands for the '*sat*,' '*existent*,' *and the* '*asat*,' *non-existent*'; and the said 'cause' is one whose '*nature*,' character, consists of the said 'existent and non-existent.'

"But how can a single entity partake of the two contradictory characters of the 'existent' and the 'non-existent'?"

The answer to this is as follows:—In as much as people of the present day cannot form any idea of such a being, the cause becomes incapable of being spoken of as 'existent,' and hence is described as '*partaking of the nature of the non-existent*; and yet, in as much as the fact of the said being being the cause of the entire world is known from the scriptures, it is described as '*partaking of the nature of the existent*;' thus the description of Brahman as both ('existent' and 'non-existent') is not incongruous, being based, as it is, upon the difference in the character of the persons conceiving of it.

"As a matter of fact, this is true of all things; everything is 'existent' in its own form and 'non-existent' in the form

of other things; why then should it be stated that this is not incongruous in the case of *Brahman* only?"

The answer to this is as follows:—Under the philosophy of 'Non-duality' nothing except Brahman being '*existent*,' what is that *other thing* which (while existent in its own form) could be spoken of as 'non-existent' *in the form of Brahman*?

'*The being produced by that*,'—being brought into existence, being created within the egg; this Being '*is described among people as Brahmā*'; the being, who is found mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* and other works as seated here and there for the purpose of granting boons to such *Dēvas*, *Asuras* and *Ṛṣis* as have performed severe austerities,—he was the first to be created by the afore-mentioned Supreme Being, the Highest Brahman.

[*A different explanation of verses 3--11*]

Other people have explained verses 3 *et seq.* in a different manner.

'*This*' (in verse 3) refers by direct gesticulation to the *world*;—the '*vidhāna*,' creation, 'of this entire' world *is of*—*i.e.*, belongs to—the '*self-born*.'—It is '*inconceivable*,' marvellous, wonderful, very extensive;—'*not directly cognisable*,' '*aprameyam*,' incapable of being known by all persons. This is what is stated in the Veda also—'Who knows it? Who has described it here? Whence have these been born? Whence this creation?' (*Ṛgvēda*, 3.54.5). That is to say,—Does this entire world come into existence through some material cause? Or is it all a mere Idea, as held by the Bauddha? Is it dependent upon the will of a Supreme Being? Or is it dependent only upon the acts of the beings born? Or is it merely a natural process?—All this cannot be rightly ascertained: similarly it cannot be ascertained whether the creation of the world proceeds from the '*Mahat*' downwards (as held by the *Sāṅkhyas*) or from the Diad downwards (as held by the *Vaishēṣikas*).—'*Of all this*,' '*you know* (A) *the* '*karya*' *product*, (B) *the* '*tattva*' *real character and* (C) *the*

'*artha*' *true purpose*,'—'*Kāryatattvārthavit*.' (A) '*Product*,' —*i.e.* (*a*) the 'Principle of Egoism' is the 'product' of *Mahat*,' (*b*) the subtile 'Rudimentary Elements' are the product of the 'Principle of Egoism,' (*c*) the Five gross 'Elementary Substances' are the product of the 'Rudimentary Elements,' (*d*) the eleven Sense-organs are the product of the 'Principle of Egoism'; (*e*) of the gross substances the product consists of the ordinary material objects, from Brahmā down to the tuft of grass,—a fact that is clearly recognised.—(B) '*Real character*'—nature,—for instance, (*a*) the '*Mahat*' consists of *mere materiality*, the entire Primordial Matter in the state of modification being called '*Mahat*,' according to the declaration (in *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 22) that 'the *Mahat* proceeds from *Prakṛti*,'—this '*prakṛti*' being synonymous with '*Pradhāna*,' 'Primordial Matter;'—(*b*) the real character of the 'Principle of Egoism' consists of the mere 'notion of I;'—(*c*) the real character of the subtile elements consists in their forming the objects of unspecified or undifferentiated cognition.—(C) '*Purpose*'—the fact that—'this thing is for the purpose of man, it serves man's purpose in such and such a manner, it accomplishes such and such a purpose.'—Though as a matter of fact, for one who is seeking for the knowledge of duties, the fact of the Teacher being cognisant with the process of the world's creation is of no use at all,—nor does it form a proper subject for enquiry,—yet, in view of the fact that the process cannot be learnt from any other source, and that there is diversity of opinion among the Great Sages themselves, it does become a fit subject for them to ask and for Manu to explain. Thus what the verse means is this—'The subject that does not come within the range of any of the six Means of Cognition, that also you know with your intuitive eye,—as for Duty it is described in the Veda, and as such it must be known to you'; and this is an eulogy of the Teacher, bearing directly upon the main subject-matter.

Being encouraged by the above eulogy, the Teacher proceeds to explain the subject of World-creation—'*Āsīt idam*;' '*this was in existence*,' etc. (verse 5);—'*thereafter the self-*

born, etc., etc.' (verse 6). It is Primordial Matter that is referred to by all these terms.—(1) It is '*self-born*' in the sense that it is by itself that it is 'born,' evolves, undergoes modifications, in the form of '*Mahat*' and other principles; there is no such self-established being as 'the Supreme Lord,' whose will Primordial Matter obeys; on the other hand, it is in the very nature of things that Primordial Matter, in the form of the Root Evolvent, undergoes modifications; just in the same manner as milk (which is a non-intelligent entity), modifying into co-agulated milk, becomes solidified in the form of the Curd.—(2) Primordial Matter is called '*supreme being*' in the sense that it is master of its own activity.—(3) It operates upon things like the elemental substances and other things [this is what is meant by the epithet '*having its power operating upon elemental substances and other things*']; '*power*' stands for capacity or energy for its own activity; the term '*ādi*' ('and other things') signifies *method* and *restriction*, so that the unmanifested Primordial Matter becomes the cause of Mahat and other things [which it would not be if '*mahābhūtādi*' were taken as 'things beginning with the elemental substances'].—(4) It is described as '*dispelling darkness*' in the sense that when Primordial Matter changes from its pristine subtile (non-evolvent) condition into the evolvent condition, it becomes resplendent with light.—The masculine gender of the epithets referring to Primordial Matter, *Pradhāna* (which is Neuter) may be explained as due to the word '*puruṣa*,' ('Being') understood (which is Masculine); and the word '*puruṣa*' is often found to be used in the sense of Primordial Matter and other things, as for instance in verse 1.19, where we have the expression 'of the said seven *puruṣas*, etc.'

'*He who*' (verse 7) is explained as before.

'*So'bhidhyāya*,' '*by mere willing*' (verse 8)—the *willing* is purely figurative; for Primordial Matter being non-intelligent, actual *willing* is not possible for it; what is meant by by 'mere willing' is that Primordial Matter, in evolving, acts by its own inherent force, independently of the will of a Supreme Lord, just in the same manner as a certain person accom-

plishes an act by himself, by his own will, independently of any extraneous thing.—'*He in the beginning produced water*'—water is called 'first' in comparison with the other elemental substances; it does not mean that water was produced before *Mahat* and other principles; the real process is going to be described under verse 1·19, where it is stated that it is the Principles that are produced first, and then the elemental substances.—'*In that he threw the seed*'—that Primordial Matter, which is the intended Nominative, threw the 'seed'—*i.e.*, its energy.

In the production of the earth and other Elemental Substances, Primordial Matter becomes solidified all over, and assumes the form of an egg; this is what is meant by the words '*that became the egg*' (verse 9). Just as the Principles are, in the beginning, produced without any intercourse between the male and the female, in the same manner (without intercourse between male and female) was Brahmā also born, under the influence of his previous acts; his body is due to his own powers, and is not born out of any womb; just as the bodies of the mosquito and other insects are not born of wombs.

'*The Being produced by that*' (verse 11)—produced by Primordial Matter; the body of Brahmā is described as 'produced by that' in the sense that it consists of Primordial Matter. The rest is as before.

The real meaning of these verses we have already explained; that is to say, they are mere 'arthavāda,' 'eulogistic descriptions' and as such are with difficulty construed figuratively. (11).

VERSE XII

THAT SUPREME LORD, HAVING DWELT IN THAT EGG FOR A YEAR, HIMSELF, BY HIS OWN THOUGHT, BROKE THAT EGG INTO TWO PARTS.—(12)

Bhāṣya.

'*That Supreme Lord,*' Brahmā,—'*for a year,*' during a year,—'*having dwelt in that egg,*'—the omniscient one, who had come into existence and was seated in the egg, thought of the way in which he would come out of it;—'*he broke the egg into two parts*';—one year is the time which the embryo takes for its development; so that after a year the egg, having reached its full development, burst (really) by reason of its full development having been reached. It is thus a chance coincidence that the egg burst just at the time that Brahmā was thinking of coming out; and it is in view of this coincidence that he is described as having *broken the egg into two parts.*—(12)

VIII. Creation of Heaven and Earth

VERSE XIII

OUT OF THOSE TWO PIECES (OF THE EGG) HE FORMED HEAVEN AND EARTH, AND, BETWEEN THEM, THE ĀKĀSHA, THE EIGHT QUARTERS AND THE ETERNAL RECEPTACLE OF WATER.—(13)

Bhāṣya.

'*Two pieces*'—the two halves of the egg-shell; *out of these* two pieces of the egg-shell,—'*he formed,*' produced,—'*Heaven and Earth*'; the lower half being earth [and the upper half Heaven];—'*between them Ākāsha,*' empty space,—'*the eight quarters,*' the East and the rest, along with the intermediate points of the South-East, etc.;—'*the receptacle of water,*'—(1) in the atmosphere, (2) the Ocean and (3) the *Ākāsha* within the Earth and the Nether Regions.—(13)

IX. Creation of the World from 'Mahat' downwards

VERSE XIV

FROM OUT OF HIMSELF HE BROUGHT FORTH THE MIND, WHICH PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF THE EXISTENT AND NON-EXISTENT; AND BEFORE THE MIND, HE BROUGHT UP THE ALL-POWERFUL PRINCIPLE OF EGOISM, WHOSE FUNCTION CONSISTS IN SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.—(14)

Bhāṣya.

The creation of the Elemental Principles is now described. What forms the constituent factor of what, and in what manner, has been already explained by implication.

'*From out of himself*'—*i.e.*, from out of Primordial Matter, which forms his body, '*he brought forth Mind.*' The creation of the Elemental Principles is set forth here in the reverse order; the meaning thus is that '*before the mind he brought up the Principle of Egoism, whose function consists in self-consciousness*'; the consciousness of self, appearing in the form of the notion of 'I,' is a function of the Principle of Egoism; it is called *all-powerful* in the sense that it is capable of accomplishing its work.—(14)

VERSE XV

ALSO THE ALL-PERVADING 'MAHAT' (THE 'GREAT' PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE); AS ALSO ALL THOSE THINGS THAT CONSIST OF THE THREE CONSTITUENT ATTRIBUTES, AND IN DUE COURSE, ALSO THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSATION WHICH APPREHEND OBJECTS.—(15)

Bhāṣya.

'*Mahat*' is the name applied by the Sāṅkhyas to one of the Elemental Principles;—'*all-pervading*' qualifies the '*Mahat*';

this Principle of Intelligence is called 'all-pervading' because, it actually pervades through the entire material creation. This he brought out *before* the Principle of Egoism; this construction being in accordance with that adopted in the preceding verse (in connection with the Principle of Egoism being produced *before* the Mind);—'*as also all those things that consist of the three constituent Attributes*'; all that has been described, as also all that is going to be described,—*i.e.*, all products or evolutes,—are constituted by the three Attributes; these 'Constituent Attributes' being '*Sattva*' (Harmony), '*Rajas*' (Energy) and '*Tamas*' (Inertia); it is only conscious entities that are free from these three Attributes; while all that is evolved out of Primordial Matter is constituted by the three Attributes.—'*The five organs of sensation, which apprehend,*'—bring about the perception of,—Colour, Taste (Odour, Touch and Sound), which form the respective '*objects*,' the '*five*,' whose specific names are going to be described later on, in 2.90—'*Also*' is meant to include the '*objects*' themselves, in the form of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour, and also the Earth and other elemental substances.—(15)

VERSE XVI

Having combined the subtile components of the said six Principles of illimitable potency with their own evolutes, he created even all beings.—(16)

Bhāṣya.

The said six principles of their own respective evolutes,—to these he joined their subtile components, and thus created all beings.

The number '*six*,' (mentioned in connection with the Principles) is made up of the *five* 'Rudimentary Substances,' to be described later on, and the 'Principle of Egoism' already described.

The '*own envolutes*' of these Principles, are their respective products; *i.e.*, the elemental substances, which are the products of the 'Rudimentary Substances,' the Sense-organs

which are the products of the 'Principle of Egoism.' The Earth and the other Elemental Substances being present, like so many 'bodies,' he joined to them the 'subtile components'; *i.e.*, the Rudimentary Substances and the Principle of Egoism; that is, he placed them in their proper places, and thus '*created all beings*,'—Gods, men, animals, birds, trees and so forth.

The meaning is as follows :—The six subtile components are productive of one portion of the entire world, the whole of which is evolved out of them; that they are 'subtile' is proved by the fact of their being 'rudimentary' in their character;—these he '*combined*,' *i.e.*, brought together, *with their own envolutes*,' *i.e.*, their respective products; he produced the material substances and the organs (of action), and through these, the entire material world; these latter being indicated by the word 'even.'

In place of '*mātrāsu*' it is better to read '*mātrābhiḥ*.—(16)

VERSE XVII

Because the six subtile components of the frame (of Primordial Matter) enter into (produce) these, therefore the wise ones have described the frame of that (Primordial Matter) as 'body.'—(17)

Bhāṣya.

'*Frame*'—body; the '*components*' of it are those things that constitute it; these are '*subtile*,' the '*six*' already described (*viz.*, the five Rudimentary Substances and the Principle of Egoism), which are called '*avishēṣa*,' the undifferentiated. —*Tāni āshrayanti*—*i.e.*, the organs and the elemental substances going to be described 'enter into' the said components; which means that they are evolved out of them; *i.e.*, the evolution of the organs &c., has for its substratum the six subtile components; this is what has been described in the words 'the five elemental substances are produced out of the five Rudimentary Substances' (*Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 22). Because they

enter into them, therefore the 'frame of that,' *i.e.*, of Primordial Matter,—has been described as 'Body.'

Manasvinaḥ, '*manīṣā*' is *wisdom*; those possessed of wisdom are '*manasvins*,' *i.e.*, *the wise ones*.

[The above explanation makes '*tāinīmāni*,' the organs and substances, the nominative, and the 'components' the objective;—this construction is found to be incompatible with the nominative ending in '*avayavāḥ*,' '*components*'; hence the *Bhāṣya* puts forward another construction, which has been adopted in the rendering of the text.]—Or, the relation of the 'nominative' and 'objective' may be reversed: the 'subtile components' being the nominative, and the 'organs' the objective (of the verb '*āshrayanti*'); the meaning of '*āshrayanti*,' 'enter into,' being that the subtile components serve as the *substratum*—'*āshraya*'—of the organs; just as in the phrase 'he has been fed (upon) by many men,' the man doing the *feeding* is spoken of as 'fed.'—Or, since verbal roots may have several meanings, '*enter into*' may be explained as 'produce.'—(17)

VERSE XVIII

THE GREAT ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES, ALONG WITH THEIR FUNCTIONS, AS ALSO THE MIND, ALONG WITH ITS SUBTILE COMPONENTS, ENTER INTO THAT WHICH (ON THAT ACCOUNT) IS THE GENERATOR OF ALL THINGS AND IMPERISHABLE.—(18)

Bhāṣya.

'*That*,' 'Primordial Matter—is 'the generator of all things';—it is '*imperishable*,' *i.e.*, in its original (causal) form it is indestructible.

"In what way does Primordial Matter *generate* all things?"

Because all these *enter into it*.

"What are *all these* that enter into it?"

First of all '*the Mind along with its subtile components*,'—*i.e.*, along with the Rudimentary Substances, the Principle of Intelligence, the Principle of Egoism and the Sense-organs;

—and then, the *Great Elemental Substances*—called 'Earth,' 'Water,' 'Fire,' 'Wind,' and 'Ākāsha;'—'*along with their functions*;—(1) sustaining, (2) conglutination, (3) cooking, (4) configuration and (5) making room (unobstruction) respectively are the 'functions' of Earth, &c. Of these (1) 'sustaining' means upholding, keeping in their places, things that are prone to falling; (2) 'conglutination' means bringing together things that are loose and disjointed; *e.g.*, loose and disjointed dust-particles are brought togther, cemented into, a mass by means of water;—(3) 'Cooking' is the well-known effect produced by fire upon such things as medicine and herbs, &c.; (4) 'Configuration' means conformation, shaping; —(5) 'making room' means non-obstruction by another body; in a point in space where one body is already present, there can be no room for another body; *e.g.*, no object can find room within a piece of gold.

'*Mind*'—is meant to indicate all the organs of sensation; and the term '*Karma*' may be taken as referring to the organs of action; or again, in the first line of the text, the term '*Karma*' may be taken to mean the 'products' of the elementary substances; the sense of the passage being that 'subsequently the products of the elemental substances, along with the subtile components, enter into the great elemental substances'—'as also do the organs of sensation,' this latter being indicated by the word '*Mind*.'—(18)

VERSE XIX

From out of the Subtile constituents of the frames of the said exceedingly potent principles is produced this (Gross Body)—the perishable proceeding from the imperishable.—(19)

Bhāṣya.

All that is meant by saying that '*the perishable proceeds from the imperishable*' is that the Gross is produced out of the Subtile; and it is not meant to emphasise whether it is

produced out of the particles of *six* or *seven* Principles ; in fact there are twenty-four Principles, all of which form the cause of the origin of all things. Or, the meaning may be that in the production of the gross object only seven Principles form the principal cause, *e.g.*, the six non-differentiated Principles (the five Rudimentary Substances and the principle of Egoism) and the seventh, the Great Principle of Intelligence. Out of these (seven) are produced the Elemental Substances and the Organs ; and when these latter have been produced, the gross body becomes formed.

[It has been said that] from out of the imperishable Primordial Matter,—which in its unified form, contains within itself the possibilities of all its evolutes,—is produced this world, which is multifarious in its character and appears in all possible forms.

Now the question arises—Does the Primordial Matter become modified into all its gross evolutes at one and the same time ? And the answer to this is 'No ;' what really happens is described in the present verse—'*From out of the subtile, &c., &c.*' The order in which the things are produced is the same as that which has been described before ; that is, from out of Primordial Matter is produced the Great Principle of Intelligence ;—from this latter the Principle of Egoism ; and from this latter again the 'group of sixteen' (*Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 22).

The term '*Puruṣa*' has been used in the sense of the *Principles*, on the ground that these latter subserve the purposes of the *Puruṣa* (Soul).

'*Exceedingly potent*'—capable of producing their effects ; it is because they are the cause of innumerable products that they have been called '*exceedingly potent.*'

The said principles have certain '*subtile constituents of their frames*' ;—'*mūrti*' is *frame* ; the constituents that go to form that frame are called '*constituents of the frame*' ; from out of these is born '*this*' (the gross Body). It is in reference to this that it is added—'*the perishable proceeding out of the imperishable.*'

Question—"What are the '*subtile* constituents' of the said Principles? Certainly the Rudimentary Substances have no other 'constituents' (save those that are *subtile*), in reference to (for the exclusion of) which such specification could be possible (as that intended by the epithet 'subtile')."

Answer—The qualification 'subtile' is not in relation to the constituents of any single Principle itself; what is meant is that (one principle is 'subtile' in relation to, in comparison to, another, *i.e.*) the Great Principle of Intelligence is subtile as compared to the Rudimentary Substances, and the Root Evolvent (Primordial Matter) is 'subtile' as compared to the Great Principle.

[Another explanation of the verse is given below, in the form of an introduction to verse 20].—19

VERSE XX

AMONG THESE (ELEMENTARY SUBSTANCES), EACH SUCCEEDING ONE ACQUIRES THE QUALITY OF WHAT PRECEDES IT; AND EACH ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCE IS ENDOWED WITH AS MANY QUALITIES AS THE PLACE IT OCCUPIES (IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THE SAID SUBSTANCES ARE SET FORTH).—(20)

Bhāṣya.

In the preceding verse some people offer a different explanation of the number 'seven':—(1) The five *organs of sensation*, the Eye and the rest, taken together from a single group; they are regarded as 'one' on account of their possessing the common character of being *the instruments of perception*;—(2) similarly the five *organs of action*; these two, forming two groups, are '*two* principles';—(3-7) the five elemental substances, being treated individually, by reason of their functions being distinct from one another, are the '*seven principles*'; and the five Rudimentary Substances and the principle of Egoism are the 'subtile constituents' that go to make up the 'bodies' of the said seven;—*i.e.*, these seven are the products of evolution from the said six.—The rest of the verse is explained in the same manner as set forth above.

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Thus, in accordance with this explanation, the Elemental Substances having been spoken of in the preceding verse (19), the pronoun '*ēṣām*,' '*among these*,' refers to those same substances. Though there are several words intervening (between the mention of Elemental Substances in verse (19) and the pronoun 'among *these*' in the present verse), which are in closer proximity to the pronoun, yet, as a matter of fact, what is described in the present verse,—the fact of 'these' being endowed with a particular number of qualities derived from well-defined sources—is applicable only to the Elementary Substances, and not to other things; even though these latter may form the subject-matter of the context (and may as such, be capable of being referred to by the pronoun in question).

The meaning of the verse thus comes to this:—'*Among these*' Elemental Substances,—which are set out (later on) in a definite order of sequence, one preceding the other—the 'succeeding one' acquires the quality of the preceding one, through its connection with it.—The term '*quality*' here stands for the five, Sound and the rest;—the '*preceding*' (and 'succeeding') is in reference to the order in which the names of the Elemental Substances are set forth in verse 75 below, where it is said that 'first of all Ākāsha is produced &c., &c.' The fact of sound &c., being the qualities of these substances will also be described in that same verse.—Among Akāsha and the rest, each one occupies a definite place in the order in which they are set forth; the term '*yāvatithaḥ*' means *the number of the place occupied by it*; the word being formed by the adding of the affix '*ithuk*,' by Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 5.2.53. The meaning is that each substance becomes endowed with as many qualities as the place, *second* or *third*, &c., occupied by it; that is, the substance occupying the *second* place in the order of sequence has *two* qualities, that occupying the *third* place has *three*, and so on.

The first half of the verse means that among the Elemental Substances, each succeeding one acquires the quality of its predecessor; and each of them is later on (under

verses 75 &c.) described has having one quality inherent in itself; for instance, 'Ākāsha is known as possessing the quality of sound' (verse 75); 'Fire is described as possessing the quality of colour' (verse 77), and so forth; so that acquiring one quality from its predecessor (and having one inherent in itself) each substance would appear to be endowed with only two qualities,—with the sole exception of Ākāsha (which, having no substance 'preceding' it, would have the single quality of Sound, which is inherent in itself); hence with a view to preclude such an idea, the author has added the the second half of the verse—*Each Elemental Substance being endowed with as many qualities &c. &c.*,—which means that Wind has *two* qualities, Fire has *three*, Water has *four*, and Earth has *five*.

"Why does the Author use the form '*ādyādyasya*'? The correct form should be '*ādyasyādyasya*', the repetition of the term '*ādyasya*' being necessitated by Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 8.1.4; just as we have in such expressions as '*paraḥ paraḥ*.'"

The form used is due to the exigencies of metre; and exigencies of metre justify the non-observance of rules.—(20)

VERSE XXI

At the outset he designated distinct names for all things; and devised Acts and Laws, on the basis of the words of the Veda.—(21)

Bhāṣya.

'*He*,' Prajāpati, '*designated the names of all things*'; just in the same manner as people assign names to new-born children, or to other things also, for the purpose of speaking of them in ordinary business; as we find done in such assertions as, '*āt* and *aich* are called *Vṛddhi*' (Pāṇini 1.1.1), or '*Dhi-shrī-strī &c.*' (Piṅgala). What is meant is that he established a connection between a certain thing and a certain term,—such terms, for instance, as '*gauḥ*' (Cow), '*Ashvaḥ*' (Horse) and '*Puruṣaḥ*' (Man).

He devised also the *acts*, known as '*Dharma-Adharma*' (Virtue-Vice),—*i.e.*, such acts as the *Agnihotra* and the like which lead to transcendental results.

Having devised the *acts*, he devised also the '*laws*,' the rules, governing them; such for instance, as, 'such and such an act should be done by the Brāhmaṇa only, at such and such a time, for the purpose of obtaining such and such a result.'—Or, 'laws' may be taken as referring to the rules governing the ordinary acts with visible worldly results; such, for instance, as 'cattle should graze in such and such a place,' 'this water should not be given for purposes of irrigation of crops to such and such a village until we have secured such and such a benefit from it in return.'—He devised also those acts that accomplish only visible results; but those acts that accomplish transcendental results he devised on the basis of Vedic declarations.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, all things have been created by Brahmā; and since he is the only independent agent, the proper statement would have been that 'he devised the Veda for the purpose of safeguarding the performance of acts'; in fact the devising of the Veda by Brahmā is going to be described even in the present context (in verse 23)."

Answer—On the subject of the origin of the Vedas, several theories have been propounded: (1) Some people hold as follows:—Brahmā studied the Vedas in a previous cycle;—at the following Universal Dissolution, they disappeared;—in the succeeding cycle at first they were recollected by Brahmā, just as if he had gone to sleep and had risen from it; in the same manner as people remember a verse that came to their mind during a dream;—the Veda having been thus recollected by him, he remembers the words of such passages as "*gauranubandhyaḥ-ashvastuparo mṛgaḥ*' (Yajurveda-Vajasa. 24.1), and immediately there come to his mind the things denoted by these words; so that as soon as these things are found to have come into existence, he decides that, inasmuch as such as was the name of this thing in the preceding cycle, it may have the same name in this cycle also. So that he devised

the *names* as well as the *acts*, both *on the basis of the words of the Veda*.—(2) The other theory is as follows:—Even at universal Dissolution the Vedas do not disappear at all; they continue to exist for ever, just like the Supreme Being postulated by certain philosophers. This same Supreme Being created within the egg the being named Brahmā and taught him the Vedas; and this Brahmā, *on the basis of the words of the Vedas*, devised every thing.

What the real truth on this point is we have already set forth above; while for one who seeks for an account in accordance with the Purāṇas, we have just described the two theories that have been propounded.

'*Ādau*,' '*at the outset*'—at the time of world creation;—or, '*ādau*' may be taken to mean 'ever-lasting,' referring to those names whose original form has not become corrupted, as distinguished from such corrupted names as '*gāvī*' and the like, which owe their origin to the incapacity of men (to pronounce the corect forms).

'*Distinct*'—the names designated were in accordance with that configuration of the body peculiar to each species; what he designated was not merely a collective name (applicable to all animals),—but a *distinct* name for each species.—(21)

X. Creation of the Gods

VERSE XXII

FOR THE SAKE OF LIVING BEINGS INTENT UPON ACTION, HE CREATED THE ETERNAL SACRIFICE; AS ALSO THE HOST OF GODS AND THE SUBTILE MULTITUDE OF THE LESSER DIVINITIES, THE SĀDHYAS.—(22)

Bhasya.

'*Living beings intent upon action*'—stands for human beings intent upon the performance of actions; for the accomplishment of the purpose of these, '*he created the sacrifice.*' Those men are called '*intent upon action*' who, not giving themselves up to the worship of Brahman, still hanker after such results as the obtaining of sons and cattle, etc., and accepting the philosophy of Dualism, engage themselves in the performance of actions.—The Genitive ending also (in the words '*Karmātmanām prāṇinām*) signifies 'for the sake of'; hence the meaning is that 'he created the sacrifice *for the sake of* the said beings.'—'*The hosts of gods*' also he created for the sake of sacrifices.—The particle '*cha*' is misplaced after '*Karmātmanām*'; its proper place is after '*dēvānām*'; the meaning thus being—'He created the sacrifice, and for the sake of the due fulfilment of the sacrifice, he created *also* the hosts of gods, such as Agni, Agni-Soma, Indra-Agni and so forth.—He also created the multitude of the divinities called '*Sādhyas*'—the word '*gaṇam*' being construed with '*Sādhyānām*' also. The *Sādhyas* are mentioned apart from the 'Gods,' because they are not entitled to partake of the sacrificial offerings,—they being entitled only to having hymns addressed to them. That the *Sādhyas* form a particular class of divinities is shown by such passages as 'In the beginning there were the gods named Sādhyas' (Ṛgveda 10.90.16).—Or the separate mention of the

'*Sādhyas*' may be explained on the analogy of such expressions as '*brāhmaṇa-parivrājaka*' and the like [the 'Parivrājaka', 'wandering renunciate' is a 'Brāhmaṇa' with some qualifications; similarly the *Sādhyas* are *Devas* with the further qualification that they are not entitled to a share of the offerings].—'*Subtile*'—the multitude of *Sādhyas* is Subtile in comparison to such deities as the *Maruts* and the *Rudrāṅgirases*.—The mention of the *Sādhyas* is meant to include all those deities that have no connection with sacrificial offerings, such, for instance, as *Veno*, (?) *Sunīti* (?) and so forth.

[*Another explanation of the verse.*]

Some people construe '*Karmātmanām-dēvānām-prāṇinām*' together, taking them as co-extensive. The 'gods' being called '*Karmātmānaḥ*' in the sense that *they are of the nature of actions*, actions form the very essence of their nature; they are so called, because they help in the accomplishment of sacrificial acts, or because they constitute the most important factor in the sacrificial act. Among the gods there are some who are described in the *Itihāsas*, in connection with sacrifices, as possessed of distinctive forms; to this class belong the gods, Indra, Rudra and Viṣṇu; there are others who are gods, not in their own forms, but only at sacrifices; to this class belong the '*Akṣa*' (wheel-axle), '*Grāvan*' (Pebbles) and the *Rathāṅga* (the wheels, or the constituent parts of the chariot). As regards Indra &c., we find in the *Mahābhārata* descriptions of such deeds of theirs as fighting with Vṛttra and other *Asuras*; but there is no description of any such acts in connection with the Wheel-axle &c.; and yet in the Vedic hymns connected with sacrificial offerings we find these latter spoken of as 'deities'; for instance, the *wheel-axles* are referred to as deities in the hymn '*prāvēpāmā &c.*'; (*Ṛgveda*, 10.34.1); the *Pebbles* are spoken of as deities in the hymn '*praitē vadantu &c.*' (*Ṛgveda*, 10.94.1)—the Wheels are spoken of as deities in the hymn '*vanaspatē vīdvaṅga &c.*'

(Ṛgveda 6.47.26).—It is in view of (with a view to exclude) these latter (which are inanimate) that we have the epithet '*prāṇinām*' (Animate). There are two kinds of gods; some are animate, others inanimate; *e.g.*, Indra and others are described in the '*Purāṇa*' as having human bodies and endowed with life; but the *wheel-axle* &c. are not found so described. All this conception of the creation of things is based upon *Itihāsas*. An additional '*cha*,' also, has to be taken as understood; the meaning being 'animate and *also* the inanimate.' According to the *Nirukta* also there are three kinds of deities—*Horses*, mentioned in the hymn '*mā no mitra &c.*' (*Ṛgveda*, 1.162.1), *Birds* mentioned in the hymn '*Kanikradat &c.*' (*Ṛgveda* 5.83.1), and *Bulls* mentioned in the hymn '*āgāvo agman*' *&c.* (*Ṛgveda*, 6.28.1);—all these deities are *animate;* and the *inanimate ones* have been already described.

The epithet '*eternal*' qualifies the '*sacrifice*'; the sacrifice having existed in the previous cycle also, there is a continuity of tradition in regard to it; and it is on this ground that it is regarded as *eternal*.—(22)

XI. Creation of the Vedas

VERSE XXIII

FROM OUT OF (THE THREE DEITIES) AGNI, VĀYU AND RAVI, HE EXTRACTED, FOR THE DUE FULFILMENT OF SACRIFICES, THE ETERNAL BRAHMAN, THREEFOLD, IN THE FORMS OF 'ṚK,' 'YAJUṢ' AND 'SĀMAN.'—(23)

Bhāṣya.

There are only three deities, Agni, Vāyu, and Ravi,—say the followers of the Nirukta; even though these three have several names; and in accordance with this theory the text would mean as follows:—'*For the due fulfilment of the sacrifices,*' *to these three deities*,—the Dative ending (in the term '*agnivāyuravibhyaḥ*') being due to the fact of these three deities being the recipients of the sacrificial offerings,—'*he milked the Brahman*,' called 'Veda', '*in the forms of Ṛk, Yajuṣ and Sāman.*'

But as a matter of fact, the root (in '*dudoha*' 'milked') is one that should have two objects; it has its primary object in the form of '*trayam*'; and it should have a second, the secondary, object; but there is no such secondary object in the sentence. Hence we conclude that the term '*agnivāyuravibhyaḥ*' should be taken in the Ablative case; the meaning being—'*From out of the three deities, Agni &c, he extracted*'—made to flow, produced—[the Veda].

Question:—"How could the words, the mantra-texts and the Brāhmaṇa-texts (of which the Veda consists)—which are made up of letters—come out of Agni and other deities?"

Answer:—Why is this not possible? In regard to invisible forces, who can say that they do not exist?

[An objection is raised against the second interpretation preferred by the Bhāṣya]—"It is not right to alter the

meaning of the verb (*'dudoha,'* 'milked'); so that (if the root retains its own meaning) how could we have the Ablative (in *'agnivāyuravibhyaḥ'*)? It should take the Accusative ending, according to the grammatical rule under Pāṇini's Sūtra 1.4.51, which lays down that the roots *'duhi,' 'yāchi'* &c., take two objects, and the source from which the 'milking' is done is the secondary object. Further, the mind of reasonable men is not satisfied when what is described as having happened in the past is something that is not compatible with the ordinary sources of knowledge."

This incongruity becomes explained away when we take the statement as referring to the framework of the Vedas; the meaning being that the *Ṛgveda* came out of Agni, the *Yajurveda* out of Vāyu and the *Sāmaveda* out of Ravi. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that Agni and the rest are *deities* endowed with superior potencies, and Prajāpati is possessed of unexcelled powers; so that what can be impossible for these? Under this explanation full significance should attach to the Ablative; so that the case-relation being already expressed (by the Ablative), and the Ablative being duly significant, it is the Ablative that is used [and not the Accusative, which has been laid down in Pāṇini 1.4.51 as to be used only in cases where the case-relation is *not* otherwise expressed]; this has been fully justified in the Bhāṣya (of Patañjali).

Question:—"If the said theory be not accepted, what would be the explanation of the word *'agnivāyuravibhyaḥ'* then?"

Answer:—In that case, we have already said that it could be taken as the Dative; and (as regards the necessity of the verb *'dudoha,'* 'milked,' having a secondary object) it has to be borne in mind that all that is here stated is mere *Arthavāda*. So that (physical impossibilities being not counted) *'ātman'* may be taken as the required secondary object,—the meaning being that 'Prajāpati milked himself (of the Veda)' [*'for the sake of Agni, Vāyu and Ravi'*]. And further, 'milking' may be taken in the sense of *teaching*,

which resembles the act of *milking* in consisting of *transferring a thing from one receptacle into another.* [So that the passage would mean that 'he taught the Veda to Agni &c.']

Even when the word '*agnivāyuravibhyaḥ*' is taken as Ablative, the statement can be justified on the ground that the opening verses of the *Ṛgveda* speak of Agni,—this fact being what is meant by the statement 'the Ṛgvēda came out of Agni.' Similarly, the opening verse of the Yajurvēda is '*Iṣē tvorjē*' &c., where the term '*iṭ*' (the base in '*iṣē*') means *food*, and food is produced by Vāyu, which is present within the food, by the bestowing (upon it) of rain; '*urk*' (the base in the second word '*urjē*') means *life-breath*, and this is *Vāyu* (Air) itself; thus since the Yajurveda opens with the description of the effects of *Vāyu*, we have the metaphorical expression that 'it came *out of Vāyu*.' Or, the duties of the *Adhvaryu* and the functions of the *Ṛtviks* (which form the subject-matter of the *Yajurvēda*) all consist of so many forms of activity; and all activity proceeds from *Vāyu*; hence it is on the basis of this similarity that the Yajurvēda is spoken of as *coming out of Vāyu*. Lastly, as regards the *Sāmavēda*, the singing of the Sāman cannot be done except by persons specially qualified for it; hence the *Sāma verses* are such as can be duly read by only the best among men, and Ravi (the Sun) occupies the highest point in space [and on this fact is based the statement that the *Sāmavēda* came out of *Ravi*].—(23)

XII. Creation of Time

VERSE XXIV

[He created] also Time, the Divisions of Time, the Lunar Mansions, the Planets, the Rivers, the Oceans, the Mountains and the tracts of land, plain and rugged.—(24)

Bhāṣya.

The author mentions Time, because it belongs to the same category (of 'action') as Duty. It is only according to Vaiśeṣikas that Time is a *substance*; according to others it is a form of *action*; it consists in the extension of the motions of the Sun and other planets, and is liable to return.

'*Divisions of Time*'—such divisions as into 'month,' 'season,' 'half-year,' 'year' and so forth.

'*Lunar Mansions*'—such as *Kṛttikā* (Pleiades), *Rohiṇī* (Aldebaran) and the rest.

'*Planets*'—Sun and the rest.

'*Rivers*'—streams.

'*Oceans*'—seas—and 'Mountains.'

'*Even tracts of land*'—such tracts of land as are of one uniform form, devoid of ditches and holes.—'*Rugged tracts of land*'—such as are high and low.—(24)

XIII. Creation of Happiness

VERSE XXV

BEING DESIROUS OF BRINGING INTO EXISTENCE THESE CREATURES, HE CREATED THIS ENTIRE CREATION (COMPRISING) AUSTERITY, SPEECH, HAPPINESS, DESIRE AND ANGER.

Bhāṣya.

'*Happiness*'—Satisfaction of the mind;—'*Desire*'—Longing or Love; the rest are well known.

'*He created this creation,*' comprising the things mentioned and others of the same kind.—The term '*this*' refers to the creation of things mentioned in this verse as also that described in the foregoing verses.

'*Being desirous of bringing into existence these creatures*' —such, for instance, as the *Dēvas* and *Asuras*, the *Yakṣa*, the *Rākṣasa*, and *Gandharva* and other beings, the vehicle of these beings, in the form of the body equipped with the soul and characteristics, and also Dharma; these he created first of all.

"What sort of verbal expression is this—'*he created the creation*'?"

It means exactly what is meant by the expression 'he wrought or did the creation'; as a matter of fact, all verbal roots express some particular form of *action*, denoted by the root 'Kṛ'; *e.g.*, 'cooks' is synonymous with 'does the cooking'; 'sacrifices' is the same as 'does the sacrificing'; in the expression under question the peculiar form of the *action* (*of creation*) having been already expressed by the verbal noun ('creation'), the root contained in the verb ('created') comes to denote only the *action*. To guard against such an expression being open to the charge of being a needless repetition, involved in the *action* being spoken of by

means of the root in the verb, after it has been already expressed by the verbal noun,—we may take the mention of the verb to be for the purpose of expressing the tense and the voice (which could not be expressed by the verbal noun).—Or, the term 'creation' may be taken as standing for the particular created things known by the ordinary means of knowledge and forming the object of the general act of *creating* expressed by the verb 'created'; such usage being analogous to the expression '*svapoṣam puṣṭaḥ*,' 'reared the rearing by oneself' (where the rearing qualified by 'self' forms the object of the verb 'reared', which denotes *rearing* in general).—(25)

XIV. Differentiation of Virtue and Vice

VERSE XXVI

FOR THE DUE DISCRIMINATION OF ACTIONS, HE DIFFERENTIATED VIRTUE AND VICE; AND HE CONNECTED THESE CREATURES WITH SUCH PAIRS OF OPPOSITES AS PLEASURE-PAIN AND THE LIKE.—(26)

Bhāṣya.

'*He differentiated Virtue and Vice*'—He fixed their character by due distinction, *i.e.*, as distinct from each other; in such form—'this is *Virtue*, that is *Vice*.'

Objection:—"In reality however, there is no such hard and fast distinction; there are several actions that partake of the nature of both and are both *virtuous* and *vicious* (sinful); for instance, they say that the actions (of sacrifice) laid down in the Veda are of mixed character, being accomplished, as they are, by means of animal-slaughter; the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice for instance, is by itself a *virtuous* or meritorious act, but by reason of animal-slaughter forming one of its factors, it is *vicious* or sinful."

Itis in view of this objection that the text has added the phrase—'*For the due discrimination of actions*';—the term 'action' here stands for the actual process, the performance of actions; as a matter of fact, the same *act*, if *performed* in a different manner, acquires an entirely different character; *i.e.*, an act which is *virtuous* (when done in one way) becomes *vicious* (when done in another way), and *vice versá*; *e.g.* the act of animal-slaughter itself; animal-slaughter, when done apart from a sacrificial performance, is *vicious*, sinful,—forming as it does the subject of such Vedic prohibitions as 'One should not kill any animals'; but when done within the sacrificial altar, during the *Agnīṣomīya* offering,

it is *virtuous*, meritorious—being an act that forms the subject of injunctions. Similarly, Austerity (in itself) is *virtuous*; but when it is performed through hypocrisy, or by a person unfit for performing it, it is *vicious*. Similarly again, for women, intercourse with the husband's younger brother is *sinful*; but when under orders from her elders, a woman desiring children has intercourse with her brother-in-law, who is besmeared with clarified butter &c. (as laid down in the scriptures), it is *virtuous*. Thus then, even though the action be one and the same, there is a distinction based upon the way in which it is actually performed. The sameness of the action however is only apparent; in view of other sources of knowledge the acts (done in different ways) are different.

Further, the term '*action*' may be taken as standing for the *effects* of the actions,—the cause being figuratively spoken of as the effect. Thus the meaning comes to be as follows:—'He differentiated actions for the due discrimination of the *effects of actions*.'

In view of the question as to what is the 'discrimination of the effects of actions,' it is added—'*he connected them with pairs of opposites, in the shape of Pleasure-Pain and the like*';—'Pleasure' being the effect of 'Virtue' and 'Pain' of 'Vice.' It is thus that people performing both kind of actions become associated with these pairs of opposites; by performing virtuous acts they become associated with pleasure, and by performing vicious acts they become connected with pain.

The term '*dvandva*', '*Pair of opposites*,' is, by usage, applied to such mutually contradictory sources of pain as 'Heat-Cold,' 'Rain-Hotweather,' 'Hunger-Satiation,' and so forth.

The phrase '*and the like*' refers to the general and special forms of the said sources of pain. For instance, the terms 'Pleasure-Pain,' in their general form are denotative either of 'Heaven-Hell,' or of 'excessive joy and sorrow'; while in their special form, they stand for the 'obtaining of heaven, of landed property, of sons, of cattle and so forth' ('*Pleasure*')

and the 'being deprived of these'; all these being implied by the terms '*Ādi*,' '*and the like*.'

The creation of Actions having been described before (in Verse 18 *et seq.*), what is described in the present verse is that Prajāpati brought about the distinction in their actual performance, as also the discrimination of their effects; thus there is a difference between what was said before and what is said now.—(26)

XV. Creation of Gross and Subtile things

VERSE XXVII

THE EVANESCENT SUBTILE CONSTITUENTS OF THE HALF-TEN (ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES) THAT HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED,—ALONG WITH THOSE, THIS WHOLE (WORLD) COMES FORTH, IN DUE ORDER.—(27)

Bhāṣya.

This verse sums up what has gone before.

'*Of the half-ten*'—*i.e.*, of the five elemental substances;—'*the subtile*,'—minute,—'*constituents*,'—parts; *i.e.*, the 'Rudimentary substances'; these are '*evanescent*';—they are called 'evanescent' (liable to destruction) in the sense that, being liable to undergo modifications, they take up grosser forms.—'*along with those*,' '*this whole*'—world,—'*comes forth*,'—is produced;—'*in due order*,'—in proper sequence; *i.e.*, from the subtile the gross, and from the gross the grosser; or in the order in which they have been described (in the foregoing verses).—(27)

XVI. Creation dependent upon 'Karma'

VERSE XXVIII

EACH BEING, WHEN CREATED AGAIN AND AGAIN, NATURALLY CONFORMED TO THAT SAME ACT TO WHICH THE LORD HAD, AT FIRST, DIRECTED HIM.—(28)

Bhāṣya.

The meaning of this verse is as follows:—Even though Prajāpati, being the supreme director of the creation of things, can create living creatures just as he chooses, yet, as a matter of fact, he creates them, not without reference to the actions done by them during the preceding cycles; he makes the creature born in that family of creatures which is indicated by the act done by it during the previous cycle,—and never in any other family; if the creature has, in the past, done a good act, it is led to be born in a family in which it would be enabled to experience the good results of that act,—in such families for instance, as 'God,' 'Man' and so forth; if, on the other hand, the acts of the creature have been bad, it is born in such families as 'animals,' 'evil spirits' and the like. What happens is that at the beginning of each new creation, the acts done by creatures in the previous cycle come out, after having, during Dissolution, lain latent within their source; just in the same manner as the Elements, the Organs and the Constituent Attributes come out at the beginning of each creation, after having lain latent within their source, in the Root Evolvent. And the reason for this lies in the fact that the law relating to the 'residue of the past' (affecting the future) applies with equal force to the case in question also.

Question:—"If the coming into existence (of a creature) is dependent upon its own past acts, where then does the almighty power of Prajāpati come in? Of what sort too

would be the almighty power which is dependent upon extraneous influences ?"

Answer:—It is only when the said almighty power is there and (active) that the world comes into existence; how then can the said power be said to have no effect at all? In fact, neither continuance, nor production, nor dissolution (of the world) is possible except when that power is present,—the power of God being ever present, at all times. In reality, what lead to a creature being born are (1) acts done by itself, (2) the will of Prajāpati and (3) the evolution of the Root Evolvent. It is by all this set of causes that this world is produced, exists and becomes dissolved. The mere fact of Prajāpati being influenced by the things does not deprive him of his almighty power. The case stands upon the same footing as a king bestowing upon his servants and dependents the rewards for acts done by them; exactly in the same manner Prajāpati assigns to each creature what is in accordance with its previous acts; and yet neither the King nor Prajāpati cease to be 'all-powerful.'

Objection:—"The meaning assigned to the verse does not appear to be its right meaning at all. What appears to be its right meaning is that the Creator is entirely independent in assigning their work to the creatures. The verse thus means as follows:—'*Every creature conformed to*,—*i.e.*, carried on—*that same action*—in the form either of *doing harm to others*, or its contrary,—*to which the Lord had directed it at first*,—at the beginning of creation'; that is, man does not have recourse to actions, either entirely on the advice of his father and other elders, or by his own will; in fact, whatever good or bad action he performs, he does wholly in accordance with Prajāpati's directions, entirely uninfluenced by the advice of any other person.

'*When created again*'—*i.e.*, when born again, whether in another cycle, or in this same cycle,—it is Prajāpati alone

who directs all animate beings to be the doers of actions; hence even past good and bad acts are done by them only in obedience to the directions of Prajāpati; this has been thus declared:—'They become agents without being masters of their own actions; to the good or the bad act they are led on by God'; and again 'this ignorant creature has no control over his pleasure and pain; it is only as led on by God that he goes to heaven or to hell.'"

To the above we make the following reply:—If the suggested explanation were accepted, (1) it would mean the abandoning of the idea of an inseparable connection between Actions and their results,—(2) it would also mean that all human effort is useless (everything being determined entirely by the independent will of God),—(3) and it would mean that the injunctions of the *Agnihotra* and such acts, as well as the worshipping of Brahman, are entirely futile; in fact it would come to this that actions for visible or invisible results would be undertaken by only such men as are ignorant of the nature of God; while those who are of opinion that the doing of actions and the enjoying of their results are dependent on the will of God would never engage in any form of activity; they would keep away from activity under the impression that 'even though an action may be done, its result may not follow (if God so wished it), and even though we may not do the act, we may enjoy its results (if God so willed it).' Especially because the desire for being the doer of a certain act does not arise in the man forcibly through the prompting of God, as illness arises from unwholesome food; on the other hand, if the said desire is held to be determined by the connection between the action and its result,—the idea being that 'this result follows from this action'—then it would not be true that 'the Lord directed the man to the act' (as the text says).

The *direction* by God, spoken of in the text can be admitted only on the authority of the scriptures; and in the statement—'*that action to which the Lord directed him at first*,'—the phrase '*at first*' is used in reference to the present,

since the world is beginningless (so that 'at first' could not mean *at the beginning of creation*); and as regards the 'direction' or 'supervision' by the Lord, this extends over all things (not only to Actions), he being the efficient cause of Time and Space (within which all things have their being). [In this way the idea of God's supervision is not incompatible with the theory that results accrue to men from their own acts.]

Other people offer the following explanation of the verse :—When a personality happens to be born in a different animal-species (from that in which it was born in its former life), it does not require the effects of its former conditions ; nor is there the resultant continuity of its former nature ; when, for instance, a certain personality happens to be born in the feline species, which species God originally prompted to such acts as the killing of others and the like,—it renounces the quality of mercy which it may have practised during its human existence, and acquires the quality of that species in which it is born, even though this latter quality may not have been taught by any one. What is meant is that the actions due to the nature of the personality being ordained by God are extremely potent, and make the personality forget its former habits.

The idea contained in this verse is further expanded in the following verse.—(28)

VERSE XXIX

HURTFULNESS OR HARMLESSNESS, TENDERNESS OR HARD-HEARTEDNESS, VIRTUE OR VICE, TRUTHFULNESS OR TRUTHLESSNESS,—EACH OF THESE ACCRUED TO THAT BEING IN WHICH HE IMPLANTED IT AT CREATION.—(29)

Bhāṣya.

'*Hurtful*' is that which deprives living beings of life, such for instance, as the Serpent, the Lion and the Elephant ;—the opposite of this is the '*Harmless*'; for instance, the

several species of the Deer, the *Ruru*, the *Pṛṣat* and the like;—'*Tender*' is that which is kind, which causes no suffering to any one;—'*Hard-hearted*' is that which causes pain to others;—the rest are well known.

Out of the said pairs of the line of actions, that which '*he*,' Prajāpati, in accordance with its previous conduct, '*implanted*,' assigned, ordained,—in a being,—'*at creation*'—at the beginning of creation,—that line of action the created living being acquires by itself.

No significance is meant to be attached to the past tense in '*accrued*': for even now-a-days we find the qualities inherent in a certain class of beings coming to the individual without teaching, spontaneously.—(29)

VERSE XXX

JUST AS ON THE APPROACH OF THE TURN OF THE SEASONS, EACH SEASON, BY ITSELF, ACQUIRES ITS OWN SEASONAL CHARACTERISTICS,—SO IN THE SAME MANNER LIVING BEINGS TAKE UP THEIR RESPECTIVE LINES OF ACTION.—(30)

Bhaṣya.

In support of what has been said in the foregoing verses, an illustration is cited. Just as even inanimate things have their character fixed by the law of God,—so animate beings also do not go beyond the law laid down by Prajāpati, in accordance with the past acts of men; they have recourse to that same line of action which has been assigned to the family of beings in which they are born; any other line of action they cannot take up, even though they may wish to do so.

'*The seasons*'—Spring and the rest;—'*its own seasonal characteristics*'—in the form of leaves, flowers, cold, heat, rain and so forth.—'*at the approach of the turn*'—when the *turn*, the occasion for functioning, of a particular season arrives,—that season acquires its character, by itself; and it does not stand in need of any act of man. For instance, at the advent of spring,

mango-blossoms bloom forth by themselves, and they do not stand in need of watering at the roots. In the same manner the 'lines of action' of men—which exist in their 'unseen' or latent form—[operate by themselves]. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as is not affected by the 'acts' (of men); for instance, it is in the nature of the Rainy Season that there should be rain, and yet on account of the faulty action, either of the king or kingdom itself, there is sometimes drought. From all this it follows that the force of 'action' is irrepressible.

The frequent repetition of the term '*ṛtu*,' season,' is due to the exigencies of metre.

Others offer a different explanation of these three verses :—They assert that these verses describe the limitations of the powers of action.

A definite result having been assigned by Prajāpati to an action, whenever that particular action is brought into existence, that is, performed, it naturally bears, *i.e.*, imparts, that same result. This means that whenever a sacrifice that has been performed bears its fruit, it does not stand in need of anything else. Even in the case of kings (who are supposed to be all-powerful), [such ordinary acts as] Service, even though done well, depends (for its fruition, in the shape of rewards from the Master, the King) upon the words (favourable reports) of Ministers and Priests :—not so the act of 'Sacrificing'; all that it requires is the visible act; that is to say, though all effects are found to be introduced by two sets of causes,—seen and unseen—the effect brought about by the sacrifice does not require (for its fruition) any other unseen cause. (*Verse 28*).—Actions bringing about desirable results form the subjects of Injunctions, while those leading to undesirable results are the subjects of Prohibitions; these two kinds of Actions are described in verse 29, beginning with '*Hurtfulness or*

Harmlessness.' 'Hurtfulness' is prohibited; and it is known that it must lead to hell, as we gather from such sentences as—'he who threatens the Brāhmaṇa, and who threatens my people, should be punished with a hundred,' and so forth; and the act of 'hurtfulness' never renounces its character of leading to the undesirable results. In fact, the several actions mentioned in the verse are only particular forms of 'Virtue' and 'Vice'; what is enjoined is 'Virtue,' and what is prohibited is 'Vice,' and 'Truthfulness and Truthlessness' and the rest are only particular forms of Virtue and Vice: 'Truthfulness' is what is enjoined and 'Truthlessness' is what is prohibited; similarly in each of the several pairs mentioned, the former is a particular form of what is prescribed, and the latter a particular form of what is prohfbited. (Verse 29).—That Actions are never found to fail in their causal operations is described by means of an example (in Verse 30)—*Just as at the approach of the turn of the seasons &c.* The rest is as already explained.—(30)

XVII. Creation of the Brahmana and other castes

VERSE XXXI

WITH A VIEW TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE (THREE) REGIONS, HE BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE THE BRĀHMAṆA, THE KṢATTRIYA, THE VAISHYA AND THE SHŪDRA, FROM OUT OF HIS MOUTH, ARMS, THIGHS AND FEET (RESPECTIVELY).—(31)

Bhāṣya.

'*With a view to the development of the regions,*' terrestrial and the rest;—'*development*' stands for *Nourishment* and *expansion*; it is only when the four castes, Brāhmaṇa and the rest, are there that there is development of the three regions; for the Gods live upon offerings made by these castes,—these castes alone being entitled to the performance of sacrifices; so that the action done by these nourishes the two regions (celestial and subterranean); then again, the Gods also are prompted by men's action to act; from the Sun-God comes rain; and thus the said creation (of the Brāhmaṇa) tends to the nourishment of this (terrestrial) region also.

'*He brought unto existence,*'—*i.e.*, produced, the Brāhmaṇa and other castes,—'*from out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet,*' respectively; *i.e.*, the Brāhmaṇa from out of his mouth, the Kṣattriya out of his arms, the Vaishya out of his thighs and the Shūdra out of his feet.—The affix '*tasi*' (*in* '*mukha-bāhūrupādataḥ*') has the sense of the Ablative; the effect is, as it were, drawn out of the cause; and this implying a sort of *separation*, the use of the Ablative becomes fully justified.

It was only a certain primeval Brāhmaṇa whom Prajāpati produced, by his divine power, out of the component particles of his own mouth; because so far as the

Brāhmaṇas of the present day are concerned, they are all actually found to be produced by intercourse between human couples, out of the material principles.

In reality however, what is stated here is merely commendatory, intended to show the relative superiority and inferiority of the castes ;—the meaning being—'of all beings Prajāpati is the highest,—among all the limbs of Prajāpati, the mouth is the highest,—similarly the Brāhmaṇa is the highest, most praiseworthy, of all the castes ;' and on the basis of this similarity the Brāhmaṇa is described as produced out of Brahma's mouth.

Or, the description of the Brāhmaṇa coming out of Brahmā's mouth may be due to the fact that the work of the mouth, such as teaching and the like, belongs pre-eminently to the Brāhmaṇa ; to the Kṣattriya belongs the work of the arms, fighting ; to the Vaishya the work of the thighs, such as wandering about with the cows, when tending cattle, and also travelling for trade on land and water ; and to the Shūdra belongs the work of the feet, *i.e.*, service.—(31)

XVIII. Creation of the Male and the Female

VERSE XXXII

HAVING DIVIDED HIS BODY INTO TWO HALVES, WITH THE ONE HALF, THE LORD BECAME MALE, AND WITH THE OTHER HALF, FEMALE ; FROM HER HE PRODUCED VIRĀJ.—(32)

Bhāṣya.

The creation described here is apparently of another Being; but others have held that it is of the same *Brahmā*; the meaning being that the body that came out of the Egg being divided into two halves, '*with one half he became Male*'—*i.e.*, he became a male being, capable of instilling semen—and '*with the other half he became the Female*'; that is, his body assumed the form of the Hermaphrodite, like *Gaurī-Shaṅkara* (combined in a single body). Or, it may mean that he created the Female apart (from the Male).—Having created her, he produced, from her, by the act of procreation, that being whose well-known name is '*Virāj.*' What is meant is that Prajāpati had recourse to his own daughter.

This mention of the bifurcation of Prajāpati's body is based upon the fact that the husband and wife differ only in their bodies, and in all functions they are entirely united.—(32)

XIX. Creation of Manu

VERSE XXXIII

O BEST OF BRĀHMAṆAS, KNOW ME, THE CREATOR OF THIS WHOLE (WORLD), TO BE THAT WHOM THE SAID BEING VIRĀJ HIMSELF, AFTER HAVING PERFORMED AUSTERITIES, PRODUCED.—(33)

Bhāṣya.

'*The said Virāj, having performed austerities,*' produced a person; *know—i.e.*, recognise—that person to be myself;—there is nothing that is not already known to you, by tradition, which I could describe to you; all that the speaker intends to point out is the purity of his own birth.

The phrase '*the creator of this whole world*' indicates his almighty character. The idea of the speaker is that 'the describing of myself as one of excellent birth and superior powers of action will make me more trustworthy.'

Or, the mention of his own birth might be for the purpose of carrying conviction (removing all doubts); that such may be the sense is shown by the fact that, though the origin of Manu is already known from other sources, yet he himself mentions it; for instance, even though a person is already known from other sources (as the son of a certain person), yet he is asked—'are you Devadatta's son?'—and he answers 'yes'; whereupon certainty of conviction is brought about.

Poets are not ashamed of describing the nobility of their own birth, even though their glories may be already well known.

'*O best of Brāhmaṇas*'—is the form of address; '*best*' means *most perfect*, most superior.—(33)

XX. Creation of Marichi and other Sages

VERSES XXXIV—XXXV

BEING DESIROUS OF BRINGING INTO EXISTENCE THE (VARIOUS KINDS OF) CREATED BEINGS, I, AT THE VERY OUTSET, PERFORMED MOST ARDUOUS AUSTERITIES AND CALLED INTO BEING THE TEN GREAT SAGES, THE DIRECTORS OF ALL CREATED THINGS; (34)—*viz*: MARĪCHI, ATRI, AṄGIRAS, PULASTYA, PULAHA, KRATU, PRACHETAS, VASHIṢṬHA, BHṚGU AND ALSO NĀRADA.—(35)

Bhāṣya,

'*I called into being*,'—produced,—'*the ten Great Sages*,' who are '*the directors of all created things*';—'*at the very outset, having performed most arduous austerities*'—austerities that were performed with great difficulty; *i.e.*, which bring suffering and take a long time.

The ten great sages are mentioned by name (in verse 35).—(34-35)

VERSE XXXVI

THESE MIGHTY (SAGES) CALLED INTO BEING THE SEVEN MANUS, GODS AND GODS' HABITATIONS, AS ALSO GREAT SAGES,—ALL POSSESSED OF ILLIMITABLE POWER.—(36)

Bhāṣya.

The aforesaid Great Sages '*called into being the seven Manus*'; 'Manu' is the name of the office; that person is called 'Manu' who, during a particular '*Manvantara*' (Cycle), controls the creating and maintaining of all created things, in the manner described.

'*Bhūritējasaḥ*,' 'mighty,' and '*amitaujasaḥ*,' 'possessing illimitable power,'—both terms mean the same thing; the

former with the nominative ending qualifies the *creators,* and the latter, with the accusative ending, qualifies those *created,* Manus and the rest.

Question :—" But the gods were created by Brahmā himself (as already described in Verse 22)."

Answer :—True ; but not all of them ; there are endless kinds of gods.

'*Gods' habitations*'—The abode of the gods, such as the Celestial Region, the 'Region of Brahman,' and so forth.—(36)

XXI. Creation of the Semi-divine Beings

VERSE XXXVII

[They called into being] also Yakṣas, Rakṣasas, Pishāchas, Gandharvas, Apsarases, Asuras, Nāgas, Sarpas, Suparṇas, and the several orders of Pitṛs.—(37)

Bhāṣya.

The various forms of the Yakṣa and other beings here mentioned can be known only from the *Itihāsas* and such other sources; they cannot be known by any of the ordinary means of cognition, perception and the rest.—The '*Yakṣas*' are the followers of Kuvēra;—'*Rākhṣasas*,' Bivīṣaṇa and others;—beings more cruel than these last are '*Pishāchas*,' who live in unclean places and in deserts, &c., and are inferior to *Yakṣas* and *Rākṣasas*; though all three are mischievous; by trickery they draw out the life of living beings, and by some invisible power they bring about diseases: so say persons knowing the *Itihāsas* (stories) and *Mantras* (Incantations).—'*Gandharvas*,' are those followers of the Gods whose chief work consists of singing and dancing;—'*Apsarases*,' the courtezans of the Gods, Urvashī and the rest;—'*Asuras*,' the Gods' enemies, Vṛttra, Virochana, Hiraṇyākṣa and so forth;—'*Nāgas*' (the Great Serpents), Vāsuki, Takṣaka and the rest;—'*Sarpas*' (Serpents) are well known;—'*Suparṇas*,' the great Birds, Garuḍa and the rest;—'*Pitṛs*,' named '*Somapa*,' '*Āyyapa*' and so forth, who reside, like Gods, in their own regions; the '*several orders*' of these also;—all these (the mighty sages) called into being.—(37)

XXII. Creation of Clouds, etc.

VERSE XXXVIII.

[THEY CALLED INTO BEING] LIGHTNINGS, HAILS, CLOUDS, VERTICAL PHOSPHORESCENCE, RAINBOWS, METEORS, PORTENTOUS SOUNDS, COMETS, AND STARS OF VARYING MAGNITUDES.—(38)

Bhāṣya.

The semi-brilliant flash of light seen within the clouds is called '*lightning*,' of which the other names are '*Taḍit*,' '*Saudāminī*' and so forth, which are based upon certain peculiar characteristics;—'*Hails*'—stone-like finely visible snow-particles, which, propelled by strong winds, fall like torrents of rain and destroy corns and other things;—'*Clouds*,' consist of the combination, in the atmosphere, of vapour, water, air and light;—'*Vertical Phosphorescence*,' is an upright mass of violet-coloured luminous matter, occasionally visible in the sky; it is seen sometimes attached to the disc of the sun, and sometimes in other places also;—a particular form of the same is called '*Rainbow*,' which differs from the former in being curved in the form of a bow;—'*Meteors*,' are those stars which are seen to fall as portents during twilights and at the advent of night, diffusing their brilliance all round;—'*Portentous sounds*,' are sounds emanating from the Earth or Sky, which are regarded as foreboding calamity;—'*Comets*,' the well-known stars with protruding crowns, seen during a public calamity;—as also various kinds of other stars, *Dhruva*, *Agastya*, *Arundhatī* and so forth.—(38)

XXIII. Creation of Birds and Animals

VERSE XXXIX

[THEY CALLED INTO BEING] KINNARAS, APES, FISHES, BIRDS OF VARIOUS KINDS, CATTLE, DEER, MEN AND WILD BEASTS WITH TWO ROWS OF TEETH.—(39)

Bhāṣya.

'*Kinnaras*' are horse-faced beings living in the Himālaya and other mountains.—'*Apes*' are animals with the face of the monkey and the body of the man.—'*Birds*,' feathered animals.—'*Cattle*,' goats, sheep, camels, asses and the rest.—'*Deer*,' the *Ruru* the *Pṛṣat* and the other species.—'*Wild beasts*'—wicked animals, like the Tiger and the rest;—'*with two rows of teeth*,' having two rows of teeth, one above and another below.—(39)

XXIV. Creation of Insects and Reptiles and Immovable Things

VERSE XL

[THEY CALLED INTO BEING] WORMS, BEETLES AND MOTHS; LICE, FLIES AND BUGS; GADFLIES AND GNATS; AND ALSO THE ENTIRE HOST OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF IMMOVABLE THINGS.—(40)

Bhāṣya.

'*Worms*'—extremely small living things.—'*Beetles*'—are slightly larger than worms and crawl on the ground.—'*Moths*,' locusts.—'*Immovable things*'—trees, mountains, etc.;—'*of several kinds*,' of different varieties.

The copulative compounds in the singular are in accordance with Pāṇini's Sutra 2.4.8, by which copulative compounds formed of the names of small living beings take the singular ending.—(40)

VERSE XLI.

IN THIS MANNER WAS ALL THIS, MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE, CALLED INTO BEING, THROUGH THE FORCE OF AUSTERITIES, BY THESE HIGH-SOULED SAGES, UNDER MY DIRECTION,—IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR ACTIONS.—(41)

Bhāṣya.

'*In this manner*,'—refers to the manner discribed above;—'*by these high-souled sages*,'—Marīchi and the rest;—'*all this, movable and immovable, was called into being, in accordance with their actions*,'—the creation of each being was in keeping with the nature of the action done by it during other lives; that is, each being was made to be born in that family of animals which was the right one for it, in view of its past acts;—

'*under my direction*,'—by my order ;—'*through the force of austerities*,'—having performed severe austerities ; what this is meant to show is that any kind of great power can be acquired only by means of austerities.—(41)

VERSE XLII

THAT KIND OF ACTION WHICH BELONGS TO THE SEVERAL BEINGS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED HERE. I AM NOW GOING TO EXPLAIN THE MANNER OF THEIR BIRTH.—(42)

Bhāṣya.

'*That kind of action which belongs to the several beings*,'—*i.e.*, hurtful or harmless—'*has been already described*' ;—now '*I am going to explain the manner of their birth*.'

Objection.—"Where has the *action* been described ? In Verses 37 *et seq.* what occurs is only the mention of the names of several beings, *Yakṣa*, *Rākṣasa* and the rest ; and their action is not mentioned at all."

Our answer is as follows :—The action of each being is indicated by its name ; the particular name being acquired by each being by reason of its actions : for instance, the *Yakṣas* are so called because of the act of *worshipping*, or *pervading* ('*Yakṣaṇa*') ;—the '*Rākṣasa*' are so called because of the act of *destroying in secret* ('*rahasi kṣaṇana*') ;—the *Pishāchas* are so called because of the act of devouring flesh ('*pishitāshana*') ;—the *Apsarases* are so called because of the act of *issuing forth from water* (*adbhyaḥ sṛtāḥ*) ;—the *Asuras* are so called because of the act of *not obtaining surā*, in the form of nectar ; and so on, the significance of the other names may be traced.

'*The manner of their birth*.'—*i.e.*, they are *viviparous*, *oviparous* and the like ; going to be described in the following verses.—(42)

XXV. The Viviparous, Oviparous, Sweat-born and Vegetable Beings

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VERSE XLIII

CATTLE, DEER, WILD BEASTS WITH TWO ROWS OF TEETH, RĀKṢASAS, PISHĀCHAS AND MEN ARE VIVIPAROUS.—(43)

Bhāṣya.

These are '*viviparous*,' 'born from the *Jarāyu*'; *Jarāyu* is the womb, the place where the fœtus lies; it is in the womb that these beings are conceived first, and it is only when they are emitted from the womb that they become *born*; this is the manner of the birth of these beings.

The term '*dat*' is synonymous with '*danta*,' and is totally different from it; hence it is that we have the nominative plural form '*ubhayatodataḥ*' ('with two rows of teeth').—(34)

VERSE XLIV

BIRDS; SERPENTS, CROCODILES, FISHES, TORTOISES, AND OTHER ANIMALS OF SIMILAR KINDS, TERRESTRIAL AS WELL AS AQUATIC,—ARE OVIPAROUS.—(44)

Bhāṣya.

'*Crocodiles*'—includes the Porpoise and the rest;—'*Kachchhapāḥ*' are the Tortoises;—'*other animals of similar kinds*'—*i.e.*, wizards and the like, which are '*terrestrial*,' born on land, and such others of similar kinds as are '*aquatic*,' born in water; such, for instance, as conches and the rest.—(44)

VERSE XLV

GADFLIES AND GNATS, LICE, FLIES AND BUGS, ARE SWEAT-BORN; WHATEVER ELSE IS OF SIMILAR CHARACTER IS BORN FROM HEAT.—(45)

Bhāṣya.

'*Sweat*'—is the moisture from within that arises in all earthy substances from contact with the heat of such things as fire or the sun; and out of this are born gadflies, gnats and the rest.—'*Whatever else is of a similar character*'—*i.e.*, extremely small, such as white ants, ants, and so forth,—'*is born from heat.*' The term '*uṣman*' may be taken to be the same as '*sweat*,' or as the *heat* that causes sweating.

If we read '*upajāyantē*' (for *upajāyatē* in line 2 of the verse), the last phrase should be read as '*yē chānyē kēchidīdṛshāḥ*' (in view of the plural form of the verb '*upajāyantē*').—(45)

VERSE XLVI

ALL THOSE IMMOVABLE BEINGS THAT ARE PRODUCED BY SPLITTING (*i.e.*, PLANTS) GROW OUT OF SEEDS AND SLIPS. THOSE THAT, ABOUNDING IN FLOWERS, PERISH WITH THE RIPENING OF THEIR FRUIT, ARE CALLED 'OṢADHIS' ('ANNUALS').—(46)

Bhāṣya.

'*Udbhid*' stands for '*udbhēdana*,' *the act of splitting*; the '*kvip*' affix having a nominal force;—'*those that are produced by splitting* are '*udbhijja*'; they are so called because they come into existence by *splitting* the seed and *breaking through* the soil; and these are *plants*; *all* these plants '*grow out of seeds and slips*' and become fixed in their places by means of roots and trunks and other such things.

'*Oṣadhyaḥ*'—the right form is '*oṣadhayaḥ*' (because the base ends in short *i*). Or we may take the word as a form of the base with the long *ī*; this lengthening of the vowel being

explained, either as according to the *Vārtika* on Pāṇini 4. 1. 45, or as a Vedic anomaly.

The natural characteristic feature of these *oṣadhis—i.e.*, Annuals—is as follows: '*They perish with the ripening of their fruit*';—*i.e.*, the ripening of the fruit constitutes their *end* or *perishing*; as a matter of fact, the paddy and other such plants perish as soon as their fruit has ripened. They also abound in, are endowed with, many fruits and flowers.

What is stated in this verse is the distinguishing characteristic of *oṣadhis* (Annual plants), and what follows in the following verse, constitutes the distinguishing feature of *Vṛkṣas* (Perennial Trees); the characters mentioned being attributed to them in accordance with actual facts.—(46)

XXVI Different ways of Fruit-bearing.

VERSE XLVII

THOSE TREES THAT ARE CALLED 'VANASPATI' BEAR FRUITS WITHOUT FLOWERS; AND THOSE CALLED '*Vṛkṣa*' BEAR BOTH FLOWERS AND FRUITS.—(47)

Bhāṣya.

[The ordinary meaning of the verse is as follows]—Those trees, in whom fruits are produced without flowers, are called '*Vanaspati*,' not '*Vṛkṣa*'; while those that bear flowers as well as fruits are, by reason of the presence of both, called '*Vṛkṣa*.' As a matter of fact, however, *Vanaspatis* are also called '*Vṛkṣa*,' and *Vṛkṣas* are spoken of as '*Vanaspati*.' The particular grounds of such usage will have to be shown later on.

What we hold however (as to the real meaning of this verse), is as follows:—The present work does not make it its business to lay down the meanings of words, in the manner of grammatical works; so that the meaning of the verse cannot be that 'those that have such and such a character are denoted by the word *Vanaspati*, and so forth.' In fact what is described here is the manner of the birth of fruits; this (*manner of birth*) having been put forward (in Verse 42) as the subject in hand. The meaning thus is as follows:—Fruits are produced in two ways: they are produced without flowers, and also from flowers; and flowers are produced from trees (called *Vṛkṣa*). Thus then, it follows that, even though the statement is apparently in the form 'those that bear fruits without flowers are to be known as *Vanaspati*,'—yet in view of what forms the subject-matter of the context, the '*yat*' ('which') and '*tat*' ('that') should be made to change their places; the construction being—'those trees that are

known by the name *Vanaspati* have no flowers, and yet they bear fruits';—*i.e.*, in these trees fruits grow without flowers; this construction is adopted on the strength of actual facts. Such altering of the construction on the strength of facts we also find in such cases as the following:—Though the actual words are in the form '*vāsasā stambham parivēṣṭayēt*,' 'the post should be surrounded with cloth,'—yet in as much as the cloth has got to be worn by the man, the words are constructed as '*stambhē nidhāya vāsaḥ paridhāpayēt*,' 'the cloth should be hung on the post and then made to be worn.'

Though what is stated in the present verse is a well known fact (and as such did not need to be mentioned in the *Smṛti*), yet it has been mentioned with the purpose of serving as an introduction to what is going to be stated below in Verse 49—'*Enveloped in darkness*, &c. &c.'—(47)

XXVII. Clumps, thickets and grasses, &c.

VERSE XLVIII

THE VARIOUS KINDS OF CLUMPS AND THICKETS, AND THE OTHER SPECIES OF GRASS, AS ALSO LOW-SPREADING TENDRILS AND CREEPERS—ALL THESE GROW OUT OF SEEDS AND SLIPS.—(48)

Bhāṣya.

'*Clumps and Thickets*'—is the name given to the cluster of those shoots that grow together in large numbers, having one or several roots, and do not attain any considerable height; *e.g.*, Copses and the like. Or '*guchchha*' 'Clump' and '*gulma*' 'thicket' may be taken as two different things; the difference between the two being that, while one bears flowers, the other is flowerless.—Other '*species of grass*'—*e. g., kusha, shādbala, shaṅkhapuṣpī* and so forth.—*Lowspreading tendrils*—the long shoots of grass spreading on the ground.—'*Creepers*'—are those shoots that grow out of the earth and clinging round a tree or some other object, rise upwards.—All these, like trees, '*grow out of seeds and slips.*'—(48)

VERSE XLIX

ALL THESE (VEGETABLE BEINGS) ARE INVESTED BY MANIFOLD 'DARKNESS' (INERTIA), THE RESULT OF THEIR ACTS; AND POSSESSING INNER CONSCIOUSNESS, THEY ARE AFFECTED BY PLEASURE AND PAIN.—(49)

Bhāṣya.

They are '*invested,*' pervaded over, by that 'Darkness' (Inertia) of which the cause is '*action,*' in the form of *vice*;—'*manifold,*' being the cause of the experiencing of various kinds of pain. As a matter of fact, all things are made up of three Constituent Attributes; so what is meant is that in the beings here described the Attribute of 'Darkness' is

in excess, and those of 'Harmony' and 'Energy' are present in less degrees; hence as abounding in 'Darkness' (Inertia), and beset with pain and humiliation, they continue, for a long time, to experience the results of their vicious acts.

In as much as the Attribute of 'Goodness' (Harmony) also is present in them, they do enjoy, in certain conditions, small measures of pleasure also; it is in view of this that they are described as '*affected by pleasure and pain.*'

'*Possessing inner consciousness,*'—the term '*sañjñā*' stands for *Buddhi*, Intelligence (Consciousness); and in as much as activity in the form of going out, speaking and the like,—which are the effects indicative of the presence of consciousness,—is absent (in Trees), they are described as '*possessing inner consciousness.*' This must be the meaning of the epithet '*inner*'; as otherwise, since every person exercises consciousness only *within* himself [there would be no point in the epithet at all]. Or, the meaning may be that plants are unable to have any cognisance of the prickings of thorns and other small things, to the extent that human beings are; in fact for the experiencing of pain they stand in need of such massive strokes as *cutting with the axe* and the like;—being, in this respect, like animate beings in the state of sleep, intoxication or swoon. [Which shows that plants have their consciousness lying far deeper within than in animals.]—(49)

VERSE L

THUS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE, BEGINNING WITH BRAHMĀ AND ENDING WITH THOSE JUST MENTIONED, WHICH OCCUR IN THIS EVER FRIGHTFUL AND CONSTANTLY FLUCTUATING CYCLE OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS OF CREATED BEINGS.—(50)

Bhāṣya.

'*Ending with those just mentioned*';—those conditions of life of which the end, or last, is the condition of the Creeper.—'*Condition*'—stands for the connection of the soul with a particular body for the experiencing of the result of

past acts; and there is no worse—*i. e.*, more painful,—'condition' of life than that of Plants; and than the condition of 'Brahmā' there is none higher or superior—*i.e.*, more full of bliss. These 'conditions' are attained by means of good and bad acts, respectively called 'Virtue' and 'Vice'; as regards the attaining of the Supreme Brahman, which consists in Salvation, and is in the form of pure bliss,—this proceeds either from pure Knowledge, or from a combination of Knowledge and Action; this we shall describe later on (in Discourse XII).

'*In this cycle of births and deaths of created beings*;'—in this '*samsāra*,' cycle, series of births and deaths, of '*created beings*,' conscious entities; *i. e.*, in which (ordinarily) the entity is not born in a genus other than in which it was in the previous existence;—'*frightful*,'—full of fear, for those that are careless and lazy; it is 'full of fear' in the sense that there is losing of the desirable and coming by the undesirable;—'*constantly*,' at all times,—'*fluctuating*,' *i. e*, liable to go off, destructible, (hence) devoid of essence;—it is '*ever frightful*,' *i.e.*, it is never not-*frightful*; it is spoken of as 'ever *frightful*' because even when one has attained the condition of gods, and remains there for a long time, he has to return to death.

This description of the cycle of births and deaths as being due to Virtue and Vice serves to show that Scripture serves an all-important purpose; it has to be born in mind that it is only from Scripture that we can obtain a knowledge of the distinction between 'Virtue' and 'Vice.'—(50)

XXXI. Disappearance of Brahmā

VERSE LI

THUS REPEATEDLY SUPPRESSING TIME (OF DISSOLUTION) BY TIME (OF CREATION AND MAINTENANCE), HE, OF INCONCEIVABLE POWER, CREATED ALL THIS AND ALSO MYSELF; [HE DIRECTED ME TO MAINTAIN IT] AND THEN DISAPPEARED WITHIN HIMSELF.—(51)

Bhāṣya.

'*Thus*'—*i. e.*, something directly himself, and some under Prajāpati's directions, the Blessed Lord,—having *created* produced,—*all this* world,—and having directed *myself* to maintain (keep going) this world;—'*He*' whose '*power*,' sovereignty over all things, is '*inconceivable*,' amazingly great, the Creator,—'*disappeared*,'—brought about his own absorption; *i. e.*, having renounced the body that he had, of his own will, taken up, He again became unmanifest;—'*within himself*';—other things become absorbed in the Root Evolvent; but He did not become absorbed in any thing else, He disappeared within his own self; He has no other source wherein He could, like other things, become absorbed; for the simple reason that all beings have their source in Him. Or '*disappearing*' may mean desisting from the entire worldly process.

'*Repeatedly suppressing time by time*'—the Present-participle ('suppressing') is connected with the verb 'having created'; the meaning being—'destroying the time of dissolution by the time of creation and maintenance';—'*repeatedly*,' again and again; it will be described later on that 'there are endless creations and dissolutions.'—(51)

VERSE LII

WHEN THAT DIVINE BEING IS AWAKE, THEN THIS WORLD IS ACTIVE; WHEN HE SLUMBERS, WITH HIS MIND IN CALM REPOSE, THEN ALL VANISHES.—(52)

Bhāṣya.

'*When that Divine Being is awake*—*i. e.*, when he wills, that 'this world may come into being and may continue to exist for such a time,'—'*then this world is active*'; that is, it becomes accompanied by such internal activities as mental, verbal and material, and such external activities as inspiration, respiration, eating, walking, cultivation, sacrifice and so forth.

'*When he slumbers*'—when his will desists from the creation and maintaining of the world,—'*then all vanishes*,' undergoes absorption.

'Waking' and 'sleeping' here stand respectively for the *prevalence* and *cessation* of his will.

'*With his mind in calm repose*'—means that he has withdrawn from his state of diversity.—(52)

VERSE LIII

WHEN HE SLUMBERS, HAVING RETIRED WITHIN HIMSELF, ALL ACTIVE EMBODIED BEINGS DESIST FROM THEIR ACTIONS, AND THEIR MIND FALLS INTO DEPRESSION.—(53)

Bhāṣya.

The meaning of this verse is quite clear, its meaning having been already explained.

'*Having retired within himself*'—*i.e.*, in calm repose, *i.e.*, in pure pristine nature of the Soul at rest;—'*retiring within himself*' stands for the cessation of all accidental diversities.

'*Active*'—the conscious beings who are fallen in the cycle of births and deaths, and for whom *Action* is of the greatest importance;—'*embodied beings*,'—so called because they feel the effects of being connected with a body which is the effect of their own past acts.

'*When he slumbers,*' all these '*desist from their actions,*'—this stands for the cessation of their *bodily* activity ;—'*their mind falls into depression*'—this stands for the cessation of their mental activity. Thus this cessation of bodily and mental activities indicates the state of Dissolution.—'*Depression*' means absence of energy, disability to carry on its functions ; this is what the Mind *falls into*,—attains.—(53)

XXXII. The Great Dissolution

VERSE LIV

WHEN THIS SOUL OF ALL THINGS SLEEPS HAPPY AND CONTENTED, THEN ALL THINGS BECOME ABSORBED ALL AT ONCE IN THAT GREAT SOUL.—(54)

Bhāṣya.

This verse has to be explained by reversing the position of 'when' and 'then'; otherwise, from what has been said in the foregoing verses, there would be mutual interdependence: it has been stated (in Verse 52) that *when He sleeps then all things vanish* [and if the persent verse is taken to mean, as the words suggest, that when the things vanish into the Great Soul, then this Great Soul retires to sleep, then we would have the vanishing of things dependent upon his going to sleep, as stated in 52, and his going to sleep dependent upon the vanishing of things, as stated in 54].

'*Sleeps happy and contented,*'—Happiness forms the very nature of the Supreme Brahman; hence it is not meant that He is happy during sleep and unhappy at other times;—of what nature his '*sleep*' is has already been explained;—as regards his '*contentment*,' that is everlasting; consisting of pure bliss, this Supreme Soul is never affected by the waves of agitation that are set up in Nescience. Though (even with all this) it is possible for him to be the *Creator* of all things. In the ordinary world, a man retires from his household duties after having done that he had to do,—with the feeling, 'I have earned all the wealth that was necessary for my family; I am free from troubles,'—and thus sleeps in happiness and contentment, without fearing any trouble to himself. To such a person is the Supreme Soul compared; this whole world being in the position of 'family' to him;—this being intended as his praise.

Or [in order to avoid the necessity of having to reverse the order of the words] the verse may be taken as referring to Primordial Matter : When Primordial Matter sleeps, then all things become absorbed into it all at once; that is, they become resolved into the form of Primordial Matter, being reduced to the position of their cause ; that is, they are reduced to a 'condition in which they cease to undergo modifications.'—'*All at once*,' all things contained in the womb of the three regions.—The '*sleep*' of Primordial Matter, which is devoid of consciousness, can mean only *cessation of evolution*, and not *inhibition of consciousness* ;—'*happiness*' also is only figurative, for the same reason that Matter is devoid of consciousness.—(54)

XXXIII. Exit of the Individual Soul

VERSE LV

THIS (INDIVIDUAL SOUL), ON ENTERING INTO 'DARKNESS,' REMAINS, FOR A LONG TIME, EQUIPPED WITH THE SENSE-ORGANS, BUT DOES NOT PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS; THEN IT DEPARTS FROM THE BODY.—(55)

Bhāṣya.

Now by means of these two verses the author is going to describe the dying and the obtaining of another body by the Soul fallen in the cycle of births and deaths.

'*Darkness*'—stands for cessation of consciousness (preceding death);—*entering into*, falling into, this unconsciousness *it remains for a long time, equipped with the sense-organs; but does not perform its functions*—of breathing in and out; *then it departs*—goes out—*from the body*, the corporeal frame.

Question:—"As a matter of fact, the Soul is omnipresent, and all-pervading like *Ākāsha*; so that what kind of '*departure*' is it that occurs in its case?"

Answer.—'*Departure*' means only the renouncing of the body that had been obtained as the result of past acts; and it does not mean that, it goes from one place to another, like a material object.—Or, the answer may be, as held by some people, that the '*departure*' spoken of is that of another and a more subtle body which comes into existence in between (the two bodies). But this intermediate body is not admitted by others; as for instance, it has been declared by the revered Vyāsa—'This present body having disappeared, the sense-organs forthwith enter into another body; so that there is no intermediate body.' Some followers of the *Sāṅkhya* such as Vindhyavāsin and the rest, also do not admit of an intermediate body.

"What is this 'intermediate body'?"

When this (physical) body has been destroyed, so long as a place in the womb of the (future) mother is not secured, where the second (physical body) would be formed, there exists during the interval, a subtle body entirely devoid of all sensation, which cannot come into contact with any thing, which is not burnt by fire and which is not obstructed by elemental substances.

Others explain the '*mūrti*' of the text as the Supreme Self. The Supreme Self, which is the Soul of all things, is like the Ocean; out of that emerge the Jīvas (Individual Souls) under the influence of nescience, just in the same manner as waves emerge from the Ocean; and when the Individual Soul thus emerges out of the Supreme Soul, it assumes, by virtue of its past Virtue and Vice, a form known by the name '*Puryaṣṭaka*'; and this is the 'subtle body,' which serves as the clothing of the Individual Soul. This has been thus declared in the Purāṇa—'He becomes united with the *Puryaṣṭaka*-form, which is known as Prāṇa (Life); when bound up with this, *he is in bondage*, and when freed from it, he is *released*.' The '*puryaṣṭaka*,' '*eight-fold*' frame consists of the five life-breaths,—*Prāṇa*, *Apāna*, *Samāna*, *Udāna* and *Vyāna*—the Group consisting of the five organs of sensation, the Group consisting of the five organs of action, and the Mind as the eighth. This body is not destroyed, until the condition of Final Release is attained. This is thus stated (in *Sankhyakārikā* 40)—'What migrates is the subtle body, which is devoid of feeling, but invested with tendencies.'—(55)

XXXIV. Transmigration of the Individual Soul

VERSE LVI

WHEN, INVESTED WITH MINUTE PARTICLES, THE INDIVIDUAL ENTERS THE MOVEABLE OR IMMOVEABLE SEED;—THEN, BECOMING UNITED WITH THE AFORESAID (SUBTILE BODY), IT ASSUMES THE (NEW) BODY.—(56)

Bhāṣya.

'*Invested with minute particles*'—that which is constituted by *minute*, subtile, *particles*, parts. This may refer either to the '*Puryaṣṭaka*,' or the 'Intermediate Body'; or to the Soul itself;—all Souls being by their very nature, *subtile*; as stated in such texts as 'This Self within the heart, is extremely minute.'

'*Seed*'—The source of the physical body;—'*Immoveable*,' that which is the cause of the birth of trees, &c.;—'*Moveable*,' animate.—'*Enters into*,' becomes enclosed in;—then '*united with the aforesaid*,'—*i.e.*, with Prāṇa and other constituents of the subtile body)—then '*it assumes*,' attaches to itself, the body; *i.e.*, takes up the new corporeal frame.—(56)

XXXV. Creation of all things by Brahma's waking and sleepiug

VERSE LVII

THUS BY WAKING AND SLEEPING, THE IMPERISHABLE ONE INCESSANTLY BRINGS TO LIFE AND DESTROYS ALL THIS THAT IS MOVEABLE AND IMMOVEABLE.—(57)

Bhāṣya.

This verse recapitulates what has been said before.

By means of his own '*waking and sleeping*,' he produces and destroys the world consisting of *moveable and immoveable* beings, *i.e.*, vegetables and animals. '*Imperishable*'—Indestructible.—(57).

XXXVI. Origin of the Law.

VERSE LVIII

Having propounded this Law, he himself, first of all, taught it to me with due care; I then taught it to Marīchi and other Sages.—(58)

Bhāṣya.

In the present context the term 'Law' stands for *the whole collection of Injunctions and Prohibitions contained in the Smṛitis*, and not for any particular *treatise;* as this latter was composed by Manu; that is why the Treatise is called '*Mānava*' (of Manu); otherwise [*i.e.*, if the Treatise were the 'Law' propounded by the Imperishable One], it would have been '*Hairaṇyagarbha*,' 'of Hiraṇyagarbha.'

Others however have held that the Treatise itself was composed by Hiraṇyagarbha [and is spoken of in the text as the 'Law' propounded by him], and since it came to be revealed to, and published among, many persons by *Manu*, it is only right that it should be called after the name of the latter. For instance, the Ganga has its real source somewhere else (in Heaven), and yet since it is seen for the first time in the Himavat (Himālaya), it is called '*Haimavatī*' (proceeding from Himavat), after the name of the latter;—similarly though the Vedic text is eternal, yet since it was expounded by Kaṭha, it is called '*Kāṭhaka*,' after his name; even though there are several other expounders and learners of that Veda, yet it is called after Kaṭha, on account of the superiority of his expounding. Nārada also has declared thus:—'This Treatise, consisting of 100,000 verses, was composed by Prajāpati, and, in due course, it came to be abridged by Manu and others.' Thus, even though the Treatise may have been originally composed by some one else, there is nothing incongruous in its being called 'Mānava,' 'of Manu.' As for the term '*Shāstra*,' '*Law*' (of the text) standing for the *Treatise*, we often find

it so used, in the sense that the subject expounded by it is *instruction*, '*shāsana*.'

'*He taught it to me*,' I was taught by him.—'*Himself*,' '*first of all*,' '*with care*,'—these words indicate the fact that there was no break in the continuity of tradition in regard to the Law. As a matter of fact, when the author of a book '*himself*' teaches it first of all, not a single syllable of it is lost: while when the book composed by one person is taught by another person who has learnt it from the former, there is not the same '*care*' taken in guarding the text from loss. In fact, in the case of the author himself, when he has taught it once and established its position, he feels confident that he has already taught it once, and hence when he comes to teach the work a second time, he is likely to be careless and lazy; so that lapses in the text become possible; hence the text has added the phrase '*first of all*.—'*With due care*,'—the term '*vidhi*,' '*care*,' stands here for the quality, in the teacher and the pupil, of having undiverted attention, a concentrated mind; and the affix '*vati*' (in the term '*vidhivat*') signifies *capability, possession*.

'*Then I taught it to Marīchi and other sages*.'—In as much as Marīchi and the other sages are persons of well-known reputation, when Manu speaks of such well-known persons having learnt the Law from him, he describes his connection with specially qualified pupils, and thereby indicates his well-established professional dignity; and by pointing out the importance of the Law, he produces in the minds of the great sages (who have asked him in verse 1 *et seq.* to propound the Law) faith and confidence, so that they may be unremitting in their study; the idea being—'So important is this Law that even such great sages as Marīchi and the rest have learnt it,—Manu also is such a high personage that he is the Teacher of those great sages,—so that it is highly proper that this Treatise should be learnt from him'; with this idea in their minds, the enquirers who have come to hear the Law propounded would not cease to give their attention to it.—Both these facts are mentioned with a view to eulogise the Law.—(58)

XXXVII. Advice to Learn from Bhrgu

VERSE LIX

THIS BHṚGU WILL FULLY DESCRIBE TO YOU THIS (LAW); THIS SAGE HAS LEARNT THE WHOLE OF THIS IN ITS ENTIRETY, FROM ME.—(59)

Bhāṣya.

'*This*,' Law;—'*to you*';—'*Bhṛgu will describe fully*,' will carry it to your ears, will teach and will explain: The pronoun '*this*' (in the second line) refers to the *Law*; the whole of this Law this Sage has '*learnt*,' read, '*in its entirety*,' '*from me*,' at my hands. The teaching proceeds as it were, from the Teacher's mouth, and the pupil takes hold of it, as it were; it is for this reason that we have the affix '*tasi*,' in the word '*mattaḥ*,' in the sense of the Ablative.

Bhṛgu is a person whose greatness is very well known to the sages; so that by directing him to explain the Law, Manu shows that the Law has come down through a tradition of teaching handed down by a long line of several persons possessing exceptional knowledge of all sciences. It is for this reason that some people are to undertake the study of the Law by the following considerations:—'This Law has come down from several high-souled persons,—why then should we not study it.' This consideration serves to prompt men to study and thus attracts them to the Law.—(59)

XXXVIII. Bhṛgu Begins

VERSE XXXVIII

THEREUPON, BEING THUS DIRECTED BY MANU, THE GREAT SAGE BHṚGU, WITH A GLADDENED HEART, SAID TO THE SAGES—'LISTEN.'—(60)

Bhāṣya.

That great sage '*Bhṛgu*,' '*being thus directed*'—prompted, by means of the words 'Bhṛgu will describe it to you';—'*thereupon*,'—after that,—'*said to the sages—'Listen*.'

'*With a gladdened heart*';—his gladness being due to the idea of respectability implied by the fact that from among the several pupils (of Manu) he had been directed to teach; Bhṛgu's idea of his own respectability was based upon this idea—'I, who am an obedient pupil of Manu, have been thus honoured by him, by reason of my special aptitude to expound the Law.'—(60)

[*Here ends the Introductory Section—describing the true origin of the Law and the authorship of the present Treatise.*]

[*Now begins the actual Text of the Treatise, as expounded by Bhṛgu, to the sages who had questioned Manu.*]

XXXIX. Manvantara and the Seven Manus

VERSE LXI

THERE ARE SIX OTHER MANUS, HIGH-SOULED AND MIGHTY, WHO BELONG TO THE SAME RACE AS THIS SVĀYAMBHUVA MANU, AND HAVE CALLED INTO BEING, EACH HIS OWN OFFSPRINGS.—(61)

Bhāṣya.

When the Teacher (Manu) was asked (in the beginning of this work) to explain Duties, he proceeded to describe the origination of the world and other cognate matters; hence when the pupil (Bhṛgu) has been directed to expound the Law, he also begins with the remaining parts of the same process of world-creation.

'*Of this*'—the pronoun refers to the Manu before their eyes;—our teacher, who is known as '*Svāyambhuva*.' There are *six other Manus who belong to the same race* as himself,—persons born in the same family are said to 'belong to the same race,' and since all Manus are called into being directly by Brahmā himself, they are born in the same family, and are hence said to 'belong to the same race.' Or, persons engaged in the same work are also said 'to belong to the same race'; as a matter of fact, living beings are often distributed among 'races' in accordance with the work done by them; *e.g.*, we have such statements as—'related to grammar there are two sages who belong to the same race.'

The text proceeds to point out one such work common to the Manus:—"*They have called into being each his own offsprings*"; in each *Manvantara*, created beings destroyed during the previous *Manvantara* are again created and protected by that particular Manu who holds sway over that *Manvantara*; hence the offsprings that each of them creates are called 'his own.'—(61)

VERSE LXII

[THESE SIX MANUS ARE]—SVĀROCHIṢA, UTTAMA, TĀMASA RAIVATA, CHĀKṢUṢA, AND THE GLORIOUS VIVASVAT-SUTA (THE SON OF VIVASVAT).—(62)

Bhāṣya.

The aforesaid Manus are now mentioned by name.

'*Glorious*' is a qualifying epithet.—The other words are names; some being merely conventional, and others based upon relationship; the last name '*Vivasvat-suta*,' '*Son of Vivasvat*,' is a different kind of word; it is a name bearing the form of a compound; just like the names 'Black-serpent,' '*Narasimha*' (Man-Lion) and the like.

VERSE LXIII

THESE SEVEN ALMIGHTY MANUS, OF WHOM SVĀYAMBHUVA IS THE FIRST, HAVING CALLED INTO EXISTENCE THE WHOLE OF THIS WORLD, CONSISTING OF MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE BEINGS, SUSTAINED IT, EACH DURING HIS OWN REGIME.—(63)

Bhāṣya.

Here *seven Manus* have been mentioned by me; elsewhere they are spoken of as *fourteen.*

'*Each during his own regime*'—during his time, *i.e.*, during the time of his sovereignty.—'*Having called into being*' the offerings, they '*maintained*,' nourished, them.—'*During his own regime*'—means during the time of his sovereignty; *i.e.*, that Manu whose time or turn it was to create and maintain the continuity of the world.

Others explain the term '*antara*' as denoting a particular time-period, just like the words 'month' &c.

But this is not right; it is only when the term '*antara*' occurs along with the term 'Manu' (*i.e.*, in the compound '*Manvantara*') that it becomes expressive of a time-period,—*i.e.*, the time-period known as '*Manvantara*,'—and not when it stands by itself (as it does in the text).

XL. Measures of Time

VERSE LXIV

TEN AND EIGHT 'NIMĒṢAS' (SHOULD BE KNOWN AS) ONE 'KĀṢṬHĀ'; THIRTY SUCH (KĀṢṬHĀS) ONE 'KALĀ'; THIRTY 'KALĀS' ONE 'MŪHURTA'; AND AS MANY 'MUHŪRTAS' ONE 'AHORĀTRA' (DAY AND NIGHT).—(64)

Bhāṣya.

The author now begins to describe the measures of time, which are taught in the Science of Astronomy, for the purpose of determining the exact duration of time of the continuance of the world and its dissolution.

Eighteen '*nimēṣas*' go to make that measure of time which is known as '*Kāṣṭhā*';—thirty '*Kāṣṭhās*' make one '*Kalā*';—thirty '*Kalās*' make one '*Muhūrta,*' and '*as many*'—*i.e.*, thirty;—thirty '*muhūrtas*' make one '*Ahorātra*' (Day and Night).

'*Should be known as*'—this verb has got to be supplied.

'*Tāvataḥ,*' 'as many,' is the Accusative Plural form.

"What is it that is called *Nimēṣa*?"

'*Nimēṣa* is the natural *winking* of the Eye-lashes, which accompanies every opening of the eye. Other people have declared that '*Nimēṣa*' is that time which is taken in the distinct utterance of one letter-sound.—(64)

VERSE LXV

THE SUN DIVIDES THE 'DAY' AND 'NIGHT' OF MEN AND GODS; [OF OTHERS] WHAT IS CONDUCIVE TO THE REPOSE OF BEINGS IS 'NIGHT,' AND WHAT IS CONDUCIVE TO ACTIVITY IS 'DAY.'—(65)

'*Ahorātra*'—'day' and 'night'; of these the Sun makes the division; the Sun having risen, so long as his rays are

visible, it is called 'day'; and from the time that the Sun sets to the time that he rises again, it is called 'night.' Such is the case in the region of men and in the region of Gods.

"In a place where the Sun does not reach with his rays,—how is one to make this division of 'day' and 'night'?"

The answer to this is given in the second line—'*what is conducive* &c.' For such beings as are self-illumined, as the light is always there (and it never ceases) the division of 'day' and 'night' is made according to the *undertaking of actions* and *going to sleep*. Just as in the case of herbs, the time for sprouting is fixed by nature, exactly in the same manner, in the case of the beings in question, the times of 'activity' and 'repose' are fixed by the nature of time itself [and are not variable].—(65)

XLI. 'Day and Night' of the 'Pitṛs'

VERSE LXVI

ONE MONTH (OF MEN) FORMS THE 'DAY AND NIGHT' OF THE 'PITṚS'; AND THEIR DIVISION IS BY FORTNIGHTS: THE DARKER FORTNIGHT, CONDUCIVE TO ACTIVITY, IS 'DAY,' AND THE LIGHTER FORTNIGHT, CONDUCIVE TO REPOSE, IS 'NIGHT.'—(66)

Bhāṣya.

That which is the 'month' of men is a 'day and night' of the '*Pitṛs.*' As regards 'division' as to which part is 'day' and which 'night,'—this division, that 'this is *day* and that is *night*,' is determined '*by fortnights*,' *i.e.*, the *fifteen days*, which are known by the name of 'half-month.' That is, the said division is based upon fortnights: one fortnight is 'day,' and another fortnight is 'night.' In view of the fact that 'day' and 'night' differ in their character and occur in a fixed order of sequence, the author adds the following distinction:—The darker fortnight is 'day,' and the brighter fortnight, 'night.'

The right reading (in view of the meaning intended) would be '*Karmachēṣṭābhyaḥ*' (the Dative form), just as we have '*svapnāya*'; for the meaning meant to be conveyed is that the day is *for the purpose* of 'activity.' Hence the Locative ending in the text can be explained only as used on account of the exigencies of metre.—(66)

XLII. 'Day' and 'Night' of the 'Gods'

VERSE LXVII

One 'year' (of men) forms the 'Day and Night' of the Gods; and the division of these is that the 'Northern Course' is the 'Day,' and the 'Southern Course' the 'Night.'—(67)

Bhāṣya.

'*One year*,' of men,—*i.e.*, twelve months,—'*forms the Day and Night of the Gods*.'—The division of these is by means of the 'Northern Course' and the 'Southern Course'; the six months during which the Sun moves towards the North is the 'Northern Course,' '*Udagayanam*'; the term '*ayana*' standing for *moving* or *occupying*; the meaning being that during the six months the Sun rises towards that particular quarter. Turning back from that, there comes the 'Southern course'; during these six months the Sun abandons the Northern quarters and rises towards the South.—(67)

XLIII. The 'day' of Brahmā and the 'Yugas'

VERSE LXVIII

LEARN IN BRIEF, IN DUE ORDER, THE MEASURE OF THE BRAHMIC 'DAY AND NIGHT,' AS ALSO THAT OF THE 'TIME-CYCLES' (YUGAS) ONE BY ONE.—(68)

Bhāṣya.

'*Brahmā*,'—The creator of living beings, has a region of his own; and what is going to be described is *the measure of Day and Night* as obtaining in that region;—'*as also of the Time-cycles*.'—'*Learn*' all this, '*in brief*,' summarily; *i.e.*, hear it from me.—'*one by one*'—that is, of each time-cycle separately.

The present verse serves as the summary of what is going to be described, intended to draw the attention of the audience; it is with this view that they are exhorted to '*learn*.'—The 'division of time' having been already mentioned as the subject-matter of the context, the reiterated promise (implied in the exhortation to 'learn') is meant to indicate that a fresh subject is going to be introduced; the idea being that what is going to be described now is not merely what remains of the afore-mentioned 'division of time,' but it is also conducive to *merit*; as will be directly stated in verse 73, where it is stated that 'Brahma's day is known to be sacred'; which means that the knowledge of it brings merit.—(68)

VERSE LXIX

THEY SAY THAT FOUR THOUSAND 'YEARS' ARE WHAT IS THE 'KṚTA-CYCLE'; AS MANY HUNDRED 'YEARS' FORM THE 'JUNCTURE' (MORNING); AND OF EQUAL MEASURE IS THE 'JUNCTURE-END' (EVENING).—(69)

Bhāṣya.

The '*years*' here spoken of are taken as the years *of the Gods*; as it is this that has been mentioned last. Says the Author of the Purāṇas—'O Brāhmaṇas, all this has been described by the divine measure: the measure of the Time-Cycles has been described by the divine measure.'—'*Four thousand*' such '*years*' of the Gods constitute the Time-Cycle known as '*Kṛta*':—of the '*Kṛta*' cycle, '*as many*', *i. e.* four '*hundred*' 'years' form the '*Juncture*'; and of the same '*Kṛta*' Cycle, the '*Juncture-end*' is '*of equal measure*', *i. e.*, consisting of a period of four hundred years. That period of time which partakes in equal degree of the character of the preceding as well as that of the succeeding Cycle, is called '*Juncture*'; and '*Juncture-end*' is that period of time which also partakes of the character of both, but in a less degree, of the preceding and, to a greater degree, of the succeeding Cycle.

The text contains the word '*tāvachchhatī*'; and it is necessary to find out the rule under which the final ī has been lengthened. The only grammatical explanation of the word possible is that it should be expounded as '*tāvat shatānām samāhāraḥ*', 'the collection of as many hundreds'; the term '*tāvat*', ending in the '*vatu*' affix, becomes a numeral according to Pāṇini's Sūtra 1.1.23, by which words ending in '*vatu*' are regarded as 'numerals'; so that the said compound having a numeral for its first number becomes a 'Dvigu', according to Pāṇini 2.1.25; and since the Feminine affix *ṭāp* is precluded from *Dvigu* compounds, we have the Feminine affix *ṅīp*; and the word '*tāvat*' means 'one whose measure is *tat* (that)': it being derived from the pronoun '*tat*' with the '*vatup*' affix, added according to Pāṇini's Sūtra 5.2.39; the vowel in '*tat*' being lengthened by the *sūtra* 6.3.91. If the form '*tāvātī*' were explained in any other way,—for instance, if it were taken as a *Bahubrīhi* compound, being expounded as '*tāvanti shatāni yasyāḥ*',—then, since the word '*shata*' ends in '*a*', it would take the

Feminine affix '*ṭāp*', according to Pāṇini 4.1.4; so that the form would be '*tāvachchatā*.' This is the meaning.—(69)

VERSE LXX.

IN EACH OF THE OTHER TIME-CYCLES, ALONG WITH THEIR 'JUNCTURES' AND 'JUNCTURE-ENDS', THE 'THOUSANDS' AND 'HUNDREDS' ARE REDUCED BY ONE.—(70)

Bhāṣya.

Among the three Time-cycles other then the *Kṛta*,—*i.e.* in *Trētā* and the rest,—along with their 'junctures' and 'juncture-ends',—the 'thousands' are reduced (in each) by one; 'reduction' means dimunition. That is in *Trētā*, the number of 'thousand,' is one less than that in *Kṛta*; similarly the number in *Dvāpara* is one less than that in *Trētā*; and that in *Kali* is one less than that in *Dvāpara*. Thus *Trētā* consists of three thousand years, *Dvāpara* of two thousand years, and *Kali* of one thousand years. Similarly the number of 'hundred' goes on diminishing in the 'junctures' and 'juncture-ends' of the Cycles.

'Time-cycle', '*yuga*', is the name given to a particular aggregate of days; and '*Kṛtā*' and the rest are particular names of the said 'Time-cycle'.—(70)

XLIV. The Yuga—Time-Cycle—of the Gods

VERSE LXXI.

THIS PERIOD OF THE FOUR TIME-CYCLES THAT HAVE BEEN JUST COMPUTED,—TWELVE THOUSAND SUCH PERIODS ARE CALLED THE 'TIME-CYCLE OF THE GODS.'—(71)

Bhāṣya.

'*Yadētat*' (in the sense of 'this') is an ordinary expression; and as a whole it means *that which has been spoken of.*—'*This period of four Time-cycles that has been computed*' —*i. e.* the exact number of years in which have been definitely determined before this verse,—e.g. in verse 69, where the number of years in the Time-cycles is declared to be *four thousand* etc., etc.,—'*Twelve thousand*' of this period of four Time-cycles are called the '*Time-cycle of the Gods*'. That is to say the *Divine Cycle* consists of twelve thousand 'Four-Cycles.'

The word '*Sāhasram*' is derived from the word '*sahasra*' with the reflexive affix '*aṇ*': and the compound '*dvādashasāhasram*' is to be expounded as '*dvādasha-sahasrāṇi parimāṇē yasmin*', 'that in which the measure is that of twelve- thousands'.—(71)

XLV. 'Day & Night' of Brahmā.

VERSE LXXII.

THE 'TIME-CYCLES' OF THE GODS, ONE THOUSAND IN NUMBER, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ONE 'DAY' OF BRAHMĀ; AND (HIS) 'NIGHT' ALSO IS OF THE SAME EXTENT.—(72)

Bhāṣya.

Thousand 'Time-cycles' of the Gods make one 'day' of Brahmā.—Brahmā's night also '*is of the same extent*'—*i. e.*, as long as thousand 'Time-cycles' of the Gods.—'*In number*'—*i.e.*, which in computation, is *one thousand*; the adding of this term is only for the purpose of filling up the verse; for a thing cannot be spoken of as a 'thousand' except *in number*.

The instrumental ending (in '*Saṅkhyayā*') denotes *causality*.

VERSE LXXIII.

THOSE WHO KNOW THE 'DAY OF BRAHMĀ' AS ENDING WITH THE (SAID) THOUSAND 'TIME-CYCLES,' AND THE 'NIGHT' ALSO AS OF THE SAME EXTENT,—ARE PEOPLE WHO ALONE KNOW WHAT IS 'DAY AND NIGHT', AND ACQUIRE MERIT.—(73)

Bhāṣya.

'*Yugasahasrāntam*,'—'that of which the thousand cycles are the end;'—those men who know this, '*they are the people who alone know what is Day and Night.*'

If it be asked—what happens to the people who know this?—it is added that '*they acquire merit.*' Such is the connection (of the word '*puṇyam*'). The sense is that 'knowledge of Brahmā's Day and Night is conducive to merit, and hence this knowledge should be acquired;'—this injunction (of acquiring the said knowledge) being implied by the valediction contained in the verse.—(73)

XLVI. Brahmâ creates the Mind and applies it to creation.

VERSE LXXIV.

AT THE END OF THE SAID 'DAY AND NIGHT,' BRAHMĀ, WHO WAS ASLEEP, WAKES UP, AND HAVING WOKEN UP, HE CREATES MIND, WHICH PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF THE EXISTENT AND THE NON-EXISTENT.—(74)

Bhāṣya.

Bramhā, having slept during the long night of the said extent, '*wakes up*,' and then proceeds to create the world again.—The 'sleep' of Brahmā is of the character already described (in verse 54); and he does not sleep in the manner of ordinary men, as he is ever awake (conscious).

The order of creation is next stated:—[He created] '*the Mind, which partakes of the nature of the existent and the non-existent.*'

Question—"It has been stated above (in verse 8) that 'at first he created water'."

In answer to this some people offer the following explanation:—There are two kinds of 'Dissolution'—the 'Great Dissolution' and the 'Intermediate Dissolution'; and what is stated in the present context is the order in which things are created after the 'Intermediate Dissolution'; and the 'Mind,' in this case, is not one of the 'Principles,'—this 'Principle' Mind having come into existence already (after the Great Dissolution); what the text means is that 'Brahmā', having woken up, '*creates*'—*i.e.*, applies—the Mind—to creation.

If, however, the text be taken to refer to the creation following on the 'Great Dissolution,'—then 'Mind' should be taken as standing for the 'Great Principle of Intelligence,'—it being

called 'Mind' because it is the cause of the Mind; and thus the order here mentioned would not in any way militate against that stated before (in verse 14-15). In the Purāṇa we read—'It is described as *Mind*, *Mahān*, *Mati*, *Buddhi* and *Mahat-tattva*; all these have been described as words synonymous with *Mahat* (the Great Principle of Intelligence)'; [and thus there is nothing wrong in taking '*manas*' of this verse as standing for the Great Principle].—(74)

XLVII. Akasha produced out of 'Mind' [the Great Principle of Intelligence].

VERSE LXXV.

THE 'MIND' IMPELLED BY (BRAHMĀ'S) DESIRE TO CREATE, EVOLVES CREATION;—FROM OUT OF THAT (MIND) IS PRODUCED ĀKĀSHA; OF THIS THEY KNOW SOUND TO BE THE QUALITY.—(75)

Bhāṣya.

Though the creation of the 'Principles' has been already described, it is stated again for the purpose of pointing out the details not set forth before.

Vikurutē, '*evolves*,'—*i.e.*, being impelled by Brahmā, it brings about creation in a particular manner;—from out of the 'Mind' (*i.e.*, the Great Principle of Intelligence), thus propelled (to modification) is produced *Ākāsha*; and this *Ākāsha* possesses the quality known as 'Sound'. '*Quality*' is that which subsists (in a substance); and the substratum of the quality of Sound is *Ākāsha*, in the sense that no Sound is possible apart from *Ākāsha*.—(75)

XLVIII.—Wind after Akasha.

VERSE LXXVI.

AFTER ĀKĀSHA, FROM OUT OF THE SAME EVOLVENT ['MIND'], THERE COMES INTO EXISTENCE THE PURE AND POTENT WIND, THE VEHICLE OF ALL ODOURS; AND IT IS HELD TO BE ENDOWED WITH THE QUALITY OF TOUCH.—(76)

Bhāṣya.

The emanation of one Elemental Substance from another Elemental Substance (as the words of the text seem to imply) is not accepted; because all Elemental Substances have been held to emanate from the 'Great Principle of Intelligence' (*Vide Sāṅkhyakārikā* 25). In view of this we explain the verse as follows:—

'*Ākāshāt*' means '*ākāshāt anantaram*', '*after Ākāsha*';—'*from out of the evolvent*' Great Principle,—*i.e.*, from out of the 'Great Principle' which has evolved, become modified into, the 'Rudimentary Element of Touch',—'*there comes into existence Wind*';—'*which is the vehicle of*', *i.e.*, conveys—'*all odours*', pure as well as impure; and is yet itself '*pure*', clean;—'*potent*'; as a matter of fact, every action of strength, in the form of motion,—such as shaking, throwing, moving up, moving down, moving horizontally, and so forth,—is the effect of Wind; anything that moves and vibrates, all is due to Wind; this is what is meant to be indicated by the epithet '*potent*'.

In the following verses also, the words with the Ablative ending should not be taken in the sense that they form the *source of emanation*; they should all be construed in the sense of '*sequence after wind*,' *i.e.*, 'subsequent to the wind,' and so forth.—(76)

XLIX. Light after Wind

VERSE LXXVII

AFTER WIND, FROM OUT OF THE SAME EVOLVENT, EMANATES THE BRIGHT AND RADIANT LIGHT, THE DISPELLER OF DARKNESS ; IT IS SAID TO BE ENDOWED WITH THE QUALITY OF COLOUR.—(77)

Bhāṣya.

The two words '*bright*' and '*radiant*,' which are synonymous, have been used with a view to indicate that Light is itself *bright*, and it also illumines other things ; that it is itself endowed with brilliance and it makes other things also brilliant.—(77)

L. Water after Light: Earth after Water

VERSE LXXVIII

AFTER LIGHT, FROM OUT OF THE SAME EVOLVENT, EMANATES WATER, WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE ENDOWED WITH THE QULITY OF TASTE. AND AFTER WATER, COMES EARTH, ENDOWED WITH THE QUALITY OF ODOUR.—SUCH IS CREATION AT THE OUTSET.—(78)

Bhāṣya.

'*Taste*'—such as '*sweet*' and the rest,—is the quality of Water.—'*Odour*,' good smell and evil, is the quality of earth; as say the *Vaishēṣikas*—'odour subsists in earth alone.'

Each of the single qualities that have been mentioned as belonging to each of the elemental substances, is what is inherent in it by its very nature; when, however, the substances come to be mixed up, their qualities also become intermingled. It is in view of this that we have the statement in verse 20 that—'each elemental substance is endowed with as many qualities as the place it occupies'.

This description of the qualities comes useful in meditation on the soul. This has been thus declared by the author of the *Purāṇa*.—'Those who meditate upon the sense-organs (as the soul) stay here for ten *manvantaras*; those who meditate upon the Elemental Substances stay for a hundred, and those who meditate upon the Principle of Egoism stay for a thousand *manvantaras*; ['*abhimāninaḥ*' means those who think of the Principle of Egoism]; those who meditate upon the great Principle of Intelligence stay for ten thousand *mavantaras*, freed from all sufferings; for full hundred thousand years stay those who meditate upon the Unmanifest (Primordial Matter); when one has reached the soul, devoid of all qualities, all limitation ceases.'—(78)

LI. Manvantara—Regime of one Manu

VERSE LXXIX

The 'Time-cycle of the Gods' which has been described above as consisting of 'twelve thousand periods,'—this multiplied by 'seventy-one' forms what is known here as 'Manvantara' (Regime of a Manu).—(79)

Bhāṣya.

The period of time named '*manvantara*' consists of seventy-one 'Time-cycles of the gods.'—(79)

Manusmṛti: Discourse I.

VERSE LXXX.

INNUMERABLE MANVANTARAS, AS ALSO CREATION AND DISSOLUTION—ALL THIS THE SUPREME LORD CALLS INTO BEING AGAIN AND AGAIN, AS IF IN AMUSEMENT—(80).

Bhāṣya.

'*Innumerable*'—Whose number is not limited.

Objection—"In works on Astronomy and other subjects we find the number of *Manvantaras* stated as *fourteen.*"

Our answer is that they are '*innumerable*' in the sense that they revert repeatedly; in the same manner as the 'twelve months.'

Of '*Creation*' and '*Dissolution*' also the repitition never ceases.

'*He calls into being all this as if in amusement*':—An *objection* is raised—"A man takes to an amusement only when he seeks for pleasure; as for the Supreme Lord, since he has all his desires fulfilled, and since his very form consists of pure Bliss, his acts of creation and dissolution could not be due to *amusement.*"

It is in view of this fact that the author has added the qualifying term '*as if.*' The real answer to the objection however is what has been stated above [in the *Bhāṣya* on verse 21, where it has been pointed out that creation and dissolution are primarily due to the previous acts of living beings.] The answer provided by the 'Knowers of Brahman' (Vedāntins) is that in ordinary life also, in the case of kings and other such persons, it is found that they often act for mere diversion, without desire for any particular thing—(80).

LII. Dharma perfect in the Kṛta Cycle.

VERSE LXXXI.

IN THE KṚTA CYCLE VIRTUE EXISTS IN ITS PERFECT FORM, WITH ALL ITS FOUR FEET; AND SO DOES TRUTH;—NO BENEFIT ACCRUES TO MEN BY VICE—(81).

Bhāṣya.

Virtue is that which has "four feet." What constitutes 'virtue' is the action of sacrifice and the like; and as this latter is something to be performed, it has no body; hence the word 'feet' in the text cannot be taken as denoting the part of a body; it stands for 'part' or 'factor.' As a matter of fact, Virtue has no body, either like men or like birds and animals. Hence what is meant by Virtue having all its 'four feet' is that it is equipped with all its four factors. The meaning of the text thus is that such virtue as is perfect and equipped with its four factors existed in the *Kṛta* Cycle.—[*The 'four factors' are now illustrated*]—At the sacrifice, when it is in course of performance, there are four priests—viz., the '*Hotṛ*,' the '*Brahman*,' the '*Udgātṛ*' and the '*Adhvaryu*';—of the performers there are *four castes*, or *four life-stages.* '*Virtue*' as it is described in the Veda was performed during that cycle in its entire and perfect form; *i.e.*, it was not deficient in even the smallest factor, and it was not wanting in any of its details. The number 'four' is applicable to Virtue in many ways. For instance, in the case of the action of 'giving' also, there is the giver, the thing given, the recipient and his satisfaction. Or the 'four factors' of Virtue may be sacrifice, charity, austerity, and knowledge. This would be in accordance with what is going to be described in verse 86 as regards 'Austerity' being the chief virtue in the *Kṛta age*.

Or, the term '*Dharma*' '*Virtue*' in the text, may be taken as standing for the *words descriptive of Virtue*; and of such words the 'four feet' are the four kinds of words—Nouns, Verbs, Prepositions and Indeclinables. This is thus declared in *Ṛgveda* 1.164.45—'There are four words contained in speech, these the wise Brāhmaṇas know'—(in this passage) the epithet '*manīṣiṇaḥ*,' '*wise*,' stands for those 'who are of powerful minds,' *i.e.*, learned, virtuous;—(the passage goes on) 'these, placed in the cave, do not appear to view,'—*i.e.*, are not perceptible—'the fourth speech people speak'—the fourth, people versed in the Veda speak. The meaning of this passage is that—'in the beginning, no Vedic sentence was hidden from view, nor was any Vedic Rescensional Text lost, while now a days, much has become lost.'

'*So does truth*,'—that is, truth also exsists in its perfect form. Though truth also, being what is prescribed in the Veda, is a 'virtue' (and as such already included in the latter term), yet it has been separately mentioned with a view to show its special importance, or to indicate that it forms the basis of all virtues, the performance of 'virtue' in its entire form is based upon truth; and those who are untruthful, perform, for the purpose of gaining popularity, only a part of what constitutes 'virtue' and ignore the rest of it.

'*By vice*'—*i.e.*, by following the prohibited path,—'*no benefit*'—in the shape of either *learning* or wealth,—'*accrues*'—comes—to the performer; this is by virtue of the special character of the age. (During that age) men do not acquire learning, nor do they earn wealth, by vicious means. Learning and wealth are the means by which virtuous acts are performed; hence when it is said that these are pure, what is meant is that this is what tends to virtue being performed in its entire and perfect form—(81).

LIII. Virtue loses one 'foot' in each succeeding Cycle.

VERSE LXXXII.

IN THE OTHER CYCLES, VIRTUE FELL OFF FROM THE SCRIPTURES, FOOT BY FOOT; AND ON ACCOUNT OF THEFT, FALSEHOOD AND FRAUD, VIRTUOUS ACTS DETERIORATED FOOT BY FOOT—(82).

Bhāṣya.

In the Cycles other than the *Kṛta*;—'*from the scriptures,*' called 'Veda';—'*virtue,*'—'*foot by foot,*'—by one foot in each succeeding Cycle,—'*fell off,*' was carried away;—the Vedic Texts disappeared, by reason of the deterioration in the powers of learning and assimilating of men (l arning the texts).

The '*virtuous acts*'—in the form of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices, that are performed now a days,—these also '*deteriorated foot by foot,*' on account of '*theft*' &c.; *i.e.*, since Priests, Sacrificers, Bestowers and Recipients of gifts, are all beset with the said evils, the virtuous act is not accomplished in the proper manner, and hence the result metioned (as accruing from that act) also is not attained. In as much as this is the real meaning, we do not take '*theft*' and the rest as applied to each of the three Cycles respectively; specially as all of them (theft &c.,) are found prevalent even now a days (in *Kali*)—(82).

LIV. The span of Human Life in each Cycle.

VERSE LXXXIII.

DURING THE KṚTA CYCLE, MEN ARE FREE FROM DISEASE, THEY HAVE ALL THEIR AIMS FULFILLED, AND THEIR LIFE LASTS TRHOUGH FOUR HUNDRED YEARS;—DURING THE TRETĀ AND OTHER CYCLES, THEIR LIFE BECOMES SHORTENED, QUARTER BY QUARTER—(83).

Bhāṣya.

By reason of the absence of vice, which is the cause of disease, men are '*f·ee from disease*'; '*disease*' stands for *sickness.*—'All,' the four castes, have their desired purposes accomplished; 'aim' stands for purpose; or (it may mean) the results following from all their acts with purposes are duly obtained; on account of the absence of obstacles, *all* results are obtained without fail.

'*Their life lasts through four hundred years.*'—"But we find the highest age described as 1600 years, in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (3:16·7), where it is said 'he lived for sixteen hundred years'."

It is in view of this that it has been held that the term '*hundred years*' here stands for the *stages of life*; the meaning thus being that '*they live through all the four stages of life,*'—man's life is never shortened, they never die without having reached the fourth stage. That such is the meaning is shown by the fact that in the second half of the verse we have the assertion '*vayo hrasati,*' '*life becomes shortened*'; this subsequent mention of the 'shorterning of life' would have some point only if the 'lengthening of life' were speken of in the preceding sentence.

'*Quarter by quarter*'—the term 'quarter' here does not stand for the *fourth part*, it stands only for *part*; the meaning being that 'man's life becomes shortened *in part*', i.e. some die while they are young children, others on reaching youth, and others on attaining old age; and the full span of life is difficult to attain.—(83)

VERSE LXXXIV

THE FULL AGE OF MORTALS SPOKEN OF IN THE VEDA, THE RESULTS OF ACTIONS AND THE POWERS OF EMBODIED BEINGS,—ARE OBTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARACTER OF THE CYCLE.—(84)

Bhāṣya.

Some people offer the following explanation:—What is meant by '*the age spoken of in the Veda*' is the age of a thousand years and so forth, which is indicated by the Veda prescribing such rites as are mentioned as extending over 'thousand years'; and this age is '*obtained*', reached, only in accordance with the nature of the Cycle, and not in all Cycles; for instance, now-a-days no one ever lives for 'thousand years', he who lives long, lives for a *hundred* years.

There are others who do not accept this explanation, and for the following reasons:—It has been decided (under Mīmāmsā-Sutras 6. 7. 31—40) that when the term 'year' occurs in the Veda in connection with the long sacrificial sessions, it stands for '*days*'; so that if something else (in the shape *of years*) were taken as enjoined, then there would be an inconsistency, and this would lead to the 'splitting of the sentence';—the text, in connection with the subject is in the form '*pañchapañchāshataḥ trvṛtaḥ samvatsarāḥ*', 'the fifty-five trios, years' (literally); now here what is definitely indicated by the context is that the term 'trio' stands for the *three days* of the *Gavāmayana* Sacrifice; so that it is in regard to these that the particular number (*Fifty-five*) is laid down; under the circumstances, if the sentence, by virtue of the term '*Samvatsarāḥ*', '*years*', were taken as laying down the further unknown fact of the said (*trios*) being 'years',—then there would be a split in the sentence; in order to avoid this, it becomes necessary to take one or the other of the words as merely *reiterative* (not *injunctive*);—now

as regards the term '*Samvatsara*', 'year', we find that, on the basis of diverse calculations, known as the '*Saura*', the '*Sāvana*' and so forth, it is often used in a sense other than that of a collection of exactly *three hundred and sixty days;* so that it is only right that this term (and not the term '*fifty-five*') should be taken figuratively, as being descriptive of '*days*'.

Others again argue as follows:—Among the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts of the Veda we find such expressions as—'The gods live for a *hundred* years', 'the man's life is of hundred years', and so forth,—where the term 'hundred' is found used in the sense of '*many*' and 'many' is purely indefinite; hence the meaning (of our text,) is that 'men are short-lived or long-lived according to the Cycle'.—If the verse were taken in its literal sense, it would mean that during *Kali* all men live for a hundred years [and this would not be true].—Or, it may mean that the exact extent of 'full age'—which is found mentioned as the result of sacrifices performed by the man desiring *full age*—being nowhere defined, the extent should be taken as determined by the character of the particular Cycle.

'*Results*'—i.e., the things desired as results, described in the Veda, proceeding from acts performed with a purpose.—Though 'full age' also is a *desired result*, yet it has been mentioned separately in view of its importance; as declared in such words as—'Full age is the highest desirable object'.

'*Power*'—i.e. the superphysical faculties, consisting in being equipped with *aṇimā* (the faculty of becoming as small as one likes) and such other faculties,—or in the form of ability to pronounce effective curses, and bestowing effective boons.

'*Are obtained in accordance with the character of the Cycle*'—this has to be construed with all (three phrases)—(84).

Verse LXXXV; Characteristics of the Cycles

VERSE. LXXXV

DURING THE KṚTA-CYCLE, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN ARE OF ONE KIND,—OF DIFFERENT KINDS DURING THE TRETĀ AND THE DVĀPARA,—AND OF YET ANOTHER KIND DURING THE KALI-CYCLE;—THIS BEING DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF EACH SUCCEEDING CYCLE.—(85)

Bhāṣya.

This verse sums up what has been said in regard to the diversity in the nature of things based upon the difference in time.

The word '*Dharma*' here is not restricted to the sense of *sacrifice* and such other acts (prescribed by the Veda); it stands for the *characteristic* of things in general. The meaning thus is that in each Cycle, the character of things varies, as shown before (in verses 83 and 84); just as, for instance, the character of things during the Spring is of one kind, of a different kind during the Summer, and of yet another kind during the Rains,—so it is in connection with the Cycles also.

By '*difference*' it is not meant that things cease to bring about effects that they are found (at one time) to produce, and bring about other effects; what is meant is that they become incapable of bringing about their complete effects; and this by reason of the decrease in their potency. This is what is meant by the phrase—'*this being due to the deterioration of each succeeding Cycle*,'—'*deterioration*' meaning *inferiority*.—(85).

LV. Variation of 'Virtue' in the four Cycles

VERSE. LXXXVI

IN THE KṚTA CYCLE, 'AUSTERITY' IS THE HIGHEST; IN THE TRETĀ 'KNOWLEDGE' IS DESCRIBED AS SUCH; IN THE DVĀPARA THEY CALL THE 'SACRIFICE' THE HIGHEST, AND 'CHARITY' ALONE IN THE KALI-CYCLE—(86).

Bhasya.

Another difference in the character of the Cycles is now described.

As a matter of fact, Austerity and the other Virtues are not prescribed in the Veda with reference to any particular Cycle, all of them should be performed at all times; hence the description contained in the present verse has got to be explained somehow or other. In fact it is in the Itihāsas that the distinction herein set forth is met with. [When 'Austerity' is relegated to the *Kṛta* Cycle] what is meant is that it is the principal—and hence the most effective—Virtue cultivated; and the men being longlived and free from disease are most capable of performing Austerities.

'*Knowledge*'—i.e. of spiritual matters. Though the men [being not quite so healthy in the *Trētā* as in the *Kṛta*], suffer in the body, yet this bodily suffering does not render the internal discipline (necessary for spiritual knowledge) very difficult.

In as much as there is not much trouble in the performance of *Sacrifices*, sacrifice forms the chief virtue in *Dvāpara.*

In *Charity*, there is neither physical suffering, nor need for internal discipline or much learning; hence it is easily done.—(86)

LVI. Distribution of Functions among the several castes :—(1) of the Brāhmaṇa

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VERSE LXXXVII

WITH A VIEW TO THE PROTECTION OF THIS ENTIRE CREATION, THE RESPLENDENT ONE ORDAINED THE DISTINCT FUNCTIONS OF THOSE WHO SPRANG FROM THE MOUTH, THE ARMS, THE THIGHS AND THE FEET—(86).

Bhāṣya

The divisions of time have been described. The qualifications of the Brāhmaṇa and the other people are now described; and the present verse serves as an introduction to that subject.

'*Of this entire creation*,'—*i.e.*, of all beings,—'*with a view to the protection*,'—for the purpose of their safety;—the Resplendent One, Prajāpati,—'*ordained*,'—distributed—'*the functions*,'—*i.e.*, actions, leading to perceptible as well as imperceptible results,—of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes, that sprang from his mouth and other limbs. (87).

VERSE LXXXVIII

FOR THE BRĀHMAṆAS HE ORDAINED TEACHING, STUDYING, SACRIFICING AND OFFICIATING AT SACRIFICES, AS ALSO THE GIVING AND ACCEPTING OF GIFTS. (88).

Bhāṣya.

The said 'functions' are now described. (88).

LVII. (2) Functions of the Kṣattriya

VERSE LXXXIX

For the Kṣattriya he ordained protecting of the people, giving of gifts, sacrificing and studying, as also abstaining from being addicted to the objects of sense. (89).

Bhāṣya.

What are referred to here are such things as Musical Sounds and the like which tend to give rise (in the minds of men) to a longing for the objects of sensual enjoyment; and the '*abstaining from being addicted to them*' means *not being attached to them*; that is, not to have recourse to them frequently. (89).

LVIII. (3) Functions of the Vaishya

VERSE XC

FOR THE VAISHYA, TENDING OF CATTLE, GIVING OF GIFTS, SACRIFICING AND STUDYING; AS ALSO TRADE, MONEY-LENDING AND CULTIVATING OF LAND. (90).

Bhāṣya.

'*Trade*,'—*i.e.*, the acquiring of wealth by carrying on trade, on land and on water, and the importing of useful goods from foreign countries into the state of that king in whose kingdom he lives.

'*Money-lending*,'—giving out money on interest. (90),

LIX. (4) Functions of the Shūdra

VERSE XCI

FOR THE SHŪDRA THE LORD ORDAINED ONLY ONE FUNCTION: THE UNGRUDGING SERVICE OF THE SAID CASTES. (91).

Bhāṣya.

'*The Lord*', Prajāpati, ordained '*one function, for the Shūdra*'; [in the form]—'Thou shalt perform the '*service of the said castes*,'—*i.e.*, of the Brāhmaṇa, Kṣattriya and Vaishya;—'*Ungrudging*'—*i.e.*, without complaining; no resentment should be felt even in the mind.

'*Service*' stands for *attending; i.e.*, doing of acts conducive to their convenience; such as massage of the body, and the obeying of wishes.

What is mentioned here is only such function of the Shūdra as leads to visible results (in the shape of livelihood); and in as much as the phrase '*one only*' is not injunctive, it does not preclude *the giving of gifts* (and such other acts, leading to invisible results); specially as we shall find later on the actual injunction of these acts (for the *Shūdra* also). And it will be on that occasion that we shall set forth the classification of sacrifices and other acts (as to which of these should be done by which castes, and so forth). (91).

XCII. Superiority of the Brāhmaṇa

VERSE XCII

MAN IS DESCRIBED AS PURER ABOVE HIS NAVAL; HENCE THE SELF-EXISTENT ONE HAS DECLARED THE MOUTH TO BE HIS PUREST PART. (92)

Bhāṣya.

Down to the very sole of his feet, Man is *pure*; that part of his body which is '*above the navel*' is *extremely pure*; and purer even than that is his mouth. This has been declared by that person himself who is the creator of the world. (92)

VERSE XCIII

IN MATTEES REGARDING 'DHARMA', THE BRĀHMAṆA IS THE LORD OF THIS WHOLE WORLD;—BECAUSE HE SPRANG OUT OF THE BEST PART OF (PRAJĀPATI'S) BODY, BECAUSE HE IS THE ELDEST OF ALL, AND BECAUSE HE UPHOLDS THE VEDA. (93)

Bhāṣya.

This verse explains what follows from what has been said in the preceding verse. '*The best part of the body*,'—the head; from out of that sprang, was born, the Brāhmaṇa.—He is also '*the eldest of all*,'—the Brāhmaṇa was produced before the other castes.—'*Because he upholds the Brahman, i.e., Veda*'; the upholding of the Veda has been specifically prescribed for him.—'*Hence*,'—for all these three reasons,—'*the Brāhmaṇa is the lord*,'—*i.e.*, as if he were the lord—'*of this whole world*'; *i.e.*, he should be approached (treated) like the lord; and people should obey his orders in matters relating to *Dharma*.—'*Dharmataḥ prabhuḥ*' means '*dharmē prabhuḥ*,'—'Lord in matters regarding *Dharma*,'—the affix '*tasi*' (in '*dharmataḥ*') being added according to the *Vārtika* on Pāṇini 5. 4. 44, which lays down the use of this affix in connection with such terms as '*ādya*' and the like. (93)

VERSE XCIV

HIM THE SELF-EXISTENT ONE, AFTER PERFORMING AUSTERITIES, CREATED, IN THE BEGINNING, OUT OF HIS OWN MOUTH, FOR THE CONVEYING OF OFFERINGS (TO THE GODS) AND OF OBLATIONS (TO THE PETRS), AND FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THIS ENTIRE CREATION. (94).

Bhāṣya.

This verse serves the purpose of pointing out the details of the three reasons set forth in the preceding verse.

In the case of the ordinary man also, the head is the most important part of his body. '*Him*'—the Brāhmaṇa,—'*the Self-existent one created out of his own mouth*'; and this creation out of his mouth came about after he had performed austerities.

The fact of the Brāhmaṇa being the '*eldest*' is vindicated by the term '*in the beginning*.'

That which is done for the benefit of the Gods is called '*offering*'; and that which is done for the benefit of the *Pitṛs* is called '*oblation*';—'*for the conveying of*' these two,—*i.e.*, for presenting them to the Gods and the *Pitṛs*.—In the term '*abhivāhyāya*,' the verbal affix (*ṇyat*) has the nominal force, which may be explained somehow or other; the root '*vah*' being transitive.

By the said act (of conveying the oblations and offerings) is accomplished '*the preservation*,'—nourishment—of this whole Trio of Worlds: the gods live upon offerings made from this world (by men),—the Gods again nourish plants and herbs and make them ripe by means of cold, heat and rains; this mutual benefit leads to '*preservation*.' (94).

VERSE XCV.

WHAT BEING IS SUPERIOR TO HIM THROUGH WHOSE MOUTH THE GODS ALWAYS EAT THE OFFERINGS AND THE PITṚS THE OBLATIONS? (95).

Bhāṣya.

The author proceeds to show the above-mentioned 'conveying of oblations.'

'*Tṛdivaukasaḥ*'—are those whose habitation consists of the 'third heaven,' *i.e.*, the denizens of heaven, the Gods.—The Gods accept the food that is eaten by the Brāhmaṇa; in connection with '*Shrāddha*' offerings also, the feeding of Brāhmaṇas has been laid down as to be done for the sake of the *Vishvēdēvas* (a class of Gods),—this feeding being a part of the offering to the *Pitṛs*. What is stated in the text is with reference to these facts.

'*What being is superior*'—*i.e.* greater—'*to him*'—than him? This means that the author himself 'forgets' (cannot think of) any being who could be so superior.

The Gods, occupying the highest regions, and the *Pitṛs* occupying the intermediate regions,—both are imperceptible; hence there is no other means of feeding them except though the feeding of Brāhmaṇas;—hence the Brāhmaṇa must be superior. (95).

VERSE XCVI.

AMONG BEINGS, AMINATED ONES ARE REGARDED AS FOREMOST; AMONG AMINATED ONES, THOSE THAT SUBSIST BY REASON: AMONG RATIONAL BEINGS MEN ARE FOREMOST; AND AMONG MEN, BRĀHMAṆAS. (96).

Bhāṣya.

The word 'being' stands for all such things on earth as Trees and other immovable things, and also such movable

things as insects, beetles and the like.—Among these, the '*animated ones*'—*i.e.*, those that are capable of such activities as eating, moving and so forth,—are '*foremost*'; being aminated, they experience more powerful pleasures.—Among these latter, '*those that subsist by reason*,'—*i.e.*, those that discriminate between wholesome and unwholesome, such for instance, as dogs, jackals and other animals [are foremost]; these animals, when suffering from heat, move into the shade; when suffering from cold, they betake themselves to the sun; they give up a place where they find no food.—Among these latter again,'*men are foremost*'; and of them, '*Brāhmaṇas*.' They are the most highly honoured; they are never ill treated by any person; in fact the killing of the Brāhmaṇa involves a serious expiatory rite, which is due entirely to considerations of caste. (96).

VERSE XCVII.

AMONG BRĀHMAṆAS, THE LEARNED ARE THE BEST, AMONG THE LEARNED, THOSE WITH FIRM CONVICTIONS, AMONG THE MEN WITH FIRM CONVICTIONS, THOSE THAT ACT UP TO THEM; AND AMONG THE ACTORS, THOSE THAT KNOW BRAHMAN. (97).

Bhāṣya.

The superiority of the learned rests on the fact that it is they alone that are entitled to the performance of sacrifices that lead to great results. Among these '*those with firm convictions*'—who have acquired firm knowledge of the essence of the Veda, and are never affected (adversely) by *Bauddhas* and other heretics.—Among these again '*those that act up to them*'—*i.e.*, the performer of actions; these persons doing what is enjoined and avoiding what is prohibited, are never attacked (by evil).—Among these,' *those that know* '*Brahman*'; those that know Brahman become of the nature of Brahman, and therein lies imperishable bliss. (97).

VERSE XCVIII.

THE VERY GENESIS OF THE BRĀHMAṆA IS THE ETERNAL INCARNATION OF VIRTUE; FOR HE IS BORN FOR THE SAKE OF VIRTUE; AND THIS (BIRTH) LEADS TO THE STATE OF BRAHMAN. (98).

Bhāṣya.

The peculiarity of the Brāhmaṇa endowed with the qualities of learning and the like having been described, some people might be led to ill-treat the mere Brāhmaṇa by birth; hence with a view to prevent this, the author has added this verse.

'*The very genesis*'—*i.e.*, irrespective of his qualities, his mere birth, the mere 'Brāhmaṇa caste'—'*is the eternal incarnation*'—body—'*of Virtue.*'

'*Born for the sake of virtue,*'—when the Brāhmaṇa has been duly initiated with the rites of initiation, this is what constitutes his '*being born for the sake of Virtue*'; and '*this birth leads to the state of Brahman*'; on abandoning the 'body of Virtue', the Brāhmaṇa becomes the partaker of Supreme Bliss,—says the *Shruti.* (98).

VERSE XCIX.

THE BRĀHMAṆA, ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, BECOMES SUPREME ON EARTH; HE IS THE SUPREME LORD OF ALL BEINGS, SERVING THE PURPOSE OF GUARDING THE TREASURE OF VIRTUE. (99).

Bhāṣya.

The Brāhmaṇa comes to the top of the entire world; this 'coming to the top' indicates his supremacy.

'*He is the Supreme Lord of all beings*',—and this supremacy comes about for the '*purpose of guarding the treasure of Virtue.*'—'*Treasure*' means a collection of objects; hence through similarity, the collection of Virtues is called 'treasure' (99).

VERSE C.

WHATEVER IS CONTAINED IN THIS WORLD IS ALL THE PROPERTY OF THE BRĀHMAṆA ; THE BRĀHMAṆA VERILY DESERVES ALL BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUPERIORITY AND NOBLE BIRTH. (100).

Bhāṣya.

Having raised the question that, if the Brāhmaṇa happen to be discontented and should again undertake to receive gifts, he would incur sin,—the Author offers his answer to it in this verse.

'*All this*'—*i.e.*, whatever wealth exists in the three worlds—'*is the property of the Brāhmaṇa*'; so that for him there can be no 'acceptance of gifts'; what he takes possession of, he does by virtue of his being its possessor, and not as the receiver of a gift.

This is mere praise, not an injunction ; hence we have the word '*deserves*'.

'*Noble birth*'—high birth, superior character. (100).

VERSE CI.

WHAT THE BRĀHMAṆA EATS IS HIS OWN; HIS OWN WHAT HE WEARS AND HIS OWN ALSO WHAT HE GIVES; IT IS DUE TO THE GOOD WILL OF THE BRĀHMAṆA THAT OTHER PEOPLE ENJOY (THINGS). (101).

Bhāṣya.

What the Brāhmaṇa eats as a guest in the house of others is really his own ; it should not be thought that he is receiving food from another person's kitchen.—Similarly '*what he wears is his own*';—*i.e.*, when he obtains clothing, either by begging or otherwise, it does not mean that he has acquired it from others ; what it means is that he is employing what is *his own* in the covering of his body.—What he obtains for his own use, in that he may be exercising his own right of possession ; but when he gives away to people what belongs to others, this also is nothing wrong for him ; it is only his *good will*,

benevolence. It is by reason of the large-heartedness of the Brāhmaṇa that Kings on earth enjoy their possessions; otherwise, if the Brāhmaṇa were to wish—'I should take all this and apply it to my own use,'—then all others would become penniless, having nothing that they could use for their own benefit.—(101)

VERSE CII.

IT WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGULATING THE ACTIONS OF THE BRĀHMAṆA,—AND INCIDENTALLY OF OTHERS ALSO,—THAT THE WISE MANU SVĀYAMBHUVA ELABORATED THESE INSTITUTES.—(102)

Bhāṣya.

This verse serves the purpose of indicating the upshot of the entire eulogium pronounced on the Brāhmaṇa (in the foregoing verses);—[the sense being]—'These Institutes are so important that they serve the purposes of the Brāhmaṇa who is endowed with a high degree of supremacy due to his own inherent excellence';—'*for the purpose of regulating the actions*,'—*i.e.* for the purposes of *regulating*, in the form 'such and such acts should be done, and such and such others should be avoided';—'*of others also*,' *i.e.* of the *Kṣattriya* and the rest;—'*Incidentally*,'—*i.e.* primarily for the Brāhmaṇa, and only incidentally for the *Kṣattriya* and other castes;—'*he elaborated*,'—set forth,—'*these institutes*.'—(102)

LXI.—Institutes to be studied by the Brāhmaṇa

VERSE CIII.

THIS MAY BE STUDIED WITH CARE, AND DULY TAUGHT TO PUPILS, BY THE LEARNED BRĀHMAṆA,—NOT BY ANY ONE ELSE.—(103)

Bhāṣya.

'*Adhyētavyam-pravaktavyam*'—'*can be studied and can be taught*'—the verbal affix denotes *capability*, not *injunction* [*i.e.* the meaning is that the institutes *deserve* to be studied and taught &c.]; for actual injunctions are going to begin only from the Second Discourse onward; and the present Discourse is purely descriptive, it contains no injunctions. Hence, just as the assertion, 'Rice forms the food of Kings,' is regarded as a mere praise of the Rice, and it is not taken as a prohibition of its eating by people other than Kings,—in the same manner, in the present passage the phrase '*not by any one else*' is not a prohibition (of study by others), but only a praise of the institutes; the sense thus is as follows:—'The Brāhmaṇa is the highest being in the world,—these institutes are the best of all institutes,—hence these are capable of being studied and taught only by the said learned Brāhmaṇa,—and they cannot be either studied or taught by any ordinary man.' It is in view of this that the author adds the term '*with great care*';—unless great care is taken, until the self has been duly equipped with the knowledge of other sciences,—such as Logic, Grammar and Exigetics,—these institutes cannot be taught. Thus it is that '*study*' implies 'hearing' (from the lips of the Teacher) also; and the justification for this implication lies in the fact that the 'learning' (spoken of by the epithet '*learned*') comes in useful only in

the case of *hearing* from the teacher's lips,—(which presupposes intelligent following of the oral lectures) ; it would not be necessary for the mere *reading of the words.* If the present verse were taken as an injunction of 'study,' the said 'learning' could be regarded only as serving some transcendental purpose. It would not be right to argue that—"in the injunction also *hearing* would be implied by the *studying*" : for it is not right to take what is *enjoined* as subserving the purposes of implications. In the case of Declamatory passages (Arthavāda) on the other hand, there is nothing incongruous in admitting of indirect implications on the basis of other sources of knowledge [while a direct Injunction by its very nature, cannot be diverted from its direct meaning, on any account whatsoever].

From all this it follows that all three castes are entitled to the study of the Institutes. This we shall explain in detail later on.—(103)

LXII. Results accruing from the study of the Institutes.

VERSE CIV.

THE BRĀHMAṆA STUDYING THESE INSTITUTES, AND (THENCE) DISCHARGING ALL PRESCRIBED DUTIES, IS NEVER DEFILED BY SINS OF COMMISSION (OR OMISSION), PROCEEDING FROM MIND, SPEECH OR BODY.—(104)

Bhāṣya.

Having thus, indirectly through its co-relative, eulogised the Institutes as serving the purposes of the Brāhmaṇa, the Author now proceeds to eulogise them directly.

Knowing these Institutes, the Brāhmaṇa, comes to '*discharge all prescribed duties,*'—*i.e.* he observes all observances and practises full self-control; having learnt from the institutes that the omission of duties is sinful, he, fearing sin, fulfils all active and passive obligations (relating to observances and self-control),—doing everything in full conformity to the Institutes. Thus fulfilling all his duties, '*he is not defiled*'—affected—'*by the sins*' arising from the omission of duties prescribed and the commission of deeds prohibited.—(104)

VERSE CV.

HE PURIFIES HIS COMPANY, AND ALSO HIS KINDREDS—SEVEN HIGHER (ANCESTORS) AND SEVEN LOWER (DESCENDANTS). HE ALONE DESERVES THIS ENTIRE EARTH.—(105)

Bhāṣya.

He becomes the sanctifier of his company; '*company*' stands here for a number of persons arranged in a particular

order; this '*he purifies*,' makes free from taint; *i.e.*, all sinful men, by associating with him, become sinless.

'*Kindreds*'—persons born in his own family;—'*seven higher*,' those above him, the Father &c., and '*seven lower*,' those that are to come, yet to be born.

He alone is entitled to receive the gift of this earth extending to the oceans; 'knowledge of Dharma' establishes a claim to become the recipient; hence it is that a full knowledge of Dharma is sought to be acquired.—(105)

VERSE CVI.

THIS (TREATISE) IS EVER CONDUCIVE TO WELFARE; IT IS MOST EXCELLENT; IT EXPANDS THE UNDERSTANDING BRINGS FAME AND CONSTITUTES THE HIGHEST GOOD.—(106)

Bhāṣya.

'*Svasti*,' '*Welfare*'—is the non-hindrance (fulfilment) of what is desired; '*ayana*,' '*conducive*,' is that which brings about; hence '*svastyayana*,' '*conducive to welfare*,' means that which brings about the fulfilment of what is desired.

'*Most excellent*'—in comparison to such acts as the telling of beads, pouring of libations and so forth; without this treatise the performance of such acts is not possible; hence as leading to their performance, it is described as '*most important*.' Or, it may mean that the words and sentences that serve to bring about the knowledge of virtue are *excellent*; while the actual performance is painful; hence the former are spoken of as '*most excellent*.'

'*It expands the intellect*'—when the treatise is duly studied, its subject-matter becomes illuminated, and the hard knots become untied; hence follows the *expansion of the understanding*, as is well known.

'*It brings fame*,'—when a man knows Dharma his opinion is sought for by enquirers, and thus he acquires fame. The term '*Yashasyam*' means *that which is the cause of fame*;

'*fame*' consists in being known as possessing the qualities of learning, nobility and so forth.

'*The highest good*'—It brings about the due knowledge of Actions and Wisdom, which lead to the attainment of bliss unalloyed with pain, such bliss appearing in the form of 'Heaven' and 'Final Release'; and for this reason this treatise constitutes the '*highest,*' most excellent, '*good.*'—(106).

VERSE CVII.

HEREIN HAS BEEN EXPOUNDED DHARMA IN ITS ENTIRETY: THE GOOD AND BAD FEATURES OF ACTIONS OF ALL THE FOUR CASTES; AS ALSO ETERNAL MORALITY.—(107)

Bhāṣya.

The Author now proceeds to describe the fact that his treatise, in regard to its subject-matter, is complete in itself, and does not stand in need of anything else.

That which is called '*Dharma,*' '*is expounded,*' in this Treatise, '*in its entirety,*' wholly; that is, for acquiring the knowledge of *Dharma*, one need not have recourse to any other treatise. This is a hyperbolic eulogium; what is meant is only that *such Dharma as is adumbrated in the Smṛtis* has been expounded in its entirety in this Treatise.

'*Th good and bad features of actions,*'—the desirable and undesirable results form the '*good and bad features of actions,*'—*i.e.* of such actions as *sacrifice* and *Brāhmaṇa-killing* (respectiveiy). '*Entirety*' refers to the details relating to (1) the form of the acts, (2) their procedure, (3) their results, also (4) their relation to a particular kind of Agent, and (5) their distinction into 'compulsory' and 'optional';—it is all this that is meant by the term '*good and bad features.*' '*Dharma*' having been already mentioned in the preceding clause, the mention again of the term '*action*' (which means the same thing) is for the purpose of filling up the verse.

'*Of all the four castes*';—this also is meant to indicate the complete character of the Treatise; the meaning being that 'whoever is entitled to the performance of *Dharma* can derive his knowledge of it from this Treatise'.

'*Eternal morality*'—*Dharma* or Action, based upon, indicated by, Morality is what is called '*Eternal Morality*' here; *i.e.* Right Behaviour. This we shall examine in detail under Discourse II (verse 4). '*Eternal*'—*i.e.* established by long-tradition, not merely set up by people of the present day.—(107).

VERSE CVIII.

MORALITY [RIGHT BEHAVIOUR] IS HIGHEST DHARMA; THAT WHICH IS PRESCRIBED IN THE SHRUTI AND LAID DOWN IN THE SMṚTI. HENCE THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, DESIRING THE WELFARE OF HIS SOUL, SHOULD BE ALWAYS INTENT UPON RIGHT BEHAVIOUR.—(108)

Bhāṣya.

'*Highest Dharma is Morality*' [Right Behaviour]; that which has been prescribed in the *Shruti*, *i.e.* Veda; and also '*that laid down in the Smṛti.*' Hence one should be ever *intent upon* Dharma in the shape of Right Behaviour *i.e.* he should carry it into practice.

'*Ātmavān*'—*lit.* 'endowed with soul,' really means '*desiring the welfare of his soul*'; all men are 'endowed with soul'; hence the affix '*matup*' is taken to mean 'welfare of soul.'—(108).

VERSE CIX

THE BRĀHMAṆA WHO DEPARTS FROM RIGHT BEHAVIOUR, DOES NOT OBTAIN THE FRUIT OF THE VEDA; HE HOWEVER WHO IS EQUIPPED WITH RIGHT BEHAVIOUR OBTAINS THE FULL REWARD.—(109)

Bhāṣya.

This verse eulogises Right Behaviour in another manner.

'*He who departs from Right Behaviour,*'—*i.e.* is devoid of Right Conduct—does not obtain the '*fruit of the Veda*'; what

is called '*the fruit of the Veda*' is the result proceeding from the performance of acts prescribed in the Veda. Even though the man may perform the acts prescribed in the Veda, in their entire and perfect forms, yet if he happens to be one who has fallen off from Right Behaviour, he does not obtain their results, in the shape of the 'birth of a son' and so forth. This is the deprecation of men not following Right Behaviour.

This same idea is expressed obversely in the next sentence. '*He who is equipped with Right Behaviour obtains the full reward*,'—of all those optional acts that are done with a purpose.

In this connection some people argue as follows:—"In as much as the text contains the qualification '*full*,' it follows that the man devoid of Right Behaviour does also obtain the results of his optional acts done with a purpose,—only the *full* result does not accrue to them."

This is not right; because the term 'full' is purely commendatory [and hence cannot be taken as having any serious import].—(109).

VERSE CX.

HAVING THUS SEEN THAT VIRTUE IS GOT AT FROM RIGHT BEHAVIOUR, THE SAGES REGARDED RIGHT BEHAVIOUR AS THE VERY ROOT OF ALL AUSTERITY.—(110)

Bhāṣya.

'*Of all Austerity*,—*i.e.* Breath-control, silence, observances, self-control, and the fasts of '*Kṛchchhra, Chāndrāyaṇa*, and also absolute Fasting;—of all this 'Austerity,' Right Behaviour is '*the root*,'—*i.e.* the direct cause, leading to the growth of their fruit.—For the reason given, the *sages regarded*, accepted, it as being the *root*,—*i.e.* the cause,—of Austerity, performed by men desiring results.—'*Having seen that virtue is got at*,'—acquired—'*from Right Behaviour*.'—However difficult the Austerity performed, it is not fruitful for the man that is without Right Behaviour;—so says the *Shruti*.—(111).

LXIV—Contents of the Treatise.

VERSE CX.

THE COMING INTO EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD,—THE RULE RELATING TO THE SACRAMENTAL RITES,—THE METHOD OF KEEPING OBSERVANCES,—AS ALSO THE EXCELLENT RULES BEARING UPON THE FINAL ABLUTION.—(111).

Bhāṣya.

The 'Virtues' expounded in the Treatise are here specified in detail. With a view to attract the attention of the hearers, it has been described in Verse 50, *et. seq.*, that the results of 'Virtue' are endless. But it is possible that hearers might become discouraged by the idea that 'Virtue' is interminable, without end; hence with a view to encourage them, the Author is now providing a summary of the institute, in the shape of a list of contents:—the sense being—'only so many are the subjects dealt with, not too many, and they can certainly be learnt by people who are endowed with due regard and amount of confidence'; the idea is that if the path traversed is one that has been described briefly, it is not unbearable.

'*The coming into existence of the world,*'—*i.e.* the measure of time, the delineation of the characteristics of principles and things, the praise of the Brāhmaṇa, and so forth,—all these are included under the '*coming into existence of the world*'; this subject has been dealt with in the Treatise as a commendatory description, and not as something to be actually accepted as absolutely true.

'*The rules relating to sacramental rites,*' '*the method of keeping observances.*' By 'sacramental rites' are meant those connected with 'Impregnation' and the rest; the 'rules' *i.e.*, procedure—relating to these;—*the keeping of 'observances'*—*i.e.*, by the Initiated Student,—of these the '*method,*' the actual performance, the procedure;

—this sums up what has been proclaimed in Discourse II.—'*Final Ablution*,'— *i.e.* the particular ceremony performed by one who is returning from the house of his Preceptor (after finishing his course of study).—(111)

VERSE CXII.

THE TAKING OF WIFE,—THE DEFINITION OF THE SEVERAL FORMS OF MARRIAGE,—THE METHOD OF THE GREAT SACRIFICES,—THE ETERNAL REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE OFFERING TO *Pitṛs*.—(112)

Bhāṣya.

'*Taking of wife*,'—the accepting of a wife in marriage;—'*the definition*'—*i.e.*, the means of distinguishing the exact character—'*of marriages*,'—such as the '*Brāhma*' and the rest, which form the means by which the wife is taken.—'*The great sacrifices*'—the five offerings of the '*Vaishvadēva*' and the rest.—'*The regulations*,' rules, method, *relating to shrāddhas*, '*offering to the Pitṛs*.'

The terms '*para*,' '*excellent*' (in verse 111), and '*shāṣhvata*,' '*eternal*' (in 112) only serve to fill in the metre.

All this forms the subject-matter of discourse III.—(112)

VERSE CXIII—CXIV—CXVI.

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD,—THE OBSERVANCES OF THE INITIATED HOUSEHOLDER,—LAWFUL AND FORBIDDEN FOOD,—PURIFICATION,—THE CLEANSING OF THINGS.—(113)

THE CONDITIONS OF WOMEN,—THE DUTIES OF THE RECLUSE,—FINAL RELEASE,—RENUNCIATION,—THE ENTIRE DUTY OF THE KING,—AND THE DECISION OF LAW-SUITS.—(114)

THE RULES REGARDING THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES,—THE DUTIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE,—LAW RELATING TO THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY,—GAMBLING,—THE EXTERMINATING OF BAD CHARACTERS.—(115)

THE DUTY OF THE VAISHYA AND THE SHŪDRA,—THE BIRTH OF THE MIXED CASTES—THE DUTIES OF ALL CASTES DURING TIMES OF DISTRESS—THE METHOD OF EXPIATION.—(116)

Bhāṣya.

The '*description of the means of livelihood,*'—*i.e.*, of the means of subsistence, in the form of acquiring wealth and the like.—'*Of the Initiated Householder,*'—*i.e.*, of one who has finished his Vedic study and has returned home from his teacher's house; '*the observances,*' such as 'he should not look at the rising sun' and so forth. All this forms the subject-matter of Discourse IV.

'*Lawful and forbidden food,*'—'five five-nailed animals are permitted food,' and 'forbidden food'—such as onion, etc.—'*Purification,*'—by lapse of time, as in the case of child-birth—'*cleansing of things,*' with water.—'*The condition of women*'—such as childhood, youth and so forth. All this is dealt with in Discourse V.

'*Duties of the Recluse*'—the Recluse is one whose chief work consists in the performing of austerity,—*i.e.*, the '*Vānaprastha,*' the Hermit; and the duty of these is called '*Tapasyā.*'—'*Final Release,*'—*i.e.*, the duty of the Wandering Mendicant.—'*Renunciation,*' is a particular form of the said 'duty' (of the Mendicant); how this is so will be explained in the chapter referred to. All this forms the subject-matter of Discourse VI.

'*The entire duty,*'—those leading to visible (physical) as well as invisible (super-physical) results,—'*of the king,*'—*i.e.*, of the man whose business it is to protect the Earth, and who has obtained sovereignty. This forms the subject-matter of Discourse VII.

'*Of law-suits,*'—such as the non-payment of debts, etc.;—'*decision,*'—*i.e.*, dispelling all doubts, ascertaining the facts and deciding upon the course of action to be adopted.—'*The method of examination of witnesses,*'—this has been mentioned separately (though already included in the

foregoing), because of its great importance. This is the subject-matter of Discourse VIII.

'*Duties of husband and wife,*'—*i.e.*, behaviour towards each other, when living together, and also when living apart.—'*Laws relating to division*'—*i.e.*, of Property. '*Gambling*'—*i.e.*, Laws relating to gambling are here spoken of as 'gambling'—'*The extermination of,*'—means of banishing,—'*bad characters*'—such as thieves, robbers and the like. Though in reality the 'Division of Property,' forming one of the eighteen 'matters of dispute,' is included under '*law-suits,*' and as such, standing on the same footing as the 'non-payment of debts,' need not have been mentioned separately, yet it has been mentioned separately because it forms the subject-matter of a distinct Discourse. *The duties of the Vaishya and the Shūdra,*'—*i.e.*, the performance of their respective duties. All this is dealt with in Discourse IX.

'*The birth,*' coming into existence, '*of the mixed Castes,*'—*i.e.*, of the '*Kṣattṛ,*' the '*Vaidēha,*' etc., etc.—'*Duties during times of distress,*'—*i.e.*, when failing to carry on livelihood by the means prescribed for them, they are reduced to the point of death; and then there are certain duties that devolve upon the various castes.—This is dealt with in Discourse X.

'*The method of expiation,*'—is dealt with in Discourse XI.—(113-116)

VERSE CXVII

THE THREEFOLD TRANSMIGRATION OF THE SOUL, ARISING FROM ACTIONS,—THE HIGHEST GOOD,—AND THE EXAMINATION OF THE GOOD AND BAD FEATURES OF ACTIONS.—(117)

Bhāṣya.

'*Samsāragamana,*'—the property, '*samsāra,*' '*series of births and deaths,*' stands here for the possessor of the property, *i.e.*, the personality or *Soul*, undergoing births and deaths;—the '*gamana*' of that is its migration from one body to another.—Or, '*samsāra*' may be taken as standing for the

objects of the world, *i.e.*, the three Regions of the Earth, etc.;—the '*gamana*' is *being born* in those regions, as described before.—'*Threefold*,' high, low and middling.—'*Arising from actions*'—brought about by good and bad deeds.

'*Highest good*'—the work describes not only the conditions brought about by deeds, but also that higher than which there is nothing,—*i.e.*, spiritual knowledge,—the means of attaining that also has been described.

'*Of actions*'—*i.e.*. those that are enjoined and those that are prohibited,—'*the examination of the good and bad features.*'—(117)

VERSE CXVIII

THE ETERNAL LAWS OF COUNTRIES, DUTIES OF CASTES AND LAWS OF DYNASTIES,—ALSO THE LAWS RELATING TO HERETICS AND TO GUILDS,—ALL THIS MANU HAS EXPOUNDED IN THESE INSTITUTES.—(118)

Bhāṣya.

The present verse further confirms the complete character of the Treatise. '*Laws of countries*'—those that are observed in particular countries, and not over the whole earth;—'*Duties of castes*'—those pertaining specifically to the Brāhmaṇa and other castes.—'*Laws of dynasties*,'—those promulgated by famous dynasties;—'*Heresy*' consists in the keeping of such observances as are prohibited; and '*laws of heretics*' are those laws that are based upon heterodox treatises; the 'heretics' being described (in 4·30) as 'persons addicted to improper deeds.'—'*Guilds*,'—companies; of traders, artisans, actors and so forth.

All these laws and duties the revered '*Manu has expounded in these Institutes.*'—(118)

VERSE CXIX

YOU ALSO LEARN FROM ME TO-DAY, THESE TEACHINGS,—JUST AS THEY WERE, IN THE PAST PROMULGATED BY MANU, ON BEING QUESTIONED BY ME.—(119)

Bhāṣya.

This address to the sages is for the purpose of attracting their attention.—(119)

Thus in the Institutes of Law promulgated by Manu, in the compilation expounded by Bhṛgu, the first *Discourse*.

Also

In the *Bhāṣya* by Bhatta Medhātithi.

DISCOURSE II

Sources of Knowledge of Dharma.

I. Dharma defined

VERSE I

LEARN THAT DHARMA, WHICH HAS BEEN EVER FOLLOWED BY, AND SANCTIONED BY THE HEART OF, THE LEARNED AND THE GOOD, WHO ARE FREE FROM LOVE AND HATE.—(1)

Bhāṣya.

The First Discourse was undertaken for the purpose of showing the real character of the subject-matter dealt with by the Treatise; the description of the creation of the World and such other subjects have also been explained as supplementary to the said delineation of the subject-matter of the Treatise. It is now that the Treatise actually begins. As the promised subject of the Discourse, interrupted by the description of world-creation and such other subjects, may have been lost sight of,—the Teacher again addresses his pupils with a view to recall the subject to their minds.

That 'Dharma,' which you desired to learn is now being expounded by me,—please now '*learn*,'—*i.e.*, be attentive and listen.

In Discourse I, five or six verses (85—91) were meant to point out the purpose of the Treatise; the rest of it is mere 'declamatory description' (*Arthavāda*). So that, if all that has not been carefully learnt, there is not much harm; in the present Discourse however 'Dharma' itself is being directly expounded; hence this subject should be carefully learnt. This is the meaning of the re-iteration (in this verse, of *Dharma* being the subject-matter of the Treatise).

The term '*dharma*,' as already explained, denotes *the performance of the Aṣṭakā* and such other prescribed acts.

External philosophers regard as '*dharma*' also such acts as the *wearing of ashes, the carrying of begging-bowls,* and so forth;—and it is with a view to exclude these from the category of '*Dharma*' that the author adds the qualifications —'*followed by the learned,*' and so forth.

The '*learned*' are those whose minds have been cultured by the study of the sciences; those that are capable of discerning the real character of the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. The 'learned' (meant here) are those who know the real meaning of the Veda, and not others. In fact those persons that admit sources other than the Veda to be the 'means of knowledge' in regard to *Dharma* are 'unlearned,' 'ignorant'; in as much as their notions of the means and objects of knowledge are wrong. That this is so, we learn thoroughly from *Mīmāmsā* (Sūtra, Adhyāya I).

The '*Good,*'—*i.e.,* righteous men; those who translate into action what is known from authoritative sources, and who always try to obtain what is wholesome and avoid what is not wholesome;—what is 'wholesome' and 'not wholesome' among visible things is well known; among the 'Unseen,' that which forms the subject of 'Injunction' is 'wholesome,' while that which forms the subject of 'prohibition' is 'not wholesome.' Those who are outside the said pale of acting in accordance with the said authoritative sources of knowledge are called 'not good' (unrighteous). It is for these reasons that both *knowledge* and *acting* have been mentioned here (by means of the two epithets, 'learned' and 'good').

It is not possible for the term '*sat*' (in '*sadbhiḥ*') to be taken in the sense of *existing at the present time;* because in this sense the epithet would be entirely superfluous: when a certain thing is 'followed' by one, it is only when this latter *exists* at the time [so that *existence* would be already implied by the other epithet.]

By '*following*' in the present context is meant capability of acting (in conformity with). The Past-participial affix (in '*sevitaḥ*,' 'followed') indicates the fact of the *Dharma* having

been in force from times without beginning. As a matter of fact, such *Dharma* as consists of the *Aṣṭakā* and other rites are not, like ordinary *Dharmas* or Duties, set up by any person during the present time. This same fact is also indicated by the term 'ever.' (The sense is that) this *Dharma* has continued ever since the world-process has been going on. All other extraneous *Dharmas*, being set up by ignorant and wicked persons, though they may obtain currency for some time, drop out in course of time; no mere delusion can continue for thousands of ages. True knowledge on the other hand, even though it may for a time be shrouded by ignorance, shines forth in all its brilliance, upon the destruction of that ignorance. Being by its very nature, pure and brilliant, it can never undergo entire destruction.

'*Who are free from love and hate*'—What is referred to here is another cause that leads men to take to heterodox *dharmas*. 'Delusion' having been already described (as leading to the same end), the present phrase serves to indicate greed and the rest; the direct mention of 'love and hate' being meant to be only illustrative; *e.g.*, it is by reason of Greed that people have recourse to magical incantations and rites. Or 'Greed' may be regarded as included (not merely indicated) by 'Love and Hate.' People who are too much addicted to what brings pleasure to themselves, on finding themselves unable to carry on their living by other means, are found to have recourse to such means of livelihood as the assuming of hypocritical guises and so forth. This has been thus described—'The wearing of ashes and carrying of begging bowls, being naked, wearing of discoloured clothes—these form the means of living for people devoid of intelligence and energy.'

'*Hate,*'—leads to the performance of acts contrary to those prescribed. People filled with hate are not quite capable of comprehending the truth; and hence they come to regard the wrong act (*adharma*) as the right one (*dharma*).

Or, both 'Love' and 'Hate' may be regarded as obstacles to the discernment of truth. As a matter of fact, even when

some slight knowledge of the scriptures has been acquired, and the man has acquired the name of being 'learned,'—there is every possibility of his acting otherwise (than in strict accordance with the scriptures), if he happens to be under the influence of love or hate. For instance, people, though fully conversant with the scriptures, do commit such wrong acts as the giving of false evidence, with a view either to do harm to some one whom he hates, or to do good to some one whom he loves, and certainly one cannot be sure that such acting of these people is based upon the Veda; for the simple reason that there are present other forces (controlling his action), in the shape of Love and Hate. It is for this reason that these are prohibited.

The following objection is here put forward:—"In the word '*sadbhiḥ*,' the term '*sat*' has been explained as denoting *righteousness*; but what sort of *righteousness* could belong to the man for whom it is considered possible to do wrong under the influence of Love and Hate? Consequently, it is not necessary to add the epithet 'free from love and hate' (this being already implied by the word 'good')."

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—As a matter of fact, the epithet in question ('*free from love and hate*') is mentioned as the reason or ground (of the aforementioned 'goodness' or 'righteousness'); the sense being that 'it is because they are free from Love and Hate that they are *good*.'

What is really meant is the absence of *undue predominance* of Love and Hate (and not absolute *absence*); because no man, even though there be forces at work tending to make him free from Love and Hate, can get rid of these entirely, as declared by *Shruti* (Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, 8-12-1))—'So long as one has a body, there can be no cessation of the agreeable and the disagreeable.'

'*Love*' here stands for hankering after the enjoyment of things; and 'Hate' is that which leads one to avoid or escape from a certain thing. 'Greed' is the jealous hankering after the sole possession of an object; the feeling being in the form

'may all this prosperity, fame and the like not belong to any other person.' All these are functions of the Mind. Or, 'Love' may be taken as standing for the affection one feels towards sentient beings, like one's wife, son, relations and so forth; and 'greed' for the longing that one has for riches and such insentient things.

'*By the heart.*'—'Heart' here stands for the Mind;—'*sanction*' is satisfaction of mind. The real condition of things is this: *Buddhi* and other principles are located inside the Heart; and even though deluded persons have recourse to such unrighteous acts as the killing of animals apart from sacrifices, the eating of prohibited food and so forth,—thinking them to be right 'Dharma,'—yet they have compunctions in their hearts; in the case of the performance of actions prescribed in the Veda, on the other hand, the Mind feels satisfied.

The sense of all this is as follows:—'The *Dharma* that I am going to expound is not one beset with the said defects;—it is one that is actually followed by high-souled persons and towards which the Mind itself urges us. For these reasons it is only right that great regard should be paid to the *Dharmas* that are going to be propounded.'

Or, '*Heart*' may be taken as standing for the *Veda*; the Veda, duly studied and borne within the heart in the form of ideas and conceptions, is called 'heart.'

The present statement refers to the following three cases:—(1) when a person, without much thought, undertakes an action, through sheer impulse,—it must be right; this is what is meant by 'sanctioned by the heart';—(2) the same expression also includes the case when one acts according to custom, depending upon the dictum 'that is the right path by which great men have gone';—(3) when 'learned' persons, without any ulterior motives, are found to act in a certain manner they are never blamed for it, and even when people do not find their action authorised (by the Veda), they accept the fact that it must be based upon the Veda. In every way the present verse makes men have recourse to activity.

Other people explain this verse as serving the purpose of providing a general definition of 'Dharma'; the sense being—'that which is done by such persons should be regarded as *Dharma*'; this definition is applicable to all forms of *Dharma*,—that which is directly prescribed by the *Veda*, that which is laid down in the *Smṛti* and also that which is got at from Right Usage. In accordance with this explanation, however, the right reading would be—'*yaḥ ētaiḥ sēvyatē tam dharmam nibodhata*.'

II. Selfishness Deprecated

VERSE II

IT IS NOT RIGHT TO BE ABSORBED IN DESIRES—" BUT THERE IS IN THIS WORLD, NO ABSOLUTE ABSENCE OF DESIRE ; FOR THE STUDY OF THE VEDAS ITSELF IS PROMPTED BY DESIRE, AS ALSO EVERY ACT PRESCRIBED IN THE VEDA."—(2)

Bhāṣya.

The man for whom desire for reward forms the sole motive to act is said to be '*absorbed in desires*' ; and it is this character that is expressed by the abstract noun *Kāmātmatā* ; the term '*ātman*' in this compound denoting *preponderance.*

'*It is not right,*'—*i.e.*, it is deprecated.

[An objection is raised]—" This deprecation leads us to infer that the said *absorption in desires* is prohibited.—This means that the text contains the prohibition of all such sacrifices as the *Saurya* and the like, which are performed with a desire for a definite reward. Or, why should we specify the *Saurya* and other sacrifices ? All performance of actions is for the accomplishment of a desirable end ; no one acts simply for the accomplishing of the act itself ; in fact there is no action without results. As for the assertion (contained in 4.63) that 'one should not act aimlessly' [which might be taken to imply that there are *aimless* actions, such as] pouring libations on extinguished fire, or seeking for information regarding what is happening to kings and places of other countries, —in reality, in these cases also there is some result following from the act ; and all that is meant by calling them 'aimless' is that they do not bring about any important results, in the shape of attainment of Heaven, acquisition of village-property and so forth, which are useful to men in

the invisible and visible spheres. It might be argued that—'It may be that the action brings about a reward; what is meant is that the man should have no desire for that reward; even though, in the very nature of things, the reward will follow.' Even so the *Saurya* and other sacrifices would be without rewards; that alone is regarded as 'reward' which is actually *desired*; so that there could be no 'reward' for one who has no desires. In the ordinary world, we do not find any such activity as is absolutely independent of a desire for reward. Nor have we any such Vedic declaration as that 'in connection with Vedic actions alone there should be no desire for reward.' On the contrary, all Vedic acts have been prescribed as bringing definite rewards; so that if desire for rewards is interdicted, it would mean that the acts would not be done; and this would militate against the spirit of the Vedas. As regards the compulsory acts (prescribed in the Veda), there is no possibility of rewards in their case. Then again, since the prohibition in the text is a general one (and not restricted to Veaic acts only), it would lead to the cessation of all ordinary activity of the world, and would thus run counter to visible practice also, and it comes to this that no one should do anything, all should sit silent."

To the above objection we make the following reply:—(1) It has been argued that the Text implies the prohibition of the *Saurya* and such other sacrifices, which are admittedly prompted by desire for rewards; as regards this, the author is himself going to say (in Verse 5) that 'the man fulfils the desires he may have entertained'; if he had meant to prohibit (by the present verse) such acts, how could there be any 'entertainment' or 'fulfilment' of desires?

(2) The second point urged is that, since the text does not specify Vedic acts alone, the interdict would apply to ordinary actions also. But the required specification has already been made by the text (in the preceding verse), where it says—'Learn that Dharma'; which shows that it is *Dharma* (and not the

ordinary activity of the world) that forms the subject-matter of the present discourse.

(3) The third point raised is that—"in as much as no rewards are mentioned in connection with the compulsory acts, there can be no possibility of any desire for rewards in the case of these; so that no useful purpose could be served by the prohibiting of such desires."—Now in answer to this we make the following observations :—(*a*) By reason of no rewards being spoken of, no one would ever undertake the performance of any compulsory act, unless he were a person thoroughly conversant with the scriptures (and hence realising the importance of compulsory duties) : and (*b*) in the case of the *Saurya* and such other acts as have rewards mentioned in connection with them, finding that men are prompted to their performance by desire for those rewards, people might be led to the generalisation that whatever one is to do should be done with the desire for a definite reward; and thus come to undertake the performance of the compulsory acts also only through a desire for reward, even though no such reward has been spoken of in the scriptures. And it is with a view to preclude these possibilities that the text lays down the interdict. Though the general rule is that—(*a*) an act which is mentioned as leading to a definite result can only be performed with a view to that result, (*b*) while that which is laid down in the scriptures as not bringing any reward, and in connection with which one cannot assume a reward according to the principle enunciated in relation to the *Vishvajit*-sacrifice [*Pūrvamīmāmsā-Sūtra*, 4.3. 15-16; that where no reward is mentioned, the attainment of heaven should be regarded as the reward], can never be performed otherwise (than in the purely disinterested manner),—yet there may be persons who are conversant with this principle; and it is to these persons that the text addresses the exhortation; specially as it would be rather difficult to carry conviction to such persons by mere reasoning; and the requisite knowledge is conveyed in a simpler and easier manner by means of direct advice. It is for this reason that the author has, in a friendly

spirit, conveyed a teaching which is thoroughly established by proofs.

Though the word '*Kāma*' is generally found to be used in the sense of *sexual desire*, yet, since in the present context that sense is not applicable, it has to be taken as synonymous with '*ichchhā*' (Desire) and '*abhilāṣa*,' (Longing). So that in view of what follows, the meaning of the text comes to be that 'one should not undertake the performance of all acts simply with a desire for reward.'

The opponent, taking the '*absorption in desires*' to mean mere *presence of desire in general*, urges the following objection :—

"*But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desires;* that is, as a matter of fact, in this world, there is no activity for one who is entirely without desire. To say nothing of such acts as cultivation of land, trade and the like, which are done by men of experience,—even the 'study of the Veda,' the learning of the Veda, which the boy is made to do by his father and others, being even chastised by them, even this is not possible without some desire; *reading* consists in the uttering of words; and utterance never proceeds, like the sound of thunder, without desire.—'Well, if the Boy *desires* to read, why is he beaten?'—It is by beating that his desire is aroused; the only difference is that in connection with things that the person likes, the desire arises of itself (and does not need an incentive in the shape of the beating).—Similarly 'the *acts prescribed in the Veda*,'—as compulsory in connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇa nāṣa* and other sacrifices are not possible without desire. There is no possibility of a man giving away to Deities things that belong to himself, unless there is a desire in him for doing so. Hence the prohibition of 'absorption in desires' becomes an interdict upon all acts prescribed in the Veda and in the Smṛtis."—(3)

VERSE III

(*Pūrvapakṣa Continued.*)

DESIRE HAS ITS ROOT IN THOUGHT; SACRIFICES PROCEED FROM THOUGHT; VOWS AND RESTRAINTS—ALL THESE HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS ORIGINATING IN THOUGHT.—(3)

Bhāṣya.

It has been asserted (in the preceding verse) that the performance of sacrifices is not possible without desire; this is explained still more clearly in the present verse.

Thought is the root of sacrifice and other acts, as also of desire; when a man is going to perform a sacrifice, or any act, he must *think* of it: and when the thinking has been done, there must follow, from the said Thinking, Desire,—however undesirable this latter may be; for instance, when a man, going to cook, lights fire, there arises, from the fire, the undesirable smoke also. Thus it is impossible that sacrifices should be performed and there should be no desire at all.

Question.—"What is this *Thought*, which is the root of all action?"

Answer.—We explain it as follows:—*Thought* is that function of the mind which precedes Desire and Resolution; all these three are functions of the mind, and they are at the root of all activity. As a matter of fact, no physical activity is possible without Thought. What happens in the case of all activity is that—(*a*) first of all we have the Thought or Idea of the exact nature of a thing, and what is meant by 'Thought,' in the present context is the cognition that one has of a certain thing as capable of accomplishing a definite desirable purpose;—(*b*) after this follows a longing, a wish; and this is 'desire';—(*c*) after the *desire* has arisen in the form 'how may I obtain it,' the man *resolves*, determines, that *he shall act* (towards the obtaining of the thing); and

this is '*Resolution.*' It is only after these three mental operations have been gone through that the man proceeds to that external activity which would accomplish the desired end. For instance, when a man is hungry, (*a*) he thinks of—has the idea of—the action of eating,—(*b*) then he *desires* 'may I eat,'—(*c*) then comes the *resolution* 'I shall desist from all other activity and take to eating,'—(*d*) then he says to the persons in charge of the place where the act of eating is to be done—'make ready,' 'set the kitchen going.'

[*Objection*]—"If this is so, then Sacrifices and other acts *do not* proceed from mere *Thought*, but from Thought, Longing and Resolution; then why is it said that *Sacrifices proceed from Thought*?"

[*Answer*]—There is no force in this objection, since Thought is the prime cause. It is in view of this that the author is going to assert (in the next verse) that 'there is no action done by one who is entirely without desires.'

Vows—A 'vow' consists in a mental resolve, in the form 'this shall be done by me as long as I live'; to this class belong the vows of the *Snātaka.*

Restraints—are negative in their character,—such as *desisting from killing* and so forth.

[The meaning of all this is that] without thought there is neither activity towards what ought to be done, nor desisting from what is prohibited and ought not to be done."—(3)

VERSE IV

(*Pūrvapakṣa concluded.*)

NO ACTION IS EVER FOUND IN THIS WORLD TO BE DONE BY A MAN ENTIRELY WITHOUT DESIRES; WHATEVER A MAN DOES IS THE OUTCOME OF DESIRE.—(4)

Bhāṣya.

The preceding verse has described the fact that such activity and cessation from activity as are laid down in the scriptures are dependent upon knowledge; and the present

verse speaks of similar dependence in the case of ordinary acts of the world; this is the difference between the two verses.

'*Iha*' means 'in this world';—'*Karhichit*' means 'ever,' 'at any time.' During the waking state, *no action is ever found in this world* to be done by any person who is without desire for performing that action.

Whatever act, scriptural or temporal,—the permitted or the prohibited—is done *is the outcome of desire.* Since desire is the cause of all activity, every act is called the 'outcome of desire.'

Thus the position becomes extremely difficult: 'It is not right to be absorbed in desires' (as declared in Verse 2), and yet there is no activity without desire.—(4)

VERSE V

[*Answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa*]

BEHAVING IN THE RIGHT MANNER, IN REGARD TO THESE (DESIRES), A MAN ATTAINS THE POSITION OF IMMORTALS; AND EVEN IN THIS WORLD HE OBTAINS ALL THE DESIRES THAT HE MAY HAVE THOUGHT OF.—(5)

Bhāṣya.

To the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, the Author replies in this verse.

[What is meant is that] one should behave *in the right manner in regard to these*—desires.

"What is this *right behaviour*?"

It consists in doing an act exactly in the manner in which it is found mentioned in the scriptures. That is, in regard to the compulsory acts one should not think of rewards at all, for the simple reason that no rewards have been mentioned in connection with them; while in regard to the voluntary acts, there is no prohibition of thinking of rewards, for the simple reason that these acts are actually mentioned as bringing definite rewards; in fact what we know of these acts from

the scriptural injunctions is that they are the means of obtaining certain rewards; so that the performance of these by a man who has no desire for those rewards would be doing something that is not enjoined in the scriptures at all. As regards the compulsory acts however, to think of rewards would be a pure mistake; for when the acts have not been prescribed as leading to any results, no results could proceed from them by merely the man's seeking for them.

By doing so [*i.e.*, by behaving rightly in regard to desires] one *goes to*—attains—*the position of Immortals*. 'Immortals' are the Gods; their 'position' is Heaven; and by reason of the Gods residing in Heaven, the term 'position' is applied to the gods themselves, the *position* being identified with the *occupier of the position*; just as we have in the expression 'the elevated sheds are shouting' [where the 'sheds' stand for the men occupying them]. Hence the compound '*Amaraloka*' is to be expounded as a *Karmadhāraya*—'the immortal positions'; and with the abstract affix '*tal*' we have the form '*amaralokatā*.' So the meaning is that 'he obtains the character of a divine being,' 'he attains divinity.' The author has made use of this expression in view of metrical exigencies.

Or, the compound '*amaralokatā*' may be explained as *one who sees*—'*lokayati*'—*the gods*—'*amarān*'; the term '*loka*' being derived from the root '*loka*' with the passive affix '*aṇ*' (according to Pāṇini 3.2.1); and then the abstract affix *tal* added to it; so that the meaning is that 'he becomes capable of seeing the Gods'; and this also means that he attains heaven.

Or again, the expression may mean that 'he is looked upon as a God'—'*amara iva lokyatē*'—among men.

This whole passage is mere declamatory Arthavāda; and it does not lay down Heaven as the result actually following from the action spoken of; because as a matter of fact, the compulsory acts do not lead to any results at all, while the voluntary acts are prescribed as leading to diverse results. So that what the 'attaining of heaven' spoken of in the text means is the due

fulfilment of what is enjoined in the scriptures; which is only an indirect way of saying that 'that particular end is attained with a view to which the action was done.' Thus in the case of the compulsory acts, the end in view would be either the avoiding of the sin (that might be incurred by the omission of the act), or the due fulfilment of what has been enjoined in the scriptures; and in the case of the voluntary acts, the end is the attaining of *rewards thought of*, *i.e.*, those contemplated as mentioned in the scriptures; when a man is going to perform an act, he thinks, in his mind, of that reward which has been mentioned in the scriptures as following from that act; having thought of that reward, he has a desire for it—'May I obtain this reward by the doing of this act'; and then he obtains *all those desires*—*i.e.*, the desirable things.

In the manner above described we have set aside the difficulty (that had been set up by the Pūrvapakṣa); for what the text prohibits is not the desire for each and everything, but the entertaining of desires only in connection with the compulsory acts; and in regard to these also there must be desire for the obtaining of things necessary for the due performance of them.

The *Brahmavādins* (Vedāntins) however regard the words 'it is not right to be absorbed in desires' as a prohibition of the *Saurya* and all such other acts as are laid down as bringing rewards; and their reason is that all actions done with a view to rewards become setters of bondage; and it is only when an act is done without any thought of rewards—doing it simply as an offering to Brahman—that the man becomes released. This is what the revered Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana has declared in the words (*a*) 'May there be no action done with a view to rewards' (*Bhagavadgītā*, 2.47),—and again, 'The perform-nce of an act becomes vitiated, (*a*) by the incompleteness of accessories, (*b*) by the illiteracy of the performer, and (*c*) by the thought of rewards.'

Various explanations have been offered of the present verse; but we have omitted them because they are of no importance.

III. Sources of Knowledge of Dharma

VERSE VI

THE ENTIRE VEDA IS THE ROOT-SOURCE OF DHARMA; ALSO THE CONSCIENTIOUS RECOLLECTION OF RIGHTEOUS PERSONS VERSED IN THE VEDA, THE PRACTICE OF GOOD (AND LEARNED) MEN, AND THEIR SELF-SATISFACTION.—(6)

Bhāṣya.

[The opponent raises an initial objection]—"What is the relevancy of what is stated in this verse? It is *Dharma* that has been declared as the subject to be described; and *Dharma* can be described only by means of Injunctions and Prohibitions. Now as regards the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma, this cannot form the subject of any injunction such as 'the Veda should be known as the source of Dharma, as the authoritative means of ascertaining Dharma'; because this fact can be known without its being enjoined in so many words; certainly the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma does not stand in need of being notified by any injunctions of such writers as Manu and others; in fact the authoritativeness of the Veda regarding matters relating to Dharma is as self-evident as that of Direct Perception,—being based upon the facts that (1) it brings about cognitions that are never sublated, (2) that it is not the work of any person, and as such it is entirely free of any suspicion of falsity that might be due to the defects of such authors, and (3) that the words of the Veda itself are free from all defects.

"It might be argued that—'what the text does is to refer to the well-established fact of the Veda being authoritative, with a view to indicate that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda.'

"But this explanation cannot be accepted. For this fact also does not need to be stated; as (1) every *Smṛti*, by its very nature, must be dependent upon a previous cognition,

(2) the chances of mistake in the Smṛtis are precluded by the fact of their being accepted by great men, (3) the super-sensuous things spoken of in the *Smṛtis* could not be known to Manu and others (by any ordinary means of knowledge), and (4) every man knows it from his own experience that there is "recollection" of things taught in the Veda; so that the only possible view that could be entertained regarding the *Smṛtis* is that they are based upon the Veda [which, therefore, need not have been re-iterated in the Text]. Further, persons who know the Veda cannot stand in need of any Smṛti for learning what they should do; and lastly, when the Veda itself is the source of *Dharma*, there can be no need for postulating any other sources (in the shape of *Smṛti*, etc.).

"Nor is it right to assert that 'the *conscientious recollection of persons versed in the Veda* is also merely referred to for the purpose of pointing out the unauthoritative character of the heterodox *Smṛtis*'; because the unauthoritative character of these latter is already well established by reasoning. For such heterodox people as the *Shākya*, the *Bhojaka*, the *Kṣapaṇaka* and the rest, there is no possibility of any knowledge of the Veda, by virtue of which they might be regarded as authoritative on matters treated of in their *Smṛtis*; because in the first place they do not admit any connection with the Veda; secondly, they openly declare that the Veda is not authoritative; thirdly, they contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; and lastly, these *Smṛtis* clearly prohibit the study of the Veda. If *Buddha* and others had been students of the Veda, then alone could there be any question as to whether or not their *Smṛtis* are based upon the Veda. When however, as a matter of fact, any connection with the Veda is not even remotely possible, how could there be any possibility of these being based upon the Veda? On the contrary, these writers themselves put forward an entirely different basis for their codes,—in the form of tradition (handed down through a series of several *Buddhas*); as for example, in the following words: 'with my divine eyes I perceive the good and bad conditions of Bhikṣus.' Exactly in the same manner, all such heterodox

people as the *Bhojaka*, the *Pañcharātra*, the *Nirgrantha*, the *Anarthavāda*, the *Pāshupata* and the rest hold that their scriptures are the works of gifted personalities, particular deities, capable of directly perceiving the subjects dealt with by them ; and they do not admit that *Dharma* has its source in the Veda ; in fact their scriptures contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda ; *e.g.*, some of these people, holding that death frees the living being from the troubles of living, hold all *Killing* to be meritorious ; and this (reckless) killing is distinctly prohibited in the Veda ; similarly, others hold Bathing at sacred places to be sinful, while the Veda directly enjoins daily bathing and living at sacred places ; so again, according to some people, the killing of animals at the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice is sinful ; and this is against the Vedic injunction laying down the performing of that sacrifice ;—lastly, some people hold that all such acts as the offering of libations and sacrifices are entirely selfish, while according to the Veda, which prescribes various deities in connection with the said acts, they are performed for the sake of these several deities. So that there is distinct disagreement between the Veda and the said heterodox scriptures.

"Some people have argued as follows :—'In the Veda also we find contradictory assertions : *e.g.*, one passage lays down the *holding* (of the Shodashī-vessel, at the Atirātra sacrifice), while another says it should not be held ; similarly one passage prescribes the time *after Sunrise* as best suited to the pouring of libations, while another lays down the time *before Sunrise* ; so that it is quite possible that in the Veda itself—either in its lost Rescensions or even in such Rescensions as are not completely lost—there may be found injunctions contrary to a certain Vedic injunction [and these contrary Vedic passages would form the basis for the non-Vedic teachings of the heterodox *Smṛtis*]. The number of Vedic Rescensions is endless; how could all of them be known to any one person? And it is quite possible that some of them might have become lost. So that it is quite possible that there may be some such Vedic Rescensional text as contains

direct injunctions of such acts as *Eating in a vessel made of human bones, remaining naked-skinned* and so forth (which have been prescribed in some heterodox scriptures).'

"Our answer to the above is as follows :—We do not deny the possibility of mutually contradictory teachings being found in the Veda ; what we mean is that in all such cases (where both the injunctions are equally directly perceived), both injunctions stand upon the same footing, and consequently the two acts are regarded as optional alternatives. In the case in question however (*i.e.*, when the teaching of a heterodox scripture is found to contradict the direct teaching of the Veda), the Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) could only be *assumed* ; but there can be no occasion for the assumption of a text directly contradictory to one that is directly perceived. The mere possibility of a Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) cannot lead to any certainty regarding its actual existence ; while the Vedic injunction to the contrary is directly perceptible and certain ; and certainly a certain text can never be sublated by an uncertain one. As for the theory of 'lost Rescensions,' we shall deal with it in detail later on, in our comments on this same verse. As regards the (orthodox) *Smṛtis* of Manu and others, their relationship to directly perceptible Vedic texts is quite patent ; in some cases they are related to the Vedic *mantras*, in others to the Vedic deities, and in others again with substances and other details. No such relationship is possible in the case of the heterodox Smṛtis ; hence no authority can ever belong to them (for the purpose of re-iterating which fact there could be a *reference* to the 'Recollection of persons versed in the Veda.')

"As regards *Practice*,—that which consists in what is actually done, with a view to invisible results, by persons learned in the Veda,—its authoritative character is exactly like that of *Recollection* (Smṛti) ; because that also has its basis in the Veda. On the other hand, wrong Practice is generally based upon visible causes (of greed, &c.), and unlearned persons are apt to commit mistakes ; hence it can not have any authority at all.

"Similarly with *Self-satisfaction*.

"If again the authority of the Veda, of Recollection and of Practice were dependent upon the teachings of Manu and others (in the shape of the present verse), on what would the authority of these latter rest? If on other teachings—such as 'the *Smārta Dharma* has been expounded by Manu,'—then, whence the authority of these latter? In fact, the ultimate criterion as to what is authoritative and what is not authoritative, would be a purely logical one, and it would not consist in any teaching at all. So that the present verse is absolutely useless; and so also other similar verses that follow."

Our answer to the above objection is as follows :—

The authors of treatises on Dharma proceed to compose their works for the expounding of their subject for the benefit of such persons as are not learned (in the Vedas). Hence it is that having themselves learnt from the Veda that the *Aṣṭakā* and such other acts should be performed, they incorporate in their own work the injunctions of these acts, for the purpose of conveying the same knowledge to others; similarly in the case of such matters as the authoritative character of the Veda [which are known by the *Smṛti*-writers themselves from the Veda, and yet they proceed to include that information in their work for the edification of persons not equally learned]. As a matter of fact, there are many enquirers who are incapable of ascertaining truth by means of independent reasoning,—not being endowed with an intellect capable of ratiocination; and for the benefit of these persons even a logically established fact is stated by the writers in a friendly spirit. Hence what is herein stated regarding Veda being the source of Dharma is a well-established fact. What the statement 'Veda is the source of Dharma' means is that 'the fact of Veda being the source of Dharma has been ascertained after due consideration, and one should never doubt its authoritative character.' Even in ordinary experience we find people teaching others facts ascertained by other means of knowledge; *e.g.* [when the

physician teaches]—'you should not eat before the food already taken has been digested, for indigestion is the source of disease.' It cannot be rightly urged that "those who are unable to comprehend, by reasoning, the fact of Veda being the source of Dharma, can not comprehend it through teaching either"; for as a matter of fact we find that when certain persons are known to be 'trustworthy,' people accept their word as true, without any further consideration. The whole of the present section therefore is based on purely logical facts, and not on the Veda. In other cases also,—*e.g.*, in the case of *Smṛtis* dealing with law-suits, &c.—what is propounded is based upon logic, as we shall show later on, as occasion arises. How the performance of the *Aṣṭakā*, etc., is based upon the Veda we shall show in the present context itself.

The word '*Veda*' here stands for the Ṛg, Yajuṣ and Sāman, along with their respective Brāhmaṇas; all these are fully distinguished, by students, from all other sentences (and compositions). Learners who have their intellect duly cultured through series of teachings, understand, as soon as a Vedic passage is uttered, that it is Veda,—their recognising of the Veda being as easy as the recognition of a man as a Brāhmaṇa. This word 'Veda' is applied to the whole collection of sentences,—beginning with '*Agnimīlē purohitam,*' '*Agnirvai dēvānāmvarua,*' and ending with '*Samsamidyuvase,*' '*atha mahāvāratam*' (Ṛgveda); as also to the several individual sentences forming part of the said collection; and this application of the word is not direct in the one case and indirect in the other,—as is the case with the word 'village' as applied (directly) to the entire group of habitations, and (indirectly) to each individual habitation. In the case of the word 'village' the twofold usage is based upon the principle that words denoting the composites are also applicable to the components; the word 'village' is known to be used generally in the sense of 'a group of houses,' and yet in the case of such expressions as 'the village is burnt,' it is used in the sense of a few individual houses in the village; as it is when people say 'the village has been burnt,' when

in reality only a few houses have been burnt. Or, in this case also the word 'village' may be regarded as used in the sense of the *group* only; and what happens is that it is the *burning*, which, though really pertaining to only a portion of that group, is spoken of as pertaining to the entire group as related to the said portion; specially as it is only through its components that a composite can have any connection with an act; in fact the composite's connection with acts can be none other than that of the components; apart from the components, the composite cannot be either seen or touched.

We now proceed to explain the etymology of the word '*Veda*.' The 'Veda' is that from which people derive their knowledge of Dharma, which cannot be known from any other source of knowledge—[*vidanti asmāṭ iti vēdaḥ*]; and this *knowledge* of Dharma is derived from each individual sentence; hence the name is not restricted to the entire collection of *Adhyāyas* and *Anuvākas* that go under the name '*Ṛgvēda*.' It is on this understanding that the penalty of having the tongue cut off is inflicted (upon the Shūdra) when he pronounces a single sentence out of the Veda. On the same principle also is the epithet 'whole' found in the injunction that 'the *whole* Veda should be studied,' where it serves to indicate the necessity of studying all the sentences contained in the Veda; otherwise (if the epithet 'whole' were not there) the learner would be satisfied with the reading of only a few sentences, and would not read the whole Veda. All this we shall explain in detail in the present work.

This *Veda* is variously divided. The *Sāma Veda* is said to have a thousand 'paths' (*i.e.*, Rescensions), in the shape of '*Sātya*,' '*Mugri*,' '*Rāṇāyanīya*' and so forth; there are a hundred Rescensions of the *Yajurveda*, in the shape of '*Kāṭhaka*,' '*Vājasanēyaka*' and the rest; there are twenty-one Rescensions of the *Ṛgvēda*; and nine of the *Atharva Veda* in the shape of '*Modaka*' '*Paippalādaka*,' and so forth.

[*Objection*]—"No one regards the Atharva as a *Veda* : (*a*) 'The science is three-fold, consisting of the Ṛk, the Yajuṣ and the Sāman,' (*b*) 'The Sun moves forward, endowed with the *three* Vedas' (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 3.12.91), (*c*) 'One should keep up the observance of studying the *three* Vedas'; [all these speak of only *three* Vedas]. In fact we also find a prohibition regarding the Atharva—'One should not recite the Atharvaṇas.' It is in view of all these that people regard the followers of the Atharvaṇa as *heretics*, beyond the pale of the *Vedic Triad*."

[*Answer*]—This is not right; all good men agree in regarding the Atharvaṇa as a *Veda*. In this *Smṛti* itself (11.33) we find the expression '*shrutīratharvāṅgirasīḥ*,' where the Atharva is spoken of as '*shruti*,' and '*shruti*' is the same as 'Veda.'

Further [whether a certain Veda is called 'Veda' or not is of no import]; when certain passages—*e.g.*, those prescribing the *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices. which all people call 'Veda'—are regarded as authoritative in matters regarding Dharma, they are so accepted, not because they are called by the name of 'Veda';—because the name 'Veda' is sometimes applied to *Itihāsa* and the *Āyurveda* also, when, for instance, it is said that '*Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* are the fifth Veda' (*Chhandogya Upaniṣad*, 7.1.2), [and yet these are not regarded as authorities on Dharma];—but because they are independent of human agency, and help to make known our duties, and because they are free from mistakes; and all these conditions are fulfilled by the Atharva: such acts as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like are prescribed in the Atharva just as they are in the Yajuṣ and the other Vedas. Some people have fallen into the mistake that the Atharva cannot be *Veda* because it abounds in teachings of acts dealing with malevolent magic (witchcraft). As a matter of fact, malevolent magic, as leading to the death of living beings, is always prohibited.

[It is described, because] it is employed by the priests of kings who are well versed in magical spells; but it is deprecated.

It has been argued above that "the Atharva is not mentioned among Vedas, in such passages as 'the Sun moves, endowed with the *three* Vedas.'"—But the passages quoted are merely declamatory (Arthavāda); it is therefore of no consequence whether or not the Atharva is mentioned among them. Or, the passages that speak of 'three Vedas,' 'the triple science,' and so forth may be taken as referring to the three *kinds* of mantras; besides the three kinds of *mantras* found in the Ṛk, Yajuṣ and Sāma Vedas, there is no fourth kind,—the Exhortations, the Invocations, the lowly recited Prayers and the Hymns to Indra, and such other Mantras being all included under these three. In the Atharva Veda also, the mantras mentioned are all of the 'Ṛk' class; hence so far as the classification according to the *kind* of mantra is concerned, it comes under the 'Ṛgveda.'

As regards the interdict placed upon the study of the Atharva Veda, it indicates a conclusion quite the reverse of that which it has been cited (by the opponent) to prove: A prohibition is possible only of what is otherwise possible [so that the very prohibition proves that the said study was, and should be, prevalent, except under the circumstances referred to in the interdict]. Or, the passage quoted may simply mean that 'one should not mix up the performance of acts enjoined in the other three Vedas with that of those prescribed in the Atharva Veda; for instance, during the performance of the *Vāchastoma* sacrifices, the reciting of all Ṛk, Sāman and Yajuṣ mantras is enjoined, and the said prohibition precludes the reciting, at this sacrifice, of the mantras occurring in the Atharva Veda.

The above-described *Veda*—which is a particular kind of literary compilation, not by any human author, which is divided into several 'Rescensions,' and known under the name '*Mantra-Brāhmaṇa*'—is the '*root*,'—*i.e.*, the *authority*, the *means of knowing*—'*of Dharma*.' '*Root*,' here means *cause*. The *Veda* and *Smṛti* can be a 'cause' only in the sense that they serve to *make known*,—not in that of *producing*, nor in

that *helping to stand*, which are the two senses in which the '*root*' is the *cause* of the Tree.

The term '*dharma*' we have already explained above; it is that which a man should do, and which is conducive to his welfare, and of a character different from such acts as are amenable to perception and the other ordinary means of knowledge. Land-cultivation, service, &c., also are conducive to man's welfare; but this fact of their being so beneficial is ascertained by means of positive and negative induction; and as regards the sort of cultivation that brings a good harvest of grains, this is ascertained by direct perception and other ordinary means of knowledge. On the other hand, the fact of sacrifices being conducive to welfare, and the manner in which they are beneficial, through the intervention of the 'Apūrva,'—all this is not amenable to perception or other ordinary means of knowledge. 'Welfare' is that which is, in its most general form, spoken of as 'pleasure,' consisting of the attaining what is desirable, in the shape of Heaven, landed property and so forth, and also (*b*) the avoiding of what is generally spoken of as 'pain,' which consists of illness, poverty, unhappiness, Hell and so forth. Others regard the attaining of Supreme Bliss only as 'welfare.'

This *Dharma* is learnt from such passages in the Brāhmaṇas as contain the '*liṅ*' and other injunctive expressions. In some cases we learnt it also from *mantras*; *e.g.*, from such mantras as '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhatē*,' 'offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta' (*Vājasaneyi Samhitā*, 24. 20). Among these such passages as contain the word '*Kāma*' ('desire') indicate that the act therein enjoined is to be performed for the purpose of obtaining a definite result; *e.g.*, '*Sauryañcharunnirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*,' ('one desirous of acquiring Brahmic glory should offer cooked rice to Sūrya'), '*Vaishvadēvīm sāṅgrahiṇīm nirvapēt grāmakāmaḥ*' ('one desirous of acquiring landed property should offer the Sāṅgrahiṇī to the Vishvēdēvas'); and the actions thus enjoined are not done by one who is not desirous of obtaining the particular results spoken of. There are other acts which are pointed out as compulsory,

by means of such words as '*yāvajjīvam*' ('throughout one's life') and so forth. These are not performed with a view to any results,—there being no results mentioned as following from them. Nor will it be right to assume, in this case also, a definite result in the shape of Heaven, in accordance with the 'Vishvajit'—principle (laid down in the Pūrva-Mimānsā Sūtra 4. 3. 15-16); because the presence of such words as 'throughout life' and so forth already indicates that these are to be performed without any reference to results, and the omission of these acts simply involves the sin of disobeying the scriptural injunction. So that it is with a view to avoid this sin that the acts thus prescribed are performed. This same holds good regarding prohibitions—such as 'the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed,' 'wine should not be drunk'; the avoiding of the prohibited act is not for the purpose of any reward, but simply for the purpose of avoiding something sinful.

'*Entire*,'—whole. That is, there is not a single word, consonant or vowel (of the Veda) that is not conducive to *Dharma*.

Some people raise the following objection against this:—

"It has been asserted that the Veda consists of injunctions, descriptions, mantras and names, and *Dharma* is of the nature of what should be done. Now it is only right that the Injunctive passages should be the means of knowing *Dharma*; as it is from these that we learn that sacrifice and other acts should be done,—*e.g.*, 'the *Agnihotra* should be offered,' 'an offering of curds should be made,' 'offerings should be made in the morning and in the evening, to Agni and Prajāpati,' 'one desirous of attaining Heaven should pour libations into the fire.' The whole set of these passages points to the particular action of '*Agnihotra*' as one that should be done; 'curds' are the substance to be offered at the same sacrifice, Agni and Prajāpati are the deities to whom the offerings are to be made,—and the 'desire for heaven' is the qualifying condition for the performer.

"But in the Veda there are many such passages as—(*a*) 'Agni is all the deities, Agni is the divine power of oblations,

he invites the Gods and makes offerings to them,' &c., and again (*b*) 'Prajāpati cut out his own fat' and so forth ; and certainly such passages do not lay down anything to be done ; all that they do is either to relate some past event or to describe some entirely irrelevant thing. If his own fat was cut out by Prajāpati, let him cut it ; what is that to us ? Similarly the fact of Agni being all deities does not help in the offerings to Agni ; that Agni is the deity to whom the offering should be made having been declared by the word 'Agni' itself ; if Agni is some other deity, then the mere fact of his being another deity would rule him out as a recipient of that offering. As for *inviting*, that also is laid down by another passage 'we invite Agni, O Agni !' &c. And lastly, as for the mention of Agni inviting and making offerings to the Gods, this is absolutely meaningless.

"As regards *mantras* again, there are some,—*e.g.*, (*a*) 'There was neither death nor immortality, &c.,' (Ṛgveda, 10.129.2), (*b*) 'Sudeva might fall to-day never to return, &c.,' (Ṛgveda, 10.95.14) and so forth—which either describe some past event or contain a wailing ; and what *Dharma* could such mantras expound ? At that time there was neither death, nor immortality, nor life—certainly no living being having been born before creation, there was no life or death of any one; during the universal dissolution also, there may come about the death of all things, or it may not come about,—it does not teach us anything as to anything *to be done.* Similarly, Sudeva, a certain highly meritorious godlike man, might to-day fall, *i.e.*,—might throw himself into a pit—never to return—*i.e.*, after which fall he cannot come back to life ;—this is how Purūravas, separated from Urvashī, bewailed.

Similarly as regards Names,—*e.g.*, as 'one should sacrifice with the Udbhid,' 'one should sacrifice with the Balābhid,' &c., &c.,—they do not enjoin any act or substance ; the enjoining of the action being done by the verb ('should sacrifice'), and the word '*Balabhid*' and '*Udbhid*, *&c.*, not being expressive of any substance ; specially

as the substance for the sacrifice in question in the form of *Soma*—is got at from its archetype by virtue of the direct injunction [that 'the ectypal sacrifices are to be performed in the manner of their archetypes,' and the archetype of the *Udbhid* sacrifice is the Jyotiṣṭoma at which *soma-juice* is the substance offered]; and hence there is no necessity for twisting the words 'udbhid,' &c., to yield the name of some sacrificial material [such as *tree* or *spade*, which may be indicated by the etymology of the word '*udbhid*,' which means 'that which shoots out' or 'that with which digging is done']. Thus it is clear that no *dharma* is indicated by the names. How then can it be said that 'the *entire* Veda is the root of dharma?'"

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is just in view of these doubts that the Author has added the epithet '*entire*'; by which it is meant that all these passages that have been cited by the objector help in providing knowledge of Dharma.

(A) First, as regards *Arthavādas*, these are not meant to be construed apart from the injunctive passages; it is only if they were so construed that they would fail to help in the knowledge of *dharma*. As a matter of fact, we find that if the Arthavāda is taken apart by itself, it remains syntactically defective; and this leads us to conclude that they subserve the purposes of the corresponding injunctive passages; being so subservient to these latter, they come to be construed along with them; and hence they have got to be explained in such a manner as to make them fit in with the corresponding injunction. Thus the mention of Prajāpati having cut his fat cannot be taken by itself; it has to be taken as supplementing an injunction; in view of the fact however that the Arthavādas do not denote a substance, a sacrificial accessory, or any such thing as generally forms the direct object of injunction, they are construed differently, as eulogising what is directly enjoined, and thus come to be recognised as supplementing the injunction. This praise of the enjoined thing is also expressed by

the Arthavāda; for instance, the sense of the passage in question is this—'it is so necessary to perform animal-sacrifices that, at a time when no animals were available, and there was no other remedy, Prajāpati constituted himself into the animal and cut out his own fat.' That such is the construction to be put upon the Arthavāda is shown by the fact that whenever we have *Arthavādas*, they always accompany injunctive passages. Thus even though the sense of the injunction is comprehended even without the accompanying *Arthavāda,—e.g.*, in the case of the injunction 'one should offer the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta,' we comprehend the injunction from the sentence itself,—yet the Arthavādas are not absolutely useless; for when the Arthavāda is there, it is not right to deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence only. The Veda is not the work of any author; we cannot argue (from the analogy of human speeches) that 'since in one case the injunction has no Arthavāda to help it, it need not have it in another case also';—the *Arthavādas are* there, we *have* to construe them; and what we have shown above is the only right way in which the particular Arthavāda can be construed. Nor is there anything very extraordinary in this; in ordinary practice also, we find eulogistic words accompanying injunctions; for instance, at the time that the master is paying wages to his servants, some servant says affectionately (in regard to another)—'This Devadatta is a good servant, he is always present, knows the occasions of service and is always careful about it.' Thus we find that *Arthavādas* also serve the purpose of *enjoining*, through the eulogising of what is enjoined by the injunction. In fact, in certain cases, details of what is enforced by the injunction are got at from the *Arthavāda* only; for instance, when the injunction says, 'wet pebbles are to be put in,' this injunction stands in need of some *wetting substance*, such as butter oil, etc.; so that when it is followed by the Arthavāda 'Butter is glory,' this praise of Butter leads us to conclude that Butter is the wetting substance to be used. Similarly the Arthavāda 'those who have recourse to these *Rātris* become respected'

serves to point out the qualifying conditions for the performers of the *Rātri-satra* sacrifice. From all this it is clear that *Arthavādas* also are '*the root of Dharma.*'

(B) Next as regards *Mantras*, some of them are directly injunctive; *e.g.*, the *Mantra* '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhatē*' ('offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta');—in connection with the *Āghāra*-offering, the deity to whom the offering is to be made is pointed out by the mantra '*Ita Indra urdhvo' dhvaraḥ*, etc.'. In this case the Deity is not mentioned in the passage that enjoins the offering, nor is it mentioned in any other purely injunctive passage; the particular *mantra* to be used however is directly enjoined as being the one that begins with '*Ita Indra*'; hence it is from the words of this *mantra* that we learn the name of the requisite Deity. There are thousands of such instances where the Deity is indicated by the words of the *mantra*. Then, there are certain *mantras* that are only descriptive of what is being done; and these also serve the purpose of making known *Dharma* by reminding (the persons engaged in the act, of what is to be done); and thus these also become '*root of Dharma*' by indicating what *should be done*.

Thirdly, as regards the *Names*, they are never found apart from verbs, and hence, like verbs, they have their character of being the '*root of Dharma*' well-established. Then again, as a matter of fact, the accessory details of sacrifices are generally enjoined through these *names* (of sacrifices); *e.g.*, (*a*) 'In the *Sharat* season one should perform the *Vājapēya* sacrifice,' (*b*) 'one desirous of Kingdom of Heaven should perform the *Vājapēya*' [in the former we have the injunction of the *time* of performance, and in the latter, of the *Result*, and both are mentioned along with the name of the sacrifice '*Vājapēya*'].

Thus it is proved that the '*entire* Veda' is the 'root of Dharma.'

Other people have taken the word '*entire*' as added with a view to the possible objection that no knowledge of Dharma is provided by the Vedic passages laying down the *Shyēna*

and such other objectionable acts, or by the Prohibitions—such as 'one should not eat garlic.'

The objection anticipated by these people is as follows:—"The *Shyēna* and other sacrifices of the kind are in the form of malevolent spells; and partaking of the character of *murder*, they are distinctly of the nature of '*Himsā*' (Injury); and since all form of injury is cruel, and all evil spells have been prohibited, these sacrifices must be '*Adharma*,' the opposite of '*Dharma*' (sinful). [And since the Veda lays down such sacrifices] the '*entire*' Veda cannot be the 'root of *Dharma*.' For '*Dharma*' has been explained as 'what should be done,' and certainly the killing of the Brāhmaṇa is not 'what should be done.' How then can the passages laying down such acts be the 'root of Dharma'? Further, even the animal-sacrifices—*Agniṣomīya* and the rest,—involve the killing of animals, and as such are very far removed from the character of 'Dharma.' That killing is sinful is admitted by all enquiries. To this end it has been said 'where the killing of living beings is *Dharma*, what can be *Adharma*?'"

Now how is this objection anticipated? It is anticipated (say these other people) by the adding of the epithet '*entire*.' There is no other use for this epithet.

It might be asked why no reason has been given [by Manu, why and how the entire Veda is the root of Dharma]; but our answer is that this is a work in the form of Precept, and as such states well-established conclusions; and those persons who seek after the 'why' and 'wherefore' of these conclusions are instructed by *Pūrvamīmāmsā*. We have already said that this work is addressed to persons who are prepared to learn things from Precept alone.

The author of the *Vivaraṇa* however puts forward a few arguments also:—It has been argued by the opponent that the *Shyēna* and other such sacrifices, being prohibited, must be '*adharma*,' sinful. This is quite true. But even though these acts are prohibited, yet in certain cases it so happens that some people may have their animosity too strong

to allow of their submitting to the general prohibition of *killing*,—in such other passages has 'no living beings should be killed,'—and such persons derive from the *Shyēna*, the pleasure of killing their enemy; and to that small extent, as conducive to this pleasure, the *Shyēna* may be regarded as '*dharma*'; so that the passage prescribing the *Shyēna* does not cease to be the 'source of Dharma.' Secondly, as for prohibitions, it is only a person who is moved by passion to do the killing that is guided by the prohibition; and the acting up to the prohibition only consists in not doing what is prohibited [and this desisting from the prohibited act is meritorious, *Dharma*]. Thirdly, the prohibition of killing does not apply to the killing that is done in course of the *Agnīṣomīya* and other such offerings; and what is prohibited by the general prohibition of killing is only that killing in ordinary practice which is done through malice. That killing, on the other hand, which is distinctly enjoined and has scriptural sanction, can never form the subject of prohibition; specially as the prohibition has its use in connection with ordinary killing. Nor is it possible to deduce the sinfulness of the scriptural killing, on the analogy of ordinary killing, from the general proposition that 'all killing is sinful.' Because what makes the killing sinful is not merely its character of 'killing,' but also the fact of its being prohibited; and we have already pointed out that the prohibition does not apply to the scriptural killing.

Some people explain the word '*mūla*,' 'root' to mean *cause*;—the meaning being that 'of Dharma Veda is the root,—the basis, the cause—either directly or indirectly.' It is the 'direct cause of Dharma' in such passages as 'one should study the Veda,' 'one should get up the Ṛgveda,' etc.'; and it is the 'indirect cause' when it points out the detailed form of the *Agnihotra* and such other acts.

'*Smṛtishīlē cha tadvidām*'—'*Conscientious Recollection of persons versed in the Veda*';—'*Smṛti*,' '*Recollection*,' is the idea that one has of what has been apprehended before.—The pronoun '*tat*' (in the compound '*tadvidām*') stands for the *Veda*; and those who know the Veda are called '*Vedavidaḥ*,' '*versed in the Veda*.' The meaning thus is that another 'authority' (means of knowing) for *Dharma* consists in the idea, 'this should be done, that should not be done,' entertained by people learned in the Veda.

"It has been held that Recollection is not a reliable means of knowledge; and the reason for this that is given is that Recollection only serves to recall what has been apprehended by other means of knowledge, and does not lead to the apprehension of anything new."

This is true; for the persons to whom the recollection belongs, it is the original means of knowledge—Trustworthy Assertion or Perception, etc.—that constitutes the reliable source of knowledge; and one's own Recollection is not a reliable source of knowledge for himself. But for us (ordinary mortals), it is the Recollection of Manu and such other persons that forms a reliable source of knowledge; we have no other means, except the said Recollection, for knowing that the *Aṣṭakā* and such other acts should be done. That the Recollection of Manu, etc., was actually in a certain form, we learn from the assertions made by themselves that have come down to us through a long line of tradition. And from this Recollection we come to the conclusion that the subject-matter of them was actually apprehended by Manu, etc., by the ordinary means of knowledge; and this is indicated by the fact of the Recollection being there, and no Recollection being possible without previous apprehension.

"It is quite possible that Manu and others have compiled their 'Recollections' from imagination, without having actually apprehended what they speak of; in the same manner as certain poets compose a story after having created the whole plot from imagination."

The answer to this is as follows:—This might be so, if the works under consideration did not contain teachings regarding what 'should be done.' Teachings regarding what should be done are meant to lead to the performance of those acts; and certainly no rational person can ever perform what is taught on an imaginary basis.

"But people might be led to perform it by mistake."

One man might fall into such a mistake; that the entire world has fallen into a mistake, and this mistake has persisted ever since the beginning of creation,—this would certainly be a most extraordinary presumption. And when it is quite possible that the assertions of Manu, etc., are based upon the Veda, there is no room for the assumption that in following them people have fallen into a mistake. We also do not admit that Manu and others directly *perceived* the *Dharmas*; because 'Perception' is that cognition which follows when the sense-organs are in contact with the objects cognised; and certainly no such contact with the sense-organs is possible for *Dharma*, for the simple reason that it is *what should be done*, and *what should be done* is not an accomplished entity, and it is only an accomplished entity that comes into contact with anything. It is true that (though perception does not apprehend non-existent things) Inference and the other means of cognition do bring about the apprehension of things *not existent* at the time,—*e.g.*, when people see a line of ants moving along with their eggs, they infer the *coming* rain; but even these latter means of cognition do not provide any knowledge of *what should be done*.

All this leads us to conclude that, in as much as the Recollection pertains to *what should be done*, it must have a source that is similar to itself; and such source can be the Veda only. The Veda that we thus infer (to be the source of the Recollections) must have been directly perceived by Manu and others and the Vedic texts in which the Dharmas laid down in the Smṛtis were originally prescribed (and which we do not find in the Vedas now) must have been contained in such Rescensions as have been lost.

On this point, the following alternative views suggest themselves as possible:—

(*a*) The Rescensions may be one or several; and it is inferred that from among these some contain the injunction of the *Aṣṭakā* and some that of others. (*b*) Or, it may be that all the Rescensions are available even at the present day; but the details of the *Dharmas* are scattered about among them; so that while one Rescension contains the originative injunction of the *Aṣṭakā*, another contains the injunction of the substance to be used at it, a third enjoins the Deity, and yet another lays down the Mantra; and what Manu and other compilers have done is to bring together in one place all these scattered details, with a view to make them more easily understood. ( ) Or, that the Dharmas in question have their origin only in the indications of Mantras and Arthavādas. (*d*) Or, these Dharmas, having been performed by men from time immemorial, and having been handed down by an unbroken line of tradition, must be regarded to be as eternal as the Veda itself. (*e*) Or, the action of Manu and others also, like that of ourselves, must have been based upon the authority of some other source, and as such their assertions must be based upon such Vedic texts as have always been assumed by inference (and never actually perceived by any one in any Veda).

These and such other alternative views have been fully considered by the author of the *Vivaraṇa*; and the definite conclusion arrived at is as follows:—The performance of the *Aṣṭakā* and such other acts laid down in the *Smṛtis* must be regarded as sanctioned by the Veda; because they are found to be connected with purely Vedic injunctions, on perceiving which latter the performers undertake the performance. The said connection we have already shown above;—in some cases what is prescribed in the Veda is subservient to what is laid down in the *Smṛti*, and sometimes it is the contrary; sometimes the Veda contains the originative Injunction of the act in question, sometimes its qualifying conditions, and sometimes it lays out a mere *Arthavāda*, an eulogistic description. In this manner all

those acts that are prescribed in the *Smṛtis* are connected with Vedic injunctions.

We have discussed this matter fully in the *Smṛtivivēka* as follows:—

'Between what is laid down in the *Smṛti* and what is prescribed in the Veda, there is a close connection. There is not much difference between the two, either as to the character of their performers or to the nature of the acts themselves. Those same persons who perform the acts prescribed in the Veda,—if they also do what is mentioned in the Smṛtis, it follows that these latter have their source in the Veda. The principal criterion of the authoritative character of a certain text is its acceptance by persons learned in the Veda; and the fact of the performing agents being the same in both cases has been put forward (in the Pūrvamīmānsā Sūtra 1.3.2) as a ground for inferring the existence of Vedic texts in corroboration of the *Smṛtis*.'

For going any further than this and for coming to particulars (as to where these corroborative Vedic texts are to be found etc., etc.), there is no reasonable ground; nor is there any necessity (it being sufficient for our present purpose that all that is contained in the *Smṛti* has its source in the Veda).

It is quite possible that certain rescensional texts of the Veda may have been lost. Even at the present day we find several such texts as are read by very few students. And some people have held that what the authors of the *Smṛtis* have done is to bring together the purely injunctive passages, shorn of their accompanying *arthavādas*, contained in such rescensional texts as were found by them to be likely to be lost (for want of learners). Āpastamba (1.4.10) for instance, says —'the injunctions are those laid down in the Brāhmaṇas,— their exact words have been lost—but they can be inferred from the details of the actual performance.'

But this theory involves many impossible and unheard of assumptions, such as the neglect of, and the total disappearance of all the learners of, just that Vedic text which was the

most useful, being that in which were declared all those *Dharmas* pertaining to castes and life-stages that are set forth in the *Smṛtis* and the *Gṛhyasūtras.*

The other view however is more reasonable,—that learned persons, who have formed definite conclusions of their own on all important matters, should compile a practical compendium of all such injunctions as are scattered over (in various sections of the Veda), beset with *arthavādas*, and difficult to determine what is conducive to the good of man and what is meant only to complete the sacrificial performance.

But under this hypothesis also, there is this difficulty, that in cases where the *Smṛti* rule runs counter to a Vedic rule, both would have to be regarded as equally directly *Vedic,* and as such representing optional alternatives; so that the *Smṛti* could not be set aside by the Veda. And this certainly cannot be accepted by the learned. In fact the authors of the *Smṛtis* themselves admit that the basis of the *Smṛti* in the Veda is only inferred, and that the former is always set aside in favour of the latter. For instance, Gautama says (3.35)—'There is only one life-stage, say the revered Teachers; since the householder's life is the only one that is directly enjoined.' If Manu and the other writers (who speak of four life-stages) had actually found the Vedic texts (upon which they based their division of the four stages),—then what would be the sense of the expression that 'the house-holder's life is the only one that is directly enjoined (by the Veda)'? For according to the hypothesis under discussion all the four stages would be equally *directly enjoined.* [Nor is the above-quoted *Sūtra* the statement of a foreign opinion.] In fact it embodies Gautama's own opinion, which he has put forward as the opinion of 'revered teachers.' This is clear from the fact that he has begun the section with the statement 'Now as regards the various views that have been held regarding the life-stages' (3.1), and he has concluded with the Sūtra (3.35) quoted above.

The authoritative character of *Mantras* and *Arthavādas* (as means of knowing *Dharma*) is not inconsistent. Though

it is true that *Arthavādas* only serve to eulogise what has been enjoined by an Injunctive sentence, and they do not exercise the function of enjoining anything,—yet there are instances in which even the connection of the *Arthavāda* with an Injunctive sentence is not possible unless the former has afforded some idea of an injunction in regard to something expressed by its words. For instance the *Arthavāda* passage 'Theft of gold, drinking of wine, etc., etc.' (*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, 5.10.9) cannot be understood as pertaining to the Injunction of the 'Science of the Five Fires,' until it is known that the 'theft of gold' and the rest are prohibited; the sense of the whole being that 'he who studies this science of the Five Fires does not fall, even though he commits the theft of gold, etc., or associates with persons who have committed them—otherwise he does fall'?

"Who has laid down the law that in the said passage the Injunction is conveyed, not directly by the *Arthavāda* itself, but by the fact of its being connected with another Injunctive passage? As a matter of fact, the passage itself contains an independent finite verb of its own—'these four fall' [and this would serve as the direct prohibition]. It might be argued that the verb does not contain the Injunctive affix: But the passage 'they obtain a standing who perform the *Rātrisatra*' also contains no verb ending with the Injunctive affix. It might be argued that—'in the case of the *Rātrisatra*, the need for a qualifying condition being distinctly felt, the two sentences (*they obtain* a *standing* and *they perform the Rātrisatra*) come to be taken as syntactically connected, and the necessary injunction is got at by assuming the verb to contain the *Leṭ* ending.'—But the same may be said in regard to the passage in question also. In fact, there are several injunctions of substances and deities that are obtained from *Arthavādas*. In a case where the *Arthavāda* is distinctly subservient to an Injunctive passage,—since this latter injunction would be in need of the mention of a substance or a deity (for the act enjoined) [that may be found mentioned in the corresponding *Arthavāda*],

it may not be improper to take the *Arthavāda* as simply serving to supply the needs of the corresponding Injunction (and not as enjoining anything independently by itself). In the present instance however (of the *Arthavāda* passage 'the theft of gold, etc., etc.'), if we are to seek for an injunction that has no connection with the *Arthavāda* (and this injunction were sought to be derived from the words of the *Arthavāda* itself), then this would give rise to a syntactical split; hence it cannot be taken as subservient to the main subject-matter of the context (*i.e.*, the science of the Five Fires); and in the absence of such subserviency, the *Arthavāda* could not provide any idea of the Prohibition. This is the point on which the case of the *Arthavāda* in question is not analogous to that of the sentences—'One should put in wet pebbles' and 'Butter is glory' [where the connection between the two is quite clear]."

This is not right; for even though the *Arthavāda* has a distinct meaning of its own, yet since its connection with the Injunction is based upon syntactical connection, there can be no room for any objection as regards syntactical split.

As regards the *Mantras*, they are, by their very nature, indicative of the form of action; and since the action cannot be got at from any other sources, we are led to assume an act indicated by the *Mantra*, specially with a view to justify its indicative character. And since in connection with the *Aṣṭakā*, it is not possible to have an indication of such origination and qualifying condition as are absolutely non-existent, we take the *Mantras* as suggestive of the action, its qualifying condition and its very origination. It is in this way that Injunctions are accepted as supplied by the words of a *Mantra*. As for instance, the injunction of the Deity of the *Āghāra* offering (is supplied by the *Mantra* '*Ita Indra urdhva*, etc., etc.')

It is admitted on all hands that *Dharma* has four 'feet'; now, it is only a small portion of this vast fabric of *Dharma* that has been directly prescribed in the Veda; and the source of the knowledge of all the remaining factors also

must be similar in character to the Veda, for the simple reason that the factors of *Dharma* can only be known through some sort of an injunction. So that (directly or indirectly) the connection (of *Dharma*) with Veda is inevitable.

Now (as regards the work of Manu) what happened was that Manu got together pupils who had studied several Vedic texts, as also other Vedic scholars, and having heard from them the several texts, he compiled his work; and he has therefore clearly stated that Vedic texts are the source of what he has written, and thereby established the trustworthy character of his work. Others that came after him performed the several duties, relying upon Manu's own words, and did not try to trace his words to their source (in the Veda). All this is what we infer (from the circumstances of the case).

Thus even in cases where a *Smṛti* rule may run counter to what is found to be laid down in the Veda, both must be equally 'Vedic' [since the *Smṛti* also is based upon Vedic texts actually found by the writer]; and yet it is quite reasonable that the former should be discarded in favour of the latter; for when all that we need for the performance of a certain act is found by us in the Vedic text itself, there is no desire on our part to seek for, and infer the existence of, any other Vedic texts (in support of anything that may be found in the *Smṛtis*). Just as in the case of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, though the two numbers, *seventeen* and *fifteen*, are both equally mentioned in available Vedic texts, yet when we have once found that the number *fifteen* is applicable to the action in hand, we have no desire to have recourse to the number *seventeen*, even though this also is directly mentioned in the Veda. Then again, it is only natural that what is directly expressed by the words of a text should set aside what is only indirectly indicated by the requirements of what has been directly expressed, this indicated factor being admittedly remoter and hence weaker than the directly expressed one. But this does not mean that what is indirectly indicated has no force at all. In fact such a case would be analogous to

the case where, even though the employment of the details of the archetypal sacrifice at the ectypal one is admissible by the general injunction (that 'the ectype should be performed in the manner of its archetype'), yet when any such archetypal details are found to be incompatible with those that may be found to be expressly prescribed specifically in connection with ectype, the former are unhesitatingly discarded. [Similarly when the indicated factor is incompatible with the expressed one, it is discarded.]

Under the view [previously put forward as (*d*)] that the *Smṛtis* are based upon an unbroken line of performers, the position of the *Smṛtis* would be no better than that of mere current tradition, which does not, at any stage (however longstanding it may have become), attain reliability (based upon direct Vedic support).

The other view [put forward as (*e*)] also, according to which Vedic texts in support of what they did and wrote were always *inferred* by Manu and others,—does not differ very much from the view that they are based upon tradition. We have proceeded to examine the source of the *Smṛti* or Recollection of Manu and others; and if they also only *inferred* the Vedic texts, just as we are doing now, then, like ourselves, they also would not be *recollectors* (of Vedic texts). Nor is it possible to infer a thing that has never been directly perceived by any one; as no affirmation (and hence no premiss) could be possible with regard to such a thing. As regards the inference (that has been cited by Shabara), of the motion (of the Sun) and such other things, a general connection (between motion and change of location) is always perceived; or such motion may be deduced from Presumption based on apparent inconsistency. Such basis of presumption however is not available in the case in question.

From all this it follows that in the matter of *Dharma*, there is certainly some sort of connection between Manu and others and the Veda; but the exact character of this connection we are unable to ascertain. In fact, when persons learned in the Veda have the firm conviction that a certain

act *should be done*, it is only right to assume that this conviction is based on the Veda, and not upon a misconception ; it is only thus that we would be assuming a source of knowledge in keeping with the character of the knowledge itself. And this assumption rests upon the possibility of such source being found in Vedic texts, in the form of *mantras* and *arthavādas* scattered far and wide by reason of lapses (of time, etc.). In some cases we also find direct Vedic Injunctions themselves, as the source (of what is found in the *Smṛti*) ; *e.g.*, the injunction that 'one should not converse with a woman in her courses,' which is found in the Veda in connection with *Upanayana* and *Study* (supplies the basis for the general prohibition of such conversation, contained in the *Smṛtis*).

What we have stated here is only a small portion of this vast subject ; more of this should be learnt from the *Smṛtivivēka* [as follows] :—

'The view that some Vedic texts have become lost is not accepted by me ; as this view necessitates several unwarrantable assumptions. It is far more reasonable to accept the view that the *Smṛtis* have brought together the injunctions of actions scattered about here and there. In fact even at the present day we find that a person who is surrounded by several Vedic scholars and teachers is capable of composing works after having heard from those persons the several Vedic texts. It is only natural that persons who have actually seen the writer at the time, basing his statements upon direct Vedic texts should accept them as trustworthy ; and we also come to have due confidence in them as far as possible. As a matter of fact, the details of performance are indicated by *Mantras* ; and there is indication of them also by Names ; there can be no performance, unless there is some sort of indication regarding the nature of the action and the qualifying conditions. For instance, the connection of a particular deity with the *Āghāra*-offering is indicated by the words of a *Mantra* ; and the reason for this lies in the indicative character of Mantras, which character becomes possible only if the Deity is taken to be indicated by them. When one action enters

into the constitution of another well-accomplished one, it does not interfere with the form of this latter [so that when a Deity indicated by the *Mantra* is introduced into an action enjoined by a distinct Injunctive passage, it does not interfere with the nature of this action]. For instance, in connection with the *Vishvajit* sacrifice, we find that the desirable result proceeding from it is got at from sources other than its originative Injunction. Thus it is quite reasonable to assume details in connection even with a well-established injunction, specially when the needs of the Injunction are not supplied even by *Mantras* and *Arthavādas*.

'[An objection is raised]—"The revered Pāṇini has laid down that Injunction is expressed only by the Injunctive and other cognate affixes. So that *Mantras* and *Arthavādas*, describing as they do only accomplished entities, can never express an injunction. If then, from the *Arthavāda*, which is not directly injunctive, some sort of Injunction were deduced by means of an indirect interpretation put upon the Arthavāda,—how could any reliance be placed upon such an Injunction? In fact such an interpretation would lead to a syntactical split; specially as (in such *arthavādas* as *they obtain a standing who perform the Rātrisatra*) the *Rātris tra* offerings do not necessarily stand in need of the '*standing*.' In fact it is only a detail of the direct Injunction (and not that of the *arthavāda*) which can be accepted as indicated by supplementary sentences. As regards the prohibition of *Theft*, etc. (which has been sought to be deduced from the *Arthavāda* passage 'the theft of gold, etc., etc.'), this will certainly be amenable to a direct Injunction; and as in the event of the *arthavāda* being made to yield the necessary injunction, syntactical split would be inevitable. Nor is there any analogy between the *Vāchastoma* and the *Aṣṭakā*; for in the *Vāchastoma* sacrifice all the details are performed in accordance with injunctions deduced *from mantras*; while in the case of the *Aṣṭakā* there are no grounds for regarding the *mantra* as indicative of any details of performance. Further, no indicative power of the *mantra* can prompt one to any course of action, unless there

is some sort of a general connection; and in the case in question there is no such connection either of context or of any such factor."

'To the above objection the following reply is given by those who hold the view that *arthavādas* also are the *source of Dharma*:—(*a*) In the case of the passage "they obtain a standing, etc.," even though there is no directly injunctive agency in the form of the Injunctive affix and the rest, yet the idea of *injunction* is held to be supplied by the conjugational affix *lēt* (in the verb "*upayanti*," "offer"). (*b*, Similarly in the case of the verb "*patanti*" "they fall" (occurring in the passage "Theft of gold, etc."), or in that of the verb "use corrupt words" (occurring in another *arthavāda* passage). (*c*) In connection with the *Vāchastoma*, we have the distinct injunction beginning with the expression '*sarvadāshatayīḥ anubrūyāt*,'—this name "*dāshatayī*" being applied to the ten *Ṛk*. verses selected each out of the ten *maṇḍalas* of the Ṛgveda. (*d*) As regards the *general connection* (of the *mantra*) with the action, this is said to be brought about by the force of the *Name*,—the *Gṛhyamantras* being named after the acts (with which they are connected). (*e*) As regards the *arthavāda* passage "Theft of gold, etc., etc.," that this is subservient to the *Science of the Five Fires* is indicated by the fact that it contains a deprecation of the said *Theft*, etc.; and this cannot be possible except when the *Prohibition* (of the Theft, etc.) is also implied. That the passage is subservient to the *Science of Five Fires* is indicated by the trend of the whole context; and the idea that the Theft, etc., *should not be done* serves to emphasise the said subserviency; and there is no incompatibility between these two [the idea of *subserviency* and that the acts *should not be done*]. Lastly, as regards the view that the Vedic texts in corroboration of the *Smṛti* rules have always been *inferred* (and never actually found by any one in the Veda),—it stands on the same footing as the notion of long-standing tradition; both would be of the nature of the "blind following the blind"; and we do not perceive any difference between these two views.'

From all this it follows that when Gautama speaks of the Householder's Life being 'directly enjoined' (by the Veda), what he means is that the words of the Veda enjoin it directly, without the intervention of any other process; that which is cognised immediately after the hearing of the words is said to be 'directly known'; while after something has been cognised, if the reflection over the capacities of that thing leads to the cognition of another thing, this latter is not said to be 'directly perceived.' Thus everything becomes duly established.

[Having discussed the idea expressed by the expression '*Smṛtishīlē cha tadvidām,*' the Author next proceeds to explain the words themselves]—'*Smṛtishīlē tadvidām,*' '*the conscientious re-collection of those versed in the Veda,*'—The compound '*smṛtishīlē*' stands for '*Smṛti* and *shīla.*'—'*Shīla*' has been explained as the abandoning *of love and hate;* and this is a 'root of a Dharma,'—not like the Veda and Smṛti, which are 'root of Dharma' in the sense of being the source of knowledge of Dharma,—but in the sense that it is a *means of accomplishing* Dharma; for by abandoning love and hate one acquires *merit* (Dharma).

Question:—"*Dharma* has been described as what leads to welfare; and certainly the abandoning of love and hate is itself of that character (of Dharma); so that there being no difference between the two (*i.e.,* between *Dharma* and the *abandoning of love and hate*), how can it be said that the said abandoning *accomplishes Dharma* ?"

Answer:—We have already pointed out that the authors of *Smṛtis* use the term '*dharma,*' sometimes in the sense of *acts* which form the subjects of Injunctions and Prohibitions (*i.e., meritorious* and *unmeritorious deeds*), and also sometimes in the sense of that peculiar thing (force, *i.e.,* merit) which proceeds from the performance of acts and continues to exist until it has brought its reward (to the doer). That there is

such a thing as this latter can be believed only on the authority of the scriptures. If the sacrificial performance were to disappear without bringing about any such *force*, then, how could its results appear at some remote period of time? It is this peculiar something that is meant by the term '*dharma*' here [when it is said that 'the abandoning of love and hate accomplishes *Dharma*.'] And certainly the said '*Shīla*' is the 'root' of 'Dharma' in this sense; so that there is nothing incongruous in this. The use of the word '*Dharma*' in this sense is common; *e.g.*, in the verse—'*Dharma* is the only friend that accompanies one even on death' (*Manu*, 8.17). Since the act disappears immediately after it has been done, how could it continue to exist at any other time (as mentioned in this verse)?

Some people bring forward the following objection:—"As a matter of fact, everything that is enjoined in the Veda and in the Smṛtis is the *source of Dharma*; and since 'Shīla' also is included among the acts thus enjoined, there is no point in mentioning it separately. In fact Manu himself is going to enjoin it in the following verse—'Day and night one should take care to subdue the senses' (7.44),—and again—'When the mind has been subdued, the two groups of five become subdued.' And it is this 'subjugation of the mind' which constitutes the 'abandoning of love and hate,' as we shall explain later on."

Some writers answer this by saying that '*Shīla*' has been separately mentioned with a view to indicate its superior importance; it is something that comes useful in the performance of all acts; and is important also by itself; being just like the *Agnihotra* and such other acts; and further, it is a '*Dharma*' for all castes and conditions. It is for these reasons that it has been specifically mentioned in the present verse, which sets forth the most general conception of *Dharma*.

Our explanation however is as follows:—'*Shīla*' stands for *Samādhi*, 'composure of the mind'; the root '*Shīl*' signifies 'composing,' and 'composure' is a property of the mind;

so that '*Shīla*' here stands for the withdrawing of the mind from other things and concentrating it upon what is enjoined in the scriptures.

The copulative compound ('*Smṛtishīlē*') connotes interdependence; hence what is meant to be the 'source of Dharma' is '*Smṛti*' (Recollection) and '*shīla*' (composed mind, *Conscience*) as interdependent; and '*shīla*' does not stand for being the *means of accomplishing Dharma* (as explained by some people, above). The sense therefore comes to be that what is the 'source of Dharma' is *Conscientious Recollection*, and not mere Recollection. Hence, even though some persons may be 'versed in the Veda,' yet any recollection that they may have at a time when they are not duly attentive to the subject cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge of Dharma; and this for the simple reason that unless people have fixed their attention upon what is prescribed in the scriptures, they are liable to fall into error.

As regards the particle '*cha*' found in the verse, this should be construed after the term '*tadvidām*,' '*of people versed in the Veda*'; and it is due to the exigencies of metre that it has been placed before that term. This particle has a copulative force; and since nothing that has gone before can be copulated, it serves to bring in here the epithet '*sādhūnām*' (good, righteous) that comes next. So that there are three qualifications intended here: the 'Recollection' that is authoritative is of such persons as (1) are *learned*, having learnt the sciences from a qualified teacher (*tadvidām*), (2) are attentive to what is prescribed in the scriptures (*shīla*) and (3) are in the habit of acting up to the injunctions of the scriptures (*sādhu*, good, righteous). It has been declared that all these qualifications existed in Manu and other writers (of Smṛtis). If it were not so, then it would never have been possible for their words to have been accepted by the wise.

"If this is what is meant, it should be stated clearly, in the form 'the words of Manu and others, are the sources of Dharma'; what is the use of setting forth the characteristics (of the writers)?"

True; but there might be persons who may not agree to the words of Manu and others being authoritative; and it is with reference to such persons that the text has set forth the well-established grounds for regarding them as trustworthy. Even at the present day, a man who is possessed of the qualifications mentioned in the text, has his words accepted with the same amount of trust and confidence as the words of Manu and others; as we find in cases where learned men pronounce their opinion upon the precise character of the expiatory rite to be performed by one who has committed a certain sin. In fact a person possessed of the said qualifications has ever been recognised as constituting the '*pariṣad*' 'court,' by himself alone: 'The Brāhmaṇa should act up to that Dharma which even a single person learned in the Vedas should declare to be Dharma'—says Manu (12.113). For these reasons, there can be no reasonable ground for enumerating the names of 'Recollectors,' as 'Manu, Viṣṇu, Yama, Aṅgiras' and so forth. For we find that many such persons as *Paiṭhīnasi, Baudhāyana, Prachētas* and the rest are recognised by the wise and learned as reliable 'Recollectors,' and yet these names are not found in any of the lists (supplied by various Smṛtis).

What thus the words '*Smṛtishīlē cha tadvidām*' mean is that 'when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said qualifications, and they also accept a certain work as really by that person,—the word of such a person (and of the work composed by him), even though proceeding from a human source, should be recognised as an authoritative source of the knowledge of Dharma. So that even at the present day if there were a person possessed of the said qualifications, and he were to compose a work by reason of just those qualifications, then for later generations they would be accepted to be just as authoritative as the words of Manu and others. People of the present generation—who would be contemporaries of the said writer—would not derive their knowledge of *Dharma* from the words of such a writer, because the

sources of information available to him would be all available to them also. Hence it is that until a teacher of the present day clearly indicates the source from which he has derived a certain information, learned people do not accept his word as reliable. When however he has pointed out his source and his work has been accepted as authoritative, then at some future time if the case of his work be found to be analogous to that of the *Smṛti* rules regarding *Aṣṭakā* and other acts (whose basis in the Veda we of the present day cannot find), it would be only right to infer its authoritative character from the fact of its being accepted by the wise and the learned (which fact could not be explained except on the basis of its being duly authoritative).

'*Ācharaschaiva sādhūnām*' '*The practice of Good Men*';—the particle '*cha*' connects the epithet '*vedavidām*' (*of persons versed in the Veda*) with this phrase also. These two qualifications ('goodness' and 'Vedic learning') indicate the '*Shiṣṭa*,' 'the cultured man.' The 'practice of cultured men' also is 'source of Dharma.'—'*Practice*' means *conduct, behaviour*. When, in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or Smṛti statements, but cultured men are found to regard it as 'Dharma' and do it,—then that act also should be accepted as 'enjoined by the Veda,' just like the act prescribed in the *Smṛti*. To this category belong such acts as the following—(*a*) the tying of the bracelet and such other auspicious rites performed during marriage, etc., (*b*) the worshipping of famous trees, Yakṣas, road-crossings and such things, varying in various countries, done by the girl on her day of marriage, (*c*) the number of hair-locks kept on the head, varying with different countries; (*d*) the exact manner of attending on guests, teachers and other respectable persons, consisting in the addressing of sweet and agreeable words, saluting, rising to receive and so forth; for instance, it is customary with some people to recite the *Pṛṣṇi-sūkta* with grass in hand, when

handing over the horse consecrated for the *Aṣhvamēdha* sacrifice. It is such customs that are meant by 'Practice' here. It is not possible to collect in any compilation all such practices, there being endless forms of them, varying with the diversities in the nature of men, caused by such variable circumstances as the calm or disturbed condition of their mind and so forth. The same act that may have been found, on several occasions, to be pleasing (to one person), may, on another occasion, turn out to be unpleasant (to another person). For instance, a house-holder may be in the habit of being in constant attendance upon his guests;—this may be quite pleasing to one guest, who may be pleased at finding the man attending upon him like a servant; but the same close attendance becomes unpleasant to another guest, who may feel—'the feeling of restraint caused by this man's constant presence is so galling that I do not find an opportunity to sit at ease.' Hence, in corroboration of such 'Practices' it is not possible for us to assume Vedic texts, corroborating them either collectively or individually. The *Aṣṭakā* and such other acts, on the other hand, have a fixed form; and hence we have *Smṛti* rules regarding their performance. This is what constitutes the difference between 'Recollection' and 'Practice' (*Smṛti* and *Āchāra*).

'*Ātmanastuṣṭirēva cha*',—'*Self-satisfaction also*'—'*is source of Dharma*' is to be construed here also. This '*self-satisfaction*' also is meant to be of those only who are 'learned in the Veda and Good' ('*Vēdavidām sādhūnām*'). The fact of this 'Self-satisfaction' being 'source of Dharma' has been held to be based upon the trustworthy character (of the people concerned). When such persons as are possessed of the stated qualifications (of being *good* and *learned*) have their mind satisfied with a certain act, and they do not feel any aversion towards it, that act is '*Dharma.*'

"But it may happen that a man's mind is satisfied with a prohibited (sinful) act; and this would have to be regarded as *Dharma*. Again, a man may have hesitation (and doubt) regarding what is enjoined in the Veda; and this latter would have to be regarded as *ot* '*Dharma*.'"

(*a*) As a matter of fact, the 'self-satisfaction' of the high-souled and extremely good men endowed with the said qualifications, is possessed of such tremendous force that, under its influence '*Dharma*' may become '*Adharma*' and '*Adharma*' become '*Dharma*'; but this cannot be so in the case of men tainted with love and hate, etc. Whatever goes into a salt-mine, becomes transformed into salt; similarly everything is rendered pure by the unpremeditated 'self-satisfaction' of persons learned in the Veda. [The mere fact of an act being prohibited does dot make it *Adharma*] for though the 'holding of the *Ṣoḍashi* vessel' has been prohibited at the *Atirātra* sacrifice, yet when the holding comes to be done, in accordance with a Vedic injunction, it is not sinful. But in the present case, there is no question of option, as there is in the case of the 'holding of the *Ṣoḍashi*.' What happens in this case is that the Prohibitions take effect in regard to all cases except the one that falls within the purview of the said 'self-satisfaction.'

(*b*) Or (the second answer to the objection is that), people like those mentioned in the verse can never feel any self-satisfaction at what is '*Adharma*.' The mongoose bites only that herb which is an antidote of poison, and not any other herb; hence the notion that 'whatever herb is bitten by the mongoose is destructive of poison.'

(*c*) (*Thirdly*) The revered teachers have explained as follows:—What is meant is that, in cases of optional alternatives, that alternative should be adopted in regard to which the mind feels satisfied. It is in accordance with this that the Author will say later on, in connection with the purification of things and expiatory rites—'the penance should be performed until the mind may feel satisfied.'

(*d*) Or, what is said in the Text may be taken as ruling out the unbelieving Atheist; as a matter of fact, the Atheist

does not feel any 'self-satisfaction' in doing even those acts that are enjoined in the Veda; hence such acts though done by him are absolutely useless.

(*e*) Or, what the Text teaches is that in the performance of all acts, one should have a tranquil mind; *i.e.*, at the time of doing anything one should keep his mind free from anger, stupefaction, grief and so forth, and should remain happy. Hence like '*Shīla*' this also is laid down as pertaining to all acts.

VERSE VII

WHATEVER DHARMA FOR WHATEVER PERSON HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY MANU,—ALL THIS IS DECLARED IN THE VEDA; SINCE THE VEDA EMBODIES ALL KNOWLEDGE.—(7)

Bhāṣya.

This verse proceeds to make it clear how the authority of the *Smṛti* (Recollection) is due to its connection with persons knowing the Veda.

'*Whatever Dharma*'—duties relating to castes, duties relating to life-stages, duties relating to sacramental rites, in their general or special forms—'*for whatever person*'—for the Brāhmaṇa or other castes—'*has been described by Manu*,'—'*all this is declared in the Veda*'—*i.e.*, is expounded in it; how this is done has been shown in the preceding verse.

'*Since the Veda embodies all knowledge*';—Veda is the cause, the source, of all that is worth knowing, in regard to superphysical things. The affix '*mayaṭ*' has been added in the sense that the Veda is *made up* of all knowledge; applying to 'knowledge' the character of being the *product* of the Veda. When one thing is the product of another, the latter is spoken of as 'embodying' the former, *i.e.*, of the same nature as the other; and Veda, being the source of knowledge, is said to 'embody' it. According to the *Sāṅkhya* theory of the Product being always existent in the Cause, the Cause is of the same nature as the Product.

Or, the meaning may be that 'the Veda proceeds from all knowledge' as its source; the '*mayaṭ*' affix in this sense being used according to Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 4.3.81.—(7)

VERSE VIII

HAVING FULLY PERCEIVED ALL THIS WITH THE EYE OF KNOWLEDGE, THE LEARNED MAN SHOULD ENTER UPON HIS OWN DUTIES, RESTING UPON THE AUTHORITY OF THE REVEALED WORD.—(8)

Bhāṣya.

'*All this*'—all things that can be known, those that are created as well as those that are uncreated (eternal); all that is dealt with in the scriptures, what is amenable to perception and other ordinary means of knowledge, and also what is not so amenable.

'*Having perceived with the eye of knowledge,*'—in the shape of the learning of and pondering over the various sciences of Reasoning, Grammar, Philology, Mīmāmsā and the rest. The study of the scriptures is called the 'eye' in the sense that it is *like* the eye, in being the instrument of knowledge; the similitude being that 'Dharma is known by means of scriptures in the same way as Colour is known by means of the Eye.'

'*Having perceived*'—*i.e.*, after having ascertained by means of due consideration.

'*Resting upon the authority of the Revealed Word.*'—*i.e.*, in accordance with the authority of the Veda.

'*Should enter upon his duties*'—*i.e.*, perform his *dharma.*

After all the sciences have been studied, the trustworthy character becomes fully established, which is not done until the sciences have been duly studied. When a man carefully ponders over the sciences, he comes to the conclusion that there are no grounds for believing in the authority of these sciences, while there are reasons for trusting the authority of the Veda.

'*Sarvam*,' '*all*,' qualifies all that is to be known; and '*nikhilam*,' '*fully*,' is an adverb modifying the participle '*samavēkṣya*,' '*having perceived*.'—'*Having fully perceived*,'—*i.e.*, (1) having stated, in the form of the *primâ facie* Argument, all possible semi-arguments in support of the view that the other sciences are authoritative,—or that the Veda is not authoritative,—(2) having refuted those arguments by means of perfectly valid reasonings based upon the established theory,—when one states his own finally considered view, the final conclusion arrived at is that *the Veda is authoritative*;—all this is what is implied by the term 'fully.' Thus though the term '*sarva*' and '*nikhila*' are synonyms, yet since they serve two distinct purposes, they are not regarded as being a needless repetition.

The term '*sva*,' '*own*' is purely explanatory; what is the 'duty' of one man is not the 'duty' of another.—(8)

VERSE IX

FOR THE MAN PERFORMING THE DUTY LAID DOWN BY THE REVEALED WORD AND THE RECOLLECTIONS OBTAINS FAME HERE, AND AFTER DEATH, UNSURPASSED HAPPINESS.—(9)

Bhāṣya.

There might be some one who, being an unbeliever, might form the misconception that the acts laid down in the Veda are fruitless, and omit to do them; hence with a view to induce such a man to undertake the performance of those acts, the Author, placing himself in the position of a friend, proceeds to indicate the perceptible results that follow from the acts in question, to say nothing of other kinds of results.

The man who performs the act, known as 'duty,' '*Dharma*,'—which is '*laid down by the Revealed Word and the Recollections*,'—obtains '*here*,' in this world, as long as he lives, '*fame*,' praise, honour, regard; that is, all men respect him and love him as one 'who is firm in the rightful path and highly virtuous.'

'*After death*,'—in another body—he obtains that 'happiness' superior to which there is no other happiness. As a matter of fact, almost all the acts are prescribed in the Veda as to be done by one who desires Heaven; and 'Heaven' stands for 'unsurpassed happiness'; hence it is that the author speaks of 'unsurpassed happiness.'

For these reasons, it is only right that the unbeliever also, who seeks for nothing but visible results, should undertake the performance of the acts in question. This is the purport of the text.—(9)

VERSE X

THE VEDA SHOULD BE KNOWN AS THE 'REVEALED WORD,' AND THE DHARMASHĀSTRA AS THE 'RECOLLECTIONS'; IN ALL MATTERS, THESE TWO DO NOT DESERVE TO BE CRITICISED, AS IT IS OUT OF THESE THAT DHARMA SHONE FORTH.—(10)

Bhāṣya.

Objection:—"Is this a treatise on the meanings of words, a lexicon,—like the works beginning with such words as *Ātmabhūḥ, Paramēṣṭhī* (are the names of Brahmā), and so forth,—that it is stated that 'Revealed Word' means the *Veda*, and 'Recollections' means the *Dharmashāstra*?"

Answer:—In ordinary life, the 'Practices of Cultured Men' are not regarded either as 'Revealed Word' or as 'Recollection,' on the ground of their being not codified; codified treatises alone are known as '*Smṛtis*,' 'Recollections'; and it is for the purpose of declaring that these Practices also are included under '*Smṛti*' that the author has set forth this verse.

'*Dharmashāstra*,' 'Dharma-ordinance,' is that which serves the purpose of 'ordaining' (teaching) Dharma as to be done; and '*Smṛti*' is that wherein *Dharma* is taught, *i.e.*, laid down as to be done; and codification or non-codification is entirely immaterial. Now as a matter of fact a knowledge of what should be done is derived from the Practices of Cultured Men also; so that these also come under '*Smṛti*.' Hence whenever mention is made of '*Smṛti*' in connection

with any matter, the Practices of Cultured Men should also be taken as included under the name.

"If all *Dharmashāstra* ('ordinance of Dharma') is '*Smṛti*,' then the Veda also, which is the 'ordinance of Dharma' *par excellence*, would have to be regarded as *Smṛti*,"—with a view to preclude the possibility of such an idea being entertained, the author has said—'*The Veda should be known as the Revealed Word.*' Where the words conveying the 'Teaching of Dharma' are directly perceived (heard), it is the 'Revealed Word'; while where the words of Teaching are only *recollected*, it is '*Smṛti*'; and since this latter condition is also fulfilled by the 'Practices of Cultured Men,' this latter also comes under '*Smṛti*'; as a matter of fact, no authority can attach to any Practice, in corroboration whereof a Vedic text is not 'recollected.'

Or, the mention of the 'Revealed Word' may be explained as serving the purpose of showing that the *Smṛti* is equal to the *Veda*.

Question :—"What is that common function of Revealed Word and Recollection which the present verse seeks to attribute to the Practices of Cultured Men?"

Answer :—'*In all matters these two should not be criticised*';—'*These two*'—*i.e.*, Revealed Word and Recollection,—'*In all matters*'—*i.e.*, even in regard to apparently inconceivable things, such as are entirely beyond the scope of those means of knowledge that are applicable to perceptible things; *e.g.*, (*a*) the same act of killing leads, in one case, to good, and while in another case it leads to sin; (*b*) the drinking of wine leads to Hell, while the drinking of Soma removes sin. In such matters, we should not proceed to discuss the various *pros and cons*. '*Criticism*' consists in raising doubts and conceiving of contrary views. For example—"If the act of *killing* is sinful, then since the act of *killing* is the same in all cases, that done in the course of Vedic sacrifices should also be sinful;—if the latter killing is a source of good, ordinary *killing* also should be conducive to good; the act being exactly the same in both cases."

What is prohibited here is that 'criticism,' in which we conceive of the form of an act to be quite the reverse of what is declared in the Veda, and proceeding to examine it by means of reasonings based upon false premisses, begin to insist on the conclusion thus arrived at. It is not meant to prohibit such enquiry and discussion as to whether the *Primâ Facie View* or the *Established Thesis* is in due accord with the Veda. That such an inquiry is not meant to be prohibited is clear from what the author says later on—'He alone, and none else, knows Dharma, who examines it by reasonings.' (Manu, 12.106)

Question:—"Is this *criticism* prohibited with a view to some invisible (superphysical) results?"

We say—*no. Because it was out of these two that Dharma shone forth.* [This is what is intended by the said prohibition.]

This assertion points out the fact that all the arguments, set forth by casuists in support of things contrary to what is laid down in the Veda, are fallacious. These arguments are of the following kind—"The killing of animals in the course of Vedic sacrifices must be sinful, because it is *killing*, like any ordinary killing."—Now that *killing* is sinful is learnt from no other source of knowledge except scriptures; under the circumstances, no reason can be found to establish the sinfulness of *killing* until the scriptures have been accepted as authoritative; and when once the authority of the Veda has been admitted, it could not be reasonable to bring forward arguments against it, as this would invalidate the (acknowledged) authority of scriptures; and this would involve self-contradiction: at first the scriptures were admitted to be authoritative, and then subsequently they are held to be unauthoritative; and this opinion would be contrary to the person's own previous assertion,—no casuist ever says 'my mother is childless'; and it is also contrary to the scriptures.

The Casuist might argue as follows:—Scripture is not authoritative; why then should contrariness to it be regarded as undesirable? That the scripture (Veda) is unauthoritative

is proved by such discrepancies as (*a*) untruthfulness, (*b*) inconsistency and (*c*) repetition. (*a*) Such sacrifices as the *Kārīrī* (which is laid down as to be performed for obtaining rain) are performed by men desiring rain, but as a matter of fact no rain comes after the performance. As regards the rain that might come at some future time, it has been well said—'The *Kārīrī* having been performed during the autumn, when the cornfields were drying up, if the rain falls during the spring, this only leads to cattle-disease!' Further, as regards the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and such other sacrifices, which are spoken of as bringing their rewards at some future time, since the acts will have completely disappeared after performance, the assertion that their reward would come after a hundred years would be exactly like the confident assertion of the Vampirist. From this it is clear that the Veda is *untruthful*. (*b*) There is 'inconsistency' also: when it is said 'libations should be offered *after sunrise*,' if it were offered *before sunrise*, it would be clearly wrong; as it is said—'those who perform the Agnihotra before sunrise utter falsehood morning after morning.' Then again, it is said 'that the libations should be offered before the sun has risen,' for (it is said) 'the offering made *after sunrise* would be like the offering of reception to the guest after he had gone.' Now in the former we have the injunction of offering *after sunrise*, and a deprecation of offering *before sunrise*, while in the latter we have the reverse. So that people are always in doubt as to which alternative they should adopt. (*c*) The same Agnihotra that is enjoined in one Vedic Rescension is found to be enjoined in another Rescension also; and it has been held (by the Mīmāmsakas) that the act, mentioned in the various texts, is one and the same (*Agnihotra*). And this is a clear *Repetition*."

That there is no 'untruthfulness' in the Veda is what is meant by the last quarter of the Verse ('it was out of these that Dharma shone forth'). Because out of the Veda '*Dharma alone*—*i.e.*, only that a certain act *should be done*, in the

form of sacrifice,—'*shone forth,*' is expounded; and it does not say anything definite in regard to the time at which the rewards shall appear; this is clear from the fact that the passages that speak of rewards do not make mention of any time; all that we learn from the Injunction is that a certain result shall follow, and the Injunction does not specify the time. As a matter of fact, divisions of time, past, present and future, are related to what is expressed by the verbal root; while the *Result* is not denoted by the verbal root at all; it is only implied by the Injunction; what is denoted by the verbal root (*i.e.*, the act of 'sacrifice') is actually accomplished at the time (of the performance), in the form of the offering of a substance for the benefit of a certain deity,—the fulfilment of this offering appearing in the form of the transformation of the substance offered (into the fire, for instance). Further in ordinary life also, we find that when a person, who is an obedient servant of another, is directed to go to a certain place, he at once obeys the order; though as regards his wages, in some cases he may obtain it at the very beginning; but also sometimes during the act, or even after the act has been accomplished; and then also he may get them on the same day, or the next day, or at some future time. In the same manner, there is no limit as to the time at which the results spoken of in the scriptures will appear; all that is meant is that (by the performance of the act) the result, in the shape of Heaven, Rain or so forth, is brought within reach,—and not that they appear on the very same day. Then again, just as there are obstacles in the way of the realising of results of acts done in the ordinary course of life, so there are also in the case of the acts prescribed by the Veda,—such obstacles consisting of past sins and so forth. This (possibility of the Rain not coming immediately after the act) is clearly shown in the Veda itself when it says 'if the rain should not come, the man should continue as before.' And as regards the *Sarvasvāra* sacrifice (which is laid down as leading the performer to heaven), people have explained that the reward does

not consist in the *immediate entrance to Heaven,* in fact it consists in what the man actually desires, and the desire is in the form 'may I reach heaven without difficulty [*i.e.*, after death; immediate translation to heaven would mean immediate death, which no man desires].

As regards the argument that there is no difference in the act of *killing* as done in ordinary life and as done during a Vedic sacrifice,—what has to be borne in mind is the fact that the sinfulness of the act of killing is known only from the scriptures, it is not amenable to perception or any ordinary means of knowledge; and there is certainly a difference: the ordinary *killing* is prompted by passion, while the sacrificial *killing* is prompted by Vedic Injunction; and as the killing of the animal offered to Agni-Soma is prompted by the Vedic Injunction, this constitutes a great difference. From all this it is clear that in the Veda there is nothing 'untruthful.'

As regards 'Inconsistency' (which is the second point urged against the Veda), the Author is going to answer it in the text itself (Verses 14-15 below).—(10)

VERSE XI

IF A TWICE-BORN PERSON, RELYING UPON THE SCIENCE OF DIALECTICS, SHOULD DISREGARD THESE TWO SOURCES, HE SHOULD BE CAST OUT BY GOOD MEN,—THE DETRACTOR OF THE VEDA BEING AN INFIDEL.—(11)

Bhāṣya.

On the ground of 'untruthfulness' and 'unreliability' *if a twice-born person, relying upon the science of dialectics*;—the 'science of dialectics' here stands for the polemical works written by Atheists, treatises of *Bouddhas* and *Charvākas*, in which it is repeatedly proclaimed that "the Veda is conducive to sin";—relying upon such a science, if one should scorn the Veda; *i.e.*, when advised by some one to desist from a certain course of action which is sinful according to

the Veda and the Smṛti, in the words—'Do not do this, it is prohibited by the Veda,'—if he disregards this advice and persists in doing it, saying, 'what if it is prohibited in the Veda or in the Smṛtis? They are not at all authoritative';—even without saying this, if he should even think in this manner,—and if he is found to pay much attention to the science of dialectics;—such a person *should be cast out by the good*—despised by all cultured persons—out of such acts as 'officiating at sacrifices,' 'teaching,' 'honours of a guest' and so forth. Since the text does not specify the acts (from which the man should be kept out), it follows that he should be kept out of all those acts that are fit for the learned. And the reason for this lies in the fact that it is only the ignorant man, whose mind is uncultured and who smacks of the polemic, that can speak as above (in deprecation of the Veda); and to the said acts (of officiating, etc.) it is only the learned man that can be entitled. It is in view of this that such 'criticism' has been prohibited in the preceding verse,—such criticism being due to want of respect,—and it does not deprecate such inquiry as might be instituted for the purpose of elucidating the true meaning of the Veda.

It is in view of all this that the author states the reason for what he has asserted—'*The detractor of the Veda being an infidel.*' Thus the man, who would set forth arguments in support of the view that 'the Veda is unauthoritative,' only by way of a *primâ facie* statement, would not be an 'infidel'; because such statement of the arguments would be made only for the purpose of strengthening the final conclusion (that the Veda is authoritative).

The text speaking of the '*detractor of the Veda,*' has not mentioned the *Smṛti*; but the idea is that both stand on the same footing, and both equally form the subject-matter of the context; hence the mention of any one of them implies both.

Some people might however take the term 'Veda' (in the expression 'detractor of the Veda') to be actually restricted to

the *Veda only*, and they would thence conclude that 'the detractor of *Smṛtis*' should not be cast out, the casting out in this verse being declared for the 'detractor of the Veda' only. With a view to such people the Author adds the following verse.—(11)

VERSE XII

THE VEDA, THE SMṚTI, THE PRACTICE OF CULTURED MEN, AND WHAT IS AGREEABLE TO ONESELF—THESE DIRECTLY CONSTITUTE THE FOURFOLD MEANS OF KNOWING DHARMA. (12)

Bhāṣya.

There is no difference here. The prohibition of detracting the Veda implies that there should be casting out of also one who detracts the *Smṛti*, the *Practice of Cultured Men* and *Self-satisfaction*. These also describe only such *Dharma* as is based upon the Veda ; hence the detractor of these is also the 'detractor of the Veda.'

Objection :—"There is no need for having both the verses ; a single verse would have been sufficient, somewhat to the following effect :—'the twice-born person, who, relying upon the Science of Dialectics, should scorn the sources of Dharma, beginning with *Veda* and ending with *Self-satisfaction*, should be cast out by all good men, on account of his being an infidel."

Our answer to the above is as follows :—Teachers do not mind the burdening (prolexity) of their works ; what they make every effort to avoid is the burdening of the intellect (of the learner) ; as it is the latter which interferes with the right understanding of *Dharma ;* and this misunderstanding obstructs the fulfilment of the ends of man.

Then again, even if the author had mentioned all the four sources of Dharma (as suggested by the objector), some people might still argue thus—"the author should have mentioned the Veda only, all *Dharma* being based upon the Veda." Hence it is for the purpose of clearness that the author has

stated the matter in both ways: the former verse being intended for those who like brevity, and both the verses for other persons.

'*What is agreeable to oneself*' is the same as the 'self-satisfaction' spoken of before. The term '*oneself*' is added only for filling up the metre.

'*These constitute directly the means of knowing Dharma*'—'*Lakṣaṇa*' means *cause, indicator*; and *Sense-Perception* is not the means of knowing *Dharma*, as some people have held, speaking of (the sages as) 'persons who have directly *perceived* Dharma.'

In the compound '*Chaturvidham*,' '*fourfold*,' the term '*vidhā*' means *kind, form*. As a matter of fact, Veda is the only source of knowledge of Dharma, and *Smṛti* and the rest are only so many *forms* of the Veda.

Other people have explained this second verse as serving the purpose of recapitulating (all that has been said regarding the sources of Dharma). The description of the means of knowing Dharma having been finished, it is the end of this section that is indicated by the repetition (contained in the present verse). Such is the fashion with treatises on the Vedāṅgas; *e.g.*, '*saṁsthājapēnopatiṣṭhantē upatiṣṭhantē*' (where '*upatiṣṭhantē*' is repeated for indicating the end of the section); and when the author sets forth the second verse he has in his mind the sum-total of all that has been said in the present section. It is just as the Naiyāyikas, having propounded the Proposition that 'Word is non-eternal,' set forth the reasons in support of it, and then re-iterate the conclusion, saying 'therefore word is non-eternal.' In fact such is the way of all writers; *e.g.*, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Patāñjali) also sometimes states the Sūtra or the Vārtika, and having explained it, repeats it again.—(12)

VERSE XIII

THE KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA IS ORDAINED FOR THOSE WHO ARE NOT ADDICTED TO THE PURSUIT OF WEALTH AND PLEASURES ; AND FOR THOSE SEEKING FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA, THE REVEALED WORD IS THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY.—(13)

Bhāṣya.

'*Wealth*' stands for cattle, land, gold and so forth, and '*addiction*' to it means being entirely taken up with the undertaking of cultivation, service, etc., for the purpose of acquiring and accumulating wealth.

'*Pleasures*' stands for *sexual pleasures* ; and 'addiction' to these means constant recourse to it, as also to its accompaniments in the shape of singing and music, etc.

For people who are devoid of these (wealth and pleasures), '*the knowledge of Dharma*,' the true understanding of *Dharma*, '*is ordained*,' specially propounded, accomplished ; the verb '*vidhīyatē*' is derived from the root '*dhīn*' to *accomplish.*

Objection.— How is it that people addicted to wealth and pleasures can have no knowledge of '*Dharma*?' In fact such persons also, as time permits them, can obtain some knowledge of '*Dharma*,'—by listening at the time of eating and at such times as do not interfere with their pursuit of wealth and pleasure, to stories and to the precept or example of others (who know *Dharma*)."

In view of the above objection, the author has added the words—'*for those who seek the knowledge of Dharma*,' *etc.* The chief authority for *Dharma* is the Veda ; and the Veda can never be understood by the persons referred to. It is extremely difficult to comprehend and for its due comprehension it requires the thorough study of the sciences of *Nigama* (Vedic commentaries), *Nirukta* (Philology), *Vyākaraṇa* (Grammar), *Tarka* (Logic) *Purāṇa* (History) and *Mīmāṃsā* (Exigetics). And this entire mass of literature can never

be acquired by a man unless he renounces all other activities. What can be learnt from stories and examples are only a few stray *Dharmas,* and not the entire body of Dharma, in the shape of the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices, along with all its accessory details, which can be learnt only from the Veda and the other sources of Dharma. It is in view of all this that the text says—'*the Revealed Word is the highest authority.*' This however is not meant to take away the force of 'Example' as a source of knowledge.

What is stated in the text is corroborated by the following well-known saying—'He alone acquires learning who shuns wealth like snake, sweetmeats like poison, and women like evil spirits?

[*Another explanation of the verse.*]

According to others again the expression '*arthakāma*' stands for *hankering after visible rewards* ;—and for people 'addicted' to these,—those who hanker after honour, fame, etc., and who, seeking after visible results, have no other end in life save worldly advancement—'the knowledge of Dharma,' *i.e.,* 'performance of Dharma,'—is not 'ordained,' taught. The term '*jñāna*' ('knowledge') stands for 'that in which the act becomes recognised' (*jñāyatē asmin*), *i.e.,* its performance ; it is only when the *Dharma* is performed that it becomes clearly manifest, clearer indeed than that comprehended at the time that the scriptures are studied. It is for this reason that it is the *performance* that is spoken of as '*jñāna,*' 'knowledge.' What the text means therefore is this :—Even though the performance of Dharma brings worldly advancement, yet one should not undertake it entirely with a view to that fame; it should be undertaken with the sole idea that it is prescribed by the scriptures. The act having been done with this idea, if some visible result also follows, it may do so, but it is not what is thought of by the man. In fact the

Veda itself describes the result following from Vedic study as 'fame and worldly advancement,' in the passage—'the world progressing endows him with four things—honour, gifts, freedom from taxes and freedom from death.' To the same effect is the following saying—'The water supplied for the growth of sugar-cane waters also the grasses and creepers, in the same manner when a man treads the path of *Dharma*, he also obtains fame, pleasure and riches.'

Objection.—"When the act is endowed with a certain faculty, it does not lose that faculty, even though it may be performed with some other end in view; it must always bring about its natural effects; *e.g.*, even though one may drink poison, with the idea that it is an efficacious medicine, yet it does not fail to kill him. Similarly even though the act may be done with a view to some visible reward, yet it cannot fail to bring about the invisible results mentioned in the scriptures. Why then should you have this aversion, which makes you assert that an act should not be undertaken with a view to worldly advancement?"

It is in view of this objection that the text adds—'*For those seeking for the knowledge of Dharma, the Revealed Word is the highest authority.*' And what this means is that 'those who seek for visible rewards do not obtain any invisible reward,—and it is not only that he does not obtain the invisible result, he commits sin also by being addicted to what is prohibited.'—(13)

IV. Conflict of Authorities.

VERSE XIV

WHERE THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO VEDIC TEXTS, BOTH ARE HELD TO BE DHARMA; BOTH HAVE BEEN RIGHTLY PRONOUNCED BY THE WISE TO BE DHARMA.—(14)

Bhāṣya.

The objection urged above (in the *Bhāṣya* on Verse 10) is answered here.

When '*between two Vedic texts*' there is '*conflict*,'—*i.e.*, setting forth of contrary facts,—*e.g.*, what is declared to be 'Dharma' by one text is pronounced to be '*adharma*' by another;—in such cases both are Dharma,—*i.e.*, to be performed as optional alternatives. The authoritative strength of the two texts is equal; hence it cannot be discerned which is reliable and which is not. Thus the conflict being between two equally authoritative texts bearing upon the same subject, there must be option.

Objection.—"The text speaks of *both* being *Dharma*, which means that there should be *combination* (and not *option*); as it is only when there is *combination* that *both* could be *Dharma*; otherwise (*i.e*, if there were *option*), only *one* of them could be *Dharma* (at a time)."

We deny this. The use of the word 'both' is incompatible with separate performance (even acts performed one after the other, and not conjointly, can be spoken of as 'both'); the word does not necessarily denote *two things taken together*.

Further, *option* is distinctly the reasonable course to adopt. The action known as '*Agnihotra*' is one only; and with reference to this single act, three points of time have been laid down; now the *action* forms the primary factor, the *time* comes in only as a subordinate element; nor is it possible to adopt all the three points of time in connection with any single performance; nor again can it be right to repeat the

performance for the sake of the *time*; as it is never right to repeat the primary for the sake of the secondary factor. From all this it follows that *option* is most reasonable, as declared in the words 'whenever there is conflict between authorities of equal force, there is option.' (*Gautama*, 1.3.)

'*Both have been proclaimed to be Dharma.*'—"What is the difference between this statement and the former one, 'both are Dharma'?"

There is no difference; in the former statement, the author has stated his own opinion, and in the latter he supports his opinion by the opinion of other teachers, by pointing out that 'this is what has also been proclaimed by other wise men.'—(14)

VERSE XV

AT SUNRISE, OR BEFORE SUNRISE, OR AT EARLY DAWN,—THE SACRIFICIAL ACT MAY BE PERFORMED AT ANY TIME,—SUCH IS THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE VEDA.—(15)

Bhāṣya.

This is an instance of the 'conflict' spoken of in the preceding verse.

In regard to the offering of the Agnihotra-libations, all these three points of time have been prescribed,—and the injunction of each of these deprecates the others; and the sense of these Vedic texts is that '*the sacrificial act may be performed at any time*';—in all ways the offering proceeds, *i.e.*, it should proceed. As regards the deprecation of the offering done *after sunrise* (which is found in the text enjoining the time before sunrise), this deprecation is not meant to be an interdict; it is only meant to be an injunction of the offering *before sunrise*. Similarly in the other cases. Thus what is meant is that the act may be performed at any one of the three points of time; and the command of the scriptures becomes fulfilled by the offering being done at any one time.

'*Such is the pronouncement of the Veda.*'—This is what is meant by the Vedic declaration; and it does not mean that what is deprecated is interdicted.

The '*sacrificial act*' spoken of here is what is known as the '*Agnihotra-homa*'; there is not much difference between '*yāga*' (a sacrifice) and '*homa*' (libation-pouring). When one renounces his proprietary right over a substance in favour of a certain deity,—the idea in his mind being 'this belongs to the deity now, and not to me,'—this is what constitutes '*yāga*,' 'sacrifice'; and exactly the same is the form of 'Homa,' 'Pouring of libation,' also. The only difference is that in *Homa* there is the additional factor of the substance being *thrown*, deposited in a specified manner, in fire or some such receptacle. It is in view of this similarity that the *Homa* is spoken of here as '*yajña*.' That this is so is proved by the fact that the three points of time spoken of have been prescribed in the Veda in connection with *Homa*, and not all kinds of sacrifice.

The expressions '*uditē*' ('after sunrise') and the rest are to be taken as parts of, and as standing for, such declarations as '*uditē hotavyam*' ('the Homa should be performed after sunrise') and so forth;—the construction being that 'the meaning of the declaration that the Homa should be performed after sunrise, not before it, etc., etc., is as follows.'

By the compound word '*samayādhyuṣita*' the time of early dawn is meant. Others have taken it as consisting of two words: '*samayā*' meaning *near*, requires its correlative in the shape of *something that is near*; and since the two points of time mentioned in the sentence are those 'before' and 'after sunrise,' the required correlative in the present instance is the time of *twilight*. '*Adhyuṣita*' stands for *the time of departure of the night*, and means 'at the departure of night.' [So the compound means 'that twilight which comes after the departure of night.']

The words of the text are intended to quote the words of the Veda, which are found to be read in one form in one text, and in another form in another text; so that whether

the expression '*samayādhyuṣita*' is one word or two words can be ascertained only from the original texts.

Thus then, the same act of Homa being laid down in the Veda as to be done *optionally* at any one of the three points of time, there is no *inconsistency*. It is only in connection with two accomplished entities that, when found to be incompatible with one another, they are held to be 'inconsistent'; the same cannot be true in connection with things still to be accomplished [and all actions belong to this latter category]. For what has got to be accomplished may be accomplished either in one way or another; and how could there be any inconsistency in this?

In the case of conflicting *Smṛti*-texts also, the most reasonable view to take is that they lay down optional alternatives.—(15)

V. Persons entitled to the Performance of Dharma.

VERSE XVI

THAT PERSON ALONE, AND NONE OTHER, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ENTITLED TO THE SCRIPTURE, FOR WHOM THE SACRAMENTS BEGINNING WITH CONCEPTION AND ENDING WITH THE CREMATORIUM, ARE PRESCRIBED AS TO BE DONE WITH MANTRAS.—(16)

Bhāṣya.

In Adhyāya I (Verse 103) are found the words 'this should be studied by the learned Brāhmaṇa'; and though this is a mere *Arthavāda*, yet the presence of the potential affix '*tavya*' (in the term '*adhyētavyam*') might lead people into the mistake that it is an Injunction; and in that case the Kṣattriya and Vaishya would be precluded from the study. It is with a view to preclude this possibility that we have the present verse, which shows the capability of the *Kṣhattriya* and the *Vaishya* also to study.

The older commentators have also taken this verse as serving to preclude the possibility of the Shūdra studying the scripture, which he might be tempted to do.

The term '*scripture*' here stands for the compilation by Manu.

'*Entitled,*'—the 'title' meant here consists in the idea that 'this should be done by me.' But no 'collection of words'—which is an accomplished entity—can be regarded as 'to be done'; nor, on the other hand, can any action be regarded as 'to be accomplished,' except as related to a certain substance. Hence the '*title*' is understood to pertain to a certain action relating to the scripture. Now in the present context, the action intended is not found to be either *making*, or *being*, or *existing*; as for 'being' and 'existing,'

they both mean 'to be'; so that if these were the action meant, the meaning would be—'one should undertake the *being* or the *existing*, as related to the scripture'; but as a matter of fact the 'being' of one thing cannot be undertaken by another. The action of 'making' also would not be applicable; because so far as the *words* are concerned, all are eternal (and as such cannot be *made*); while as regards *sentences*, they have been already *made* by another person (the author of the scripture). From all this it follows that the action intended is that of *studying* as pertaining to the scripture. So that the meaning comes to be this—'the man is entitled to the study of the scripture'; and just as to the studying, so also to the learning of its meaning.

"In as much as the work of Manu has had a beginning in time, how could any injunction relating to it (as the present verse is supposed to be) be based upon the Veda, which is beginningless?"

Our answer is as follows:—It is quite open to us to infer some such general (Vedic) injunction as that 'the Shūdra should not study such sentences as serve to expound the scriptures.' Further, these statements of the expounders of the Veda that serve to explain Vedic texts bear a certain resemblance to these texts; and hence they are as much the subject of a beginningless tradition as the Vedic texts themselves.

What forms the subject-matter of the scriptures is actual *performance*, and to this all the four castes are entitled [though to the *study* of the scriptures the three twice-born castes alone are entitled].

"If such be the case, then it would be permissible for the *Shūdra* to perform all those acts which are prescribed in a general manner, without reference to any specified persons."

How this contingency does not arise we shall show, as occasion arises.

Objection:—"When the *Shūdra* is not entitled to study the scripture and learn its meaning, how can he be entitled to the performance of the acts therein prescribed? Unless the man knows the exact form of the act, he cannot do it;

unless he studies the scriptures, he cannot know what is contained in them ; and no unlearned person is entitled to the performance of any (religious) act."

True ; but the requisite knowledge can be obtained from the advice of other persons. The *Shūdra* may be dependent upon a Brāhmaṇa ; or a Brāhmaṇa may be doing the work of instructing people for payment ; and such a Brāhmaṇa might very well instruct the Shūdra to 'do this, after having done that' and so forth. So that the mere fact of the Shūdra performing the acts does not necessarily indicate that he is entitled to the study and understanding of the scriptures ; as performance can be accomplished, even on the strength of what is learnt from others ; as is done in the case of women ; what helps women (in the performance of their duties) is the learning of their husbands, which becomes available to them through companionship. Then again, the texts laying down the acts do not imply the direct knowledge (of the injunctive texts). It is only in the case of men, to whom is addressed the injunction of Vedic study—contained in the words 'one should study the Veda'—that the performance of duties proceeds upon the basis of their own learning ; and this injunction is meant only for the *male* members of the three higher castes. But in the case of these also their study and understanding of the scriptures is not prompted by their knowledge of what is contained in them ; it is prompted entirely by the two injunctions—(1) the injunction of having recourse to a duly qualified teacher, and (2) the injunction of Vedic study.

'*Conception*,' is 'impregnation' ; that series of sacraments which begins with this is called '*niṣēkādiḥ*,' '*beginning with conception*.' This sacrament is laid down as to be performed after the marriage (of the parents),—with the *mantra* '*viṣṇuryoninkalpayatu*,' etc. (*Ṛgveda*, 10.184.1)—on the occasion of the first intercourse only, for some people, while for others at each menstrual period, till conception takes place.

That which has the '*crematorium*' for its end is called '*ending with the crematorium*.' The word 'crematorium' stands for that place where dead bodies are disposed of; and through association it indicates the rites performed for the dead, called the '*Antyēṣṭi*'; as it is only this performance that is done with *mantras*, and not the *place* (which is what is directly denoted by the word 'crematorium').

The qualification mentioned in the text points to the Twice-born castes; it is only these persons who have their sacraments done with *mantras*. The author does not say simply '*dvijātīnām*,' 'for the twice-born' (and he has taken to the round-about way of saying the same thing), because Manu Svāyambhuva has a peculiar style of composing his verses.

The passage is not to be construed to mean that 'the sacraments are laid down *in mantras*'; because *mantras* do not contain the injunction of any acts; they are not injunctive; they only serve as *reminders*, during the performance of the act, of the details enjoined in other texts. Hence the passage should be explained as meaning—'those for whom the sacraments are laid down as to be done with Mantras.'

'*None other*,'—is purely explanatory; the rest of the sentence having already served the purpose of restricting what is said to the twice-born castes. Or, it may be taken as reiterated for the preventing of the idea that some one might entertain the notion that 'what is laid down here is something that *must* be done by the twice-born castes, while for the *Shūdra* it is neither prescribed nor interdicted.'—(16)

VI. Qualified Countries

VERSE XVII

The region lying between the divine rivers Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī which has been created by the gods,—they call 'Brahmāvarta'—(17)

Bhāṣya.

The sources of the knowledge of Dharma have been described; it has also been stated that in cases of conflict there is *option*; persons entitled to the performance of *dharma* have also been indicated in a general way. Now the author proceeds to describe those countries that are fit for the performance of Dharma, and where (on that account) it becomes incumbent to perform it.

'*Sarasvatī*' is the river bearing that name. '*Dṛṣadvatī*' is another river; that which *lies between these two*, that region they call by the name of '*Brahmāvarta*'; that is the region which the cultured speak of by that name.

'*Created by the Gods*'—is for the purpose of eulogising the boundaries and the bounded region; the sense being that 'the region is created by the Gods, and is therefore more sacred than all other regions.'—(17)

VERSE XVIII.

That practice, which has come down through an unbroken line of tradition among the several castes and sub-castes in that country, is called the 'Practice of Good Men.'—(18)

Bhāṣya.

Question—"As regards the *usage* in the said country, what is the condition of its reliability? Is it *learning* and *culture*? Or the connection of the particular country is the only

condition, and the practices of the ignorant and the uncultured also are authoritative? We ask this because if 'learning' and 'culture' are not regarded as necessary conditions, then the two qualifications mentioned in the sixth verse—in the phrase 'the Practice of good and learned men'—become futile. And further, it is not possible for the 'Practice of Bad men' to be a *source of Dharma*, for the simple reason that such persons can have nothing to do with the Veda. If, on the other hand, *learning* and *culture* do form the conditions of reliability, then no useful purpose will have been served by the connection of the particular country herein mentioned; because it cannot be said that practice of learned and cultured men of other countries is not authoritative."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—The statement is based upon probability; the chances are that in the country mentioned only learned and cultured men are born. This is what is meant by the assertion that '*the Practice in that country is called the Practice of good men.*'

Others have explained that the verse is intended to deny the authority of a purely local 'Practice' (Usage), on the ground that in other countries people marry the daughter of the maternal uncle.

This explanation is not right. Because it has been laid down as a general principle that 'from among the practices of the country, the family and the caste, only that should be done what is not contrary to law'; and the marrying of one's maternal cousin is actually contrary to the law, as found in the injunction that 'one should marry beyond the seventh grade of relationship on the father's side and beyond the fifth on the mother's' [and the maternal cousin falls within these prohibited degrees]. Further, as regards the said country of Brahmāvarta also there are certain practices—such as eating in the same dish with boys who have not undergone the Brahmanical Initiation—which are not regarded as authoritative. In fact no practice can ever be authoritative which is contrary to *Smṛti*; because it would be so much further

removed from the Veda (the source of all authority); as the Practice leads to the inference of the *Smṛti*, and the *Smṛti* leads to the inference of the Veda; while the *Smṛti* leads to the inference of its corroborative Veda directly. There is another reason why Practices like the one mentioned above can never be even suspected to be authoritative. Such Practices are found to be clearly due to perceptible motives: *e.g.*, some one having fallen in love with a handsome maternal cousin married her, through fear of the King, in order to escape from the penalty that would be inflicted for violating the chastity of an unmarried girl; and others who came after him being themselves illiterate and relying upon the words 'one should go on on the same path on which his father and grand-father have gone' (*Manu*, 4·178), taken in their literal sense, came to regard the said marrying as '*Dharma*' (something *that should be done*). Then again, even though the text (4·172) prescribes an expiatory rite in connection with the taking as wife of the three classes of girls (the daughter of the Father's sister, the daughter of the Mother's sister and the daughter of the Mother's brother),—yet people are liable to fall into the mistake that marriage with relatives other than the three specified here is not interdicted. That such is not the meaning of the verse (11·172) we shall explain later on.

Now no *Smṛti* or *Practice*, that is prompted by a perceptible motive, can ever be regarded as authoritative. Says the revered Bhatta (Kumārila)—'That *Smṛti*, which is contrary to the Veda, or deprecated, and which serves a visible purpose, and is prompted by perceptible motives, can never be based upon the Veda.'

From all this it follows that what is contained in this verse is only an *arthavāda*, eulogising the particular country,—this eulogy being supplementary to the Injunction coming later on that 'the Twice-born people should betake themselves to these countries' (verse 24 below).

'*Pāramparya*' is the same as '*paramparā*,' 'Tradition'; which goes from one to the other, from him again to a fourth

person, and so on; this succession is what is called '*Tradition*'; and '*Krama*,' '*line*,' stands for 'unbroken continuity;'—'*come down*' means *learnt*.

'*Sub-castes*'—are people of mixed birth;—the 'castes' along with these are called *Sāntarālāḥ*.

VERSE XIX.

NEXT TO BRAHMĀVARTA IS THE 'BRAHMARṢIDESHA,' COMPRISING THE REGIONS OF KURUKṢETRA, MATSYAS, PAÑCHĀLAS AND SHURASENAKAS. (19).

Bhāṣya.

These are the names of the various regions.

'*Kurukṣētra*' is what is known as *Samantapañchaka*, the place where the Kurus were exterminated. The etymological signification of the name '*Kurukṣētra*' has been explained as meaning—'do good deeds here, and salvation shall come quickly,' '*kuru sukṛtamatra kṣiprantrāṇam bhavati*.'

'*Matsyas*' and the rest are the names of countries, in the plural form.

'*Brahmarṣidēsha*' is the name of the entire group. *Brahmāvarta* is the country 'created by the Gods'; and since the *Brahmarṣis* are a little lower in degree than the Gods, this country, being related to *Brahmarṣis*, is slightly lower in grade than *Brahmāvarta*. This is what is meant by this being '*next to Brahmāvarta*,'—*i.e.*, slightly different from it;—the negative particle (in '*anantaraḥ*') denoting *slightly*; just as when it is said that 'the sick person should drink gruel when it is *not-hot*,' it is meant that it should be drunk when it is *slightly hot*. The term '*antara*' means *different*; as it is found in such assertions as '*nāripuruṣatoyānāmantaram mahadantaram*,' 'in the case of men, women and water, even a slight difference makes a great difference.' (19)

VERSE XX.

ALL MEN ON THE EARTH MAY LEARN THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES FROM THE BRĀHMAṆA BORN IN THESE COUNTRIES. (20)

Bhāṣya.

From the '*agrajanma*,' *i.e.*, the Brāhamṇa—'*born in these countries*'—Kurukṣētra and the the rest—all men '*may learn*' —seek to know—'*their respective duties*'—proper conduct.

This has been already explained under Verse 18.—(20)

VERSE XXI.

THE COUNTRY LYING BETWEEN THE HIMĀLAYA AND THE VINDHYA, TO THE EAST OF VINASHANA AND TO THE WEST OF PRAYĀGA, IS CALLED THE 'MADHYADESHA,' THE 'MIDDLE COUNTRY.' (21)

Bhāṣya.

On the north lies the Himālaya and on the south the Vindhya. '*Vinashana*' is the name of the place where the Sarasvatī river has disappeared.—(20)

'*Prayāga*'—is the confluence of the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā.

The region having these four as its boundaries is to be known by the name '*Madhya-dēsha*.' It is called '*madhya*' or 'middle,' because it is neither very superior nor very inferior,—and *not* because it is located *in the centre* of the Earth.—(21)

VERSE XXII.

THE COUNTRY EXTENDING AS FAR AS THE EASTERN OCEAN AND AS FAR AS THE WESTERN OCEAN, AND LYING BETWEEN THE SAME TWO MOUNTAINS,—THE LEARNED KNOW AS 'ĀRYĀVARTA.' (22).

Bhāṣya.

The country that lies between the two limits of the Eastern and Western Oceans,—and between the two mountains

spoken of in the preceding verse,—*i.e.*, the Himālaya and the Vindhya,—is described as '*Āryāvarta*,' '*by the learned*,'—*i.e.*, by cultured people. It is called '*Āryāvarta*' in the sense that the *Āryas live there* ('*Āryāḥ vartantē tatra*'); *i.e.*, it is they that are born there again and again, and the Barbarians, even though attacking it repeatedly, do not remain there.

The particle '*āṅ*' (in '*āsamudrāt*') indicates the *outer* not the *inner* boundary, and it does not indicate *inclusion*. Hence the islands in the oceans do not come under '*Āryāvarta*.'

What are mentioned here are the four boundaries of the country: the Eastern Ocean on the east, the Western Ocean on the west, the Himālaya on the north and the Vindhya on the south.

In as much as these two mountains have been mentioned as 'boundaries,' they are not included under '*Āryāvarta*'; from this people might be led to conclude that one should not inhabit these mountains. And with a view to (avoiding) this possibility, the Author adds the next verse.—(22)

VERSE XXIII.

BUT THE REGION WHERE THE SPOTTED DEER ROAMS BY NATURE IS TO BE KNOWN AS THE 'LAND FIT FOR SACRIFICIAL ACTS'; BEYOND THAT IS THE 'LAND OF THE MLECHCHHAS.' (23)

Bhāṣya.

Where the deer known as '*Kṛṣṇasāra*'—that which is either black with white spots, or black with yellow spots—'*roams*,'—lives—*i.e.*, is found, born,—'*by nature*,'—*i.e.*, not that where it resides for a time only, having been imported as a present of rare value, and so forth;—'*that country is to be known*'—regarded—'as *yajñīya*'—'*fit for sacrificial acts*.'

'*Beyond that*'—*i.e.*, the region other than the one where the *Kṛṣṇasāra* is indigenous—'*is the land of the Mlēchchhas*.' The *Mlēchchhas* are the people who are known as lying beyond the pale of the four castes,—not included even among the *Pratiloma* castes; such as the *Medas*, the *Āndhras*, the *Shabaras* and the *Pulindas*.

It is not meant that the sacrifices are to be performed on the very spot where the deer roams,—in the way in which they are performed 'on level ground,' according to the injunction that 'one should perform sacrifices on level ground'; as we have '*roams*' in the present tense, and certainly one could not perform a sacrifice on the very spot, and at the very time, at which the deer may have started to roam. Further, a certain place is the 'locus' of the sacrifice only in the sense that it holds all those things that are operative towards its performance, either as instruments or agents and the like, and certainly two material substances (*i.e.*, the Roaming Deer and the Sacrificial Accessories) could never occupy the same spot. Nor can the condition mentioned (the roaming of the deer) be taken as indirectly indicating some other time (than the one at which the *roaming* is being done); as no such indirect indication is admissible in the case of Injunctions; as has been shown under the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the 'winnowing basket' (*Mīmāmsā-Sūtra*, 1·2·26 *et. Seq.*), by Shabara (on 1·2·26), who says—'what is meant by *is done* is that *it is capable of being done*' [and the *present time* is not what is meant to be emphasised].

"As a matter of fact, when one thing is spoken of as *located* (contained) in another, it does not mean that it occupies the whole of it; so that it is not necessary for the *Locus* to be occupied in its entirety, as it is in the case of the oil contained in the seasamum-seed. In fact, even when only a portion of one thing is occupied by another, the whole of the former becomes its *locus* or *container*; *e.g.* when a man is spoken of as 'sitting *in the house*,' or 'occupying the chariot.' So that in the case in question what is described here is the entire country, consisting of villages and towns, and bounded by hills and rivers; and when the deer roams even in some part of it, the whole country becomes its *locus*. Hence there is no force in the argument that 'two material substances cannot occupy the same spot.'"

Our answer to the above is as follows:—In the present instance there is no direct injunction, such as 'one should

perform sacrifices here (in this country)'; as the injunctive affix is found added to the root 'to know' (in the word '*jñēyaḥ*'), and not to the root 'to sacrifice.' All that is meant is that the country spoken of is 'fit for sacrifices'; the meaning being that 'this country is fit for sacrificial performances'; and this 'fitness for sacrifices' is possible even without a direct injunction (of the actual performance). The fact of the matter is that it is only in the countries mentioned that the several sacrificial accessories, in the shape of the *kusha*-grass, the *Palāsha*, the *Khadira* and other trees, are mostly found; and sacrificial performers also, in the shape of persons belonging to the three higher castes and learned in the three Vedas, are found only in these countries; and it is on the basis of these facts that the countries have been described as 'fit for sacrifices.' The verb '*jñēyaḥ*' ending in the verbal affix ('*yat*') also has the sense of the injunctive only imposed upon it, and in reality it is only an *Arthavāda* resembling an injunction; just like the passage '*jartilayavāgvā vā juhuyāt,*' ('one should offer either the wild seasamum or the wild wheat') [which, even though cotaining the injunctive word '*juhuyāt,*' has been regarded as an *Arthavāda* ressembling an injunction].

When again it is said that '*beyond this is the land of the mlēchchhas,*' this also is purely descriptive of the usual state of things; the sense being that in these other lands it is mostly *mlēchchhas* that are born; it does not mean that people inhabiting them are all (on that account) '*mlechchhas*'; because what is a '*mlēchchha*' is well known, just like the '*Brāhmaṇa*' and other well known castes. In fact, the name '*mlechchhadēsha*' is to be taken literally, in the sense that it is 'the country of mlechchhas'; so that if mlechchhas happen to conquer a part of Āryāvarta itself and take their habitation there, that also would become '*mlechchhadēsha.*' Similarly if a certain well-behaved king of the Kṣattriya-caste should happen to defeat the *mlēchchhas* and make that land inhabited by people of the four castes, relegating the indigenous *mlechchhas* to the category of '*Chāṇḍāla,*' as they are in *Āryāvarta*, then that which was a 'country of the mlechchhas'

would become a 'land fit for sacrifices.' And this for the simple reason that no land is by itself defective; it is only by association that it becomes defective, just as it is when soiled by impure things. Hence, even apart from the countries designated here as 'fit for sacrifices,' if, in a certain place, all the necessary conditions are available, one should perform his sacrifices, even though it be a place where the spotted deer does not roam.

From all this it follows that the statement—'*this should be known as the country fit for sacrifices, and beyond this is the land of the mlēchchhas*' is purely descriptive, being meant to be supplementary to the injunction that follows in the next verse.—(23).

VERSE XXIV.

THE TWICE-BORN PEOPLE SHOULD SEEK TO RESORT TO THESE COUNTRIES; THE SHUDRA MAY HOWEVER, WHEN DISTRESSED FOR A LIVING, RESIDE IN ANY LAND.—(24).

Bhāṣya.

The author now proceeds to state that injunction for the sake whereof the names of several countries have been set forth.

'*The twice-born people.*' even though they be born in another country, should '*resort to these countries,*' *i.e.* to *Brahmāvarta*, etc. Abandoning the country of their birth, they should make every effort to reside in *Brahmāvarta* and the other countries just described.

In connection with this some people hold that the injunction of residing in these countries is with a view to unseen (spiritual) results; the sense being that even though certain results might accrue to one in other countries also, yet people should reside in these countries; and when we come to look for the reward of such residence,—we may conclude, either (*a*) that the residence in the said countries is enjoined as purificatory, just like bathing in the Gaṅgā and other sacred places,—the idea being that just as the water of one

place is more sacred than that of another, so also it is only some regions that are sacred, as has been described in the *Purāṇas*;—or (*b*) that from the mere residence itself the man goes to Heaven, this assumption being on the analogy of the *Vishvajit* sacrifice.

Neither of these two views is admissible. If the present verse had laid down such residence as would not be possible (without this injunction), then there might be some justification for assuming a reward, and for considering which of the two alternatives mentioned (in the previous paragraph) is the more reasonable. As a matter of fact however, the possibility of the residence in question is already secured by the fact that it is only in the said countries that the performance of the compulsory and optional rites is possible; in fact apart from the said countries, there is no possibility of the performance of *Dharma* in its entirity. For instance, in the snowy regions of Kāshmīra and such places, people suffer so much from cold that they are unable to attend to their evening prayers outside their house; nor (for the same reason) is it possible to read the Veda in the proper manner, going out either to the east or to the north of the village; nor lastly, is it possible to bathe in the river every day during the winter.

The implication of the expression '*twice-born people*' is that no country can be 'the land of mlechchhas' except when it is inhabited by mlechhhas. For otherwise any man entering that country would at once become a 'mlechahha'; and as such how could he be a 'twice born' person? It might be argued that—"by merely entering that country one does not become a *mlechahha;* he becomes so only by residing there, and it is this residence that is prohibited here."—But this can not be accepted; because what is mentioned here is '*samshrayaḥ*' 'resorting;' which connotes the idea of the man being born in one country and then leaving it and going to another country; and there can be no 'resorting' to a place which is already

inhabited. If this were not meant, then the Author would have simply said that 'one should never reside in any other country after renouncing these.' It might be argued that "the 'resorting' being already accomplished, the re-iteration of it serves the purpose of precluding others."—But in that case this would become a '*Parisaṅkhyā*' a 'Preclusive Injunction;' and such injunctions are beset with three defects.

It might be argued that "it is the *abandoning* (of the countries) that is indirectly indicated, the sense being that one should never abandon these countries."

But so long as the direct meaning of a text is admissible, there can be no justification for admitting an indirect indication. For this reason what has been said above cannot be accepted. From all this it follows that what the words imply is that men do not become '*mlēchchhas*' by merely coming into contact with a certain country, it is the country that becomes 'the land of *mlēchchhas*' through the contact of men (*mlēchchhas*).

In as much as service of the twice-born people constitutes the prescribed duty of the *shūdra*, it follows as a matter of course that the latter should reside where the former reside; but if he fails to obtain a living in that country, then he may go and live in another country; this is what is permitted (in the latter part of the verse). When the man comes to have a large family, or becomes unfit for service,—even though the twice-born person on whom he is dependent may be prepared to support him,—the *shūdra* may go and live in another country, where there may be a chance for him to acquire wealth. But even so he should never live in a country where *mlēchchhas* form the majority of inhabitants; he should betake himself to a land fit for sacrifices; because if he lived in a country abounding in *mlēchchhas* it would be impossible for him to avoid their contact, in the course of moving, sitting, eating and so fourth; so that there would be the fear of his becoming a *mlēchchha*.

'*Distressed for a living,*'—*i.e.*, suffering from want of a living. '*Living*' means wealth sufficient for the maintaining of one's family. In the absence of such 'living,' there is a certain amount of 'distress;' and this distress which is caused by the want of living is spoken of as caused by the 'living' itself; just as good harvest being the effect of rain, famine is caused by *want of rain*, but is spoken of as 'caused *by rain*.'

'*In any country*' implies want of restriction.

Section (7).

Summing up

VERSE (XXV)

THUS HAS THE SOURCE OF DHARMA BEEN BRIEFLY EXPLAINED TO YOU, AS ALSO THE ORIGIN OF ALL THIS (WORLD). LEARN NOW THE DUTIES OF THE SEVERAL CASTES.—(25).

Bhāṣya.

Here we have the recapitulation of all that has gone before,—and this for the purpose of refreshing the memory.

'*Yoniḥ*'—'*source,*' *cause.*

'*Samāsena*'—'*briefly,*' *in brief.*

'*Sambhavashcha*'—'*also the origin*'—this refers to what has gone in Discourse I.

'*Of all this*'—this refers to the 'creation of the world,' which is recalled in the form of a mental picture, and thus brought before the eye (which makes it capable of being referred to by the pronoun 'this').

'*The duties of the several castes*'—The duties that should be performed by the various castes.

'*Learn*'—*i.e.* in detail.

In this connection, the author of the *Smṛtivivaraṇa* describes five kinds of *Dharma* or Duty :—(1) '*Varṇa-dharma,*' 'duties pertaining to caste ;' (2) '*Āshrama-dharma,*' 'Duties pertaining to Life-stages,' (3) '*Varṇāshrama-dharma,*' 'duties pertaining to caste and life-stage' ; (4) '*Naimittika-Dharma,*' 'Occasional Duties,' and (5) '*Guṇa-Dharma,*' 'Duties pertaining to qualification.'—(1) Of these, that which proceeds entirely on the basis of caste, and takes no account of age, life-stage or any such circumstances, is called 'duty pertaining to castes ;' *e.g.*, what is laid down in such rules as—'the *Brāhmaṇa* should not be killed,' 'wine shall not be drunk by the *Brāhmaṇa*'—refers to a particular caste only, and is meant to apply to

every person of that caste till his very last breath. (2) 'Duty pertaining to life-stage' is that which does not depend upon caste only, but takes account of a particular life-stage also; *e.g.*, 'Fire-kindling and alms-begging are the duties of the Vedic student' (*Gautama* 2.8). (3) 'Duty pertaining to caste and life-stage' is that which is related to both; *e.g.*, when it is prescribed that 'the bow-string made of *murvā* grass is the girdle for the Kṣattriya student,' it means that what is mentioned does not apply to any other life-stage (than that of the student), nor to any other caste (except the Kṣattriya);—what is meant to be the example here is the *wearing* of the girdle during student-life, not the *first* taking of it, which forms part of the *Upanayana*-rites, and does not pertain to the particular life-stage; and the *Upanayana* itself is what ushers in a particular life-stage, and it is not a 'duty pertaining to the life-stage.' (4) The 'Occasional Duty' consists of such acts as the *purifying of things* and so forth. (5) 'Duty pertaining to qualifications' is that which is prescribed in connection with special qualifications; *e.g.*, what is laid down in such rules as 'he should be absolved from six' is with reference to the qualification of 'vast learning;' to this same category belong also all those duties that are laid down for the 'annointed' Kṣattriya.

All these are meant to be included under the '*duties of the castes*' (mentioned in the text); and hence the text mentions those only; and it does not make mention of the sub-divisions, because in the first place there are endless subdivisions, and secondly, (if the text went about mentioning all possible kinds of duties) it would have to mention those many duties also which are laid down for men in general, without reference to any particular caste. Similarly with other varieties of 'Duty.' In fact the 'Duties pertaining to castes' have been mentioned only as an indication; it does not mean that the duties of the mixed castes are excluded from consideration; because this latter has also been promised (in 1.2) as the subject to be expounded; and the present statement is only meant to be the reiteration of that promise.—(25)

Section VIII
Duties and Sacraments

VERSE XXVI.

FOR THE TWICE-BORN PERSONS CORPOREAL CONSECRATION, BEGINNING WITH 'CONCEPTION,' SHOULD BE PERFORMED WITH AUSPICIOUS VEDIC RITES; IT PURIFIES IN THIS WORLD AND ALSO AFTER DEATH.—(26)

Bhāṣya.

The '*Vedic rites*' spoken of here are *mantra-recitations.* '*Veda*' here stands for *mantras*; and what 'arises out of them' (which is what is expressed by the affix in '*Vaidikaiḥ*') is the 'reciting'; hence the nominal affix '*ṭhañ*' comes under the provisions of the Vārtika on Pāṇini, 4. 3. 60.

Or, the word '*vaidika*' (Vedic) may be taken as figuratively applied to the *rites*, on the ground of their source lying in the Veda. '*Karma*,' 'Rites,' would, in this case, stand for the *act* constituting the procedure; and hence becomes possible the differentiation and the relation of cause and effect (between the *Karma* and the *Saṁskāra*), which is expressed in the assertion—'the consecration, *saṁskāra*, should be performed *by means of* the Rites?

'*Conception*'—is the depositing of the semen in the womb, and '*niṣēkādiḥ*' stands for that body of sacraments to be described below, which begins with the said 'Conception' and ends with 'Initiation' (*Upanayana*). The singular number in '*Sharīrasaṁskāraḥ*,' 'corporeal consecration,' is due to the whole body of sacraments being taken collectively. '*Consecration*' means the preparation of a qualified body; and the several sacraments serve to produce in the body special qualifications.

This is what is meant by the term '*pāvanaḥ*,' '*it purifies*,' —*i.e.*, removes impurities.

'*In this world and also after death*'.—This means that the person duly consecrated becomes entitled to the performance of all those acts that, like the *Kārīri* and other sacrifices, lead to material results,—as also those that, like the Jyotiṣṭoma etc., bring spiritual rewards; and hence the consecrations are of use in both worlds.

'*Puṇyaiḥ*'—'*auspicious*,' *i.e.*, propitious; *i.e.*, they bring good luck and remove bad luck. Thus there is a clear difference between the word '*puṇya*' and '*pāvana*' here.

'*For the twice-born persons*,'—this serves to exclude the *Shūdras*. This word serves to point out who are the persons to be consecrated; and it is only by indirect indication that the three higher castes are understood to be meant; for before consecration, they are not yet 'twice-born' (the 'second birth' consisting of the consecration).—(26)

VERSE XXVII.

OF TWICE-BORN MEN THE TAINT OF SEED AND WOMB IS REMOVED BY THE 'LIBATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH PREGNANCY' AND BY 'JĀTAKARMAN' (RITES ATTENDANT UPON BIRTH), 'CHAUḌA' (TONSURE) AND 'MAUÑJĪBANDHANA' (TYING OF THE GRASS-GIRDLE). (27)

Bhāṣya.

The statement that 'corporeal consecration is purifying and auspicious' has pointed out the use of the Sacraments Now, 'purification' consists in removing the impurities of the impure thing; and the question arises—"whence the impurity of the Body?"

It is in answer to this that the text speaks of '*the taint of seed and womb*,';—'*of the seed*,' is that which arises from, or is due to, the seed;—similarly 'of the womb' (is that which arises from, or is due to, the womb). '*Taint*' is evil, an unseen source of pain. All that is meant by this is that the Body is impure, owing its birth to the seed and the womb. The 'seed' of man consists of semen and ovule; and these by their very nature, are impure. Similarly the womb, is

impure by contamination. And the '*taint*' of the man thus caused is '*removed*,' wiped away, by the sacraments.

These sacraments are now mentioned; some are actually named, while others are left to be indicated by the peculiar circumstances of what is sanctified.

'*Libations in connection with pregnancy*,'—those that are offered when the pregnancy of the woman has come about,—or those that are offered for the purpose of bringing about pregnancy; in either case the libations are said to be '*in connection with pregnancy*.' What prompts the offering is the *pregnancy*, the woman being only a means to it; so that the libations, being prompted by pregnancy, are said to be in connection with it; and these are the rites of '*Pumsavana*,' '*Sīmantonnayana*' and '*Garbhādhāna*.' The word '*libation*' here stands for the whole rite; as the '*Garbhādhāna*' ('Conception') is certainly not a 'Libation.' The exact details of the rites,—regarding the substances to be offered, the duties and so forth—are to be found out from the *Gṛhyasūtras*.

Just as by the 'libations in connection with pregnancy', so also by the sacrament known as '*Jātakarman*' (Rites attendant upon birth). Similarly by '*Tonsure*';—'*Chauḍa*,' '*Tonsure*,' is meant that which is performed for the purpose of the '*chūḍā*' (the lock of hair left to grow on the crown of the head). '*Tying of the grass-girdle*' is *Upanayana*; as it is at this ceremony that the girdle of muñja-grass is tied, this indicates that rite. '*Nibandhana*' is the same as '*bandhana*'; and the prefix '*ni*' has been added for filling up the metre.

'*Jātakarman*' and the rest—which are the names of the sacraments—have been made into a copulative compound, and then have the instrumental ending added to show that they are instrumental in the removal of taint.

Every 'consecration' brings about some peculiarity, either seen (material) or unseen (spiritual), in the thing consecrated, which is subservient to something else to be brought about, and has either already subserved, or is going to subserve, the

purposes of this latter thing. For instance, in the case of the 'threshing of the corn' and 'offering sacrifices with the corn,' the 'threshing' (which is the 'consecration' or 'purification' in this case) produces in the corns, that are going to help in the accomplishment of the sacrifice, the visible peculiarity, in the shape of the removal of the chaff. [So that in this case the thing consecrated is going to subserve some useful purpose]. When again it is said that 'removing the garland from the head one should keep it in a clean place,' the garland is something that has been used (and served its purpose) and has become mangled in shape; so that the special method of its *disposal* (after use) only produces an invisible effect. Now all the sacraments mentioned in the text are prescribed for the purpose of the purification of the body; but they are not found to bring about in the body any such effects as the removal of bad odour, etc., which is done by washing with clay and water. Hence the 'purification' in this case should be understood to consist in some unseen effect; just as has been held to result from the particular time at which the birth of the individual takes place. And when the man has become purified by such purification, he becomes fit for the performance of acts prescribed in the *Smṛtis* and in the Vedas; just as the Butter sanctified by *mantras* is fit for use in libations. In connection with ordinary (non-religious) acts, all necessary purity is attained by the (external) purification of things; as in the case of the Butter required for eating. As for that 'purity' of the boy which consists in his *touchableness*, this is brought about by the 'washing with water' mentioned as the means of purifying the body (in 5.109). Hence has it been declared that 'there is no impurity arising from his touch.'

Objection.—"How can these sacraments be regarded as subserving the purposes of actions? As regards the 'sprinkling of butter,' it is only natural that through the butter it should subserve the purposes of the sacrificial act, in connection with which it has been prescribed. These sacraments however lie entirely outside the pale of any action;—their

injunction not occurring in the context of any sacrificial act. So it is difficult to say that they help in the sacrifice through the man (in the way in which the *sprinkling* does through the butter). And unless it subserves the purposes of an act, consecration cannot be performed for its own sake; as in that case it should cease to be a 'consecration' (which is always subsidiary to something else), and become a *primary* act itself, and (when it ceases to be a *consecration*) this would mean the nullification of the statement 'corporeal consecration should be performed' (verse 26), and also of the Accusative ending in the statement 'when the boy is born, before he is touched by any other person, the father should etc.' (which refers to the Birth-rites); and in that case, the sense of the injunction will have to be altered, as is done in the case of the injunction '*Saktūñjuhoti*' [where the incompatibility of the *Accusative* ending leads us to alter it into the *Instrumental*],—a particular result (as arising out of the consecration, as a primary act by itself) will have to be assumed; and so forth, a number of absurd assumptions will have to be made."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—What we mean by the consecration subserving the purposes of sacrifices is not that it is a subsidiary integral part of these,—which character is indicated by Direct Vedic Declaration and certain other means; all that we mean is that it is helpful to it; and this helpfulness is possible even without the one forming an integral part of the other. For instance, we have the injunction regarding the 'laying of fire' and that relating to 'Vedic study'; but there is no Direct Injunction or any other indication (of these forming part of any sacrifice); all that we find is the Vedic text 'offerings are made into the *Āhavanīya*,' which lays down the '*Āhavanīya*' (as the receptacle of the offerings); and as the precise nature of the '*Āhavanīya*' is superphysical, the only way in which it can be brought into existence is by means of the prescribed 'laying of fire,' which is contained in the text 'the Brāhmaṇa should lay the fires during spring'; so that the 'laying of fire' helps in the sacrificial performance through the bringing into existence of the *Āhavanīya*, and

yet it does not form an integral part of the performance. 'Vedic study' also helps in the sacrificial performance, through the knowledge of the meaning of Vedic texts (acquired by the study). Analogous to these two is the case of the sacraments: (1) the act of Vedic study can be done only by one who has had these sacraments performed, (2) it is only when one has carried out the injunction of Vedic study that he can marry, (3) it is only when one has married that he can 'lay the fire,' and (4) it is only one who has 'laid the fire' that is entitled (to the performance of sacrifices). It is in this way that even though the sacraments are laid down apart from the sacrificial injunctions, yet their due performance is helpful towards the sacrificial acts.

Since the text speaks of '*Niṣēka*' (conception, depositing of the semen) as the first of the sacraments, it follows that all the sacraments for the child are to be performed by the father. Thus the *mantra* for the 'Rites on Birth' reads—'You are my very soul, bearing the name of son' (*Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 14. 9. 4. 8.) [which clearly shows that it is recited by the father]. It is for the father again that the begetting and instructing of children has been prescribed as a dut,y in the verse—'Having paid off the three debts etc.,' (6.35); and thepassage 'It is for this reason that the duly instructed son is called the real son,' speaks of 'instruction,' which consists in teaching the boy his duties; and we shall show later on that this 'instruction' is accomplished only by teaching him the Veda up to the point where the boy comprehends its full meaning. It is thus that the sacraments are of use to both: they help the father in the begetting of the right sort of child, and they help the boy in the performance of those acts that can be done only by one who has been duly consecrated. Thus it is the father on whom devolves the task of having the sacraments properly performed; and on his death, for him who takes his place; for instance, it is said 'he who has not been consecrated should be consecrated by his brothers who have had their consecration already done.' (*Yājñavalkya*, 2.124).—(27)

The author next indicates, by way of illustration, those acts in which the sacraments of the Boy are helpful :—

VERSE XXVIII.

THIS BODY IS MADE GODLY,—BY A THOROUGH STUDY OF THE THREE VEDAS, BY OBSERVANCES, BY LIBATIONS, BY OFFERINGS, BY CHILDREN, BY THE GREAT SACRIFICES AND BY THE SACRIFICES. (28)

Bhāṣya.

The term '*svādhyāya*' here stands for the *act of studying* (in general; and not for *Vedic study,* which is what it ordinarily means); and the subject-matter of the study is therefore indicated by the term '*of the Three Vedas,*' '*traividyēna.*' Even though the two terms ('*svādhyāyēna*' and '*traividyēna*') do not stand in close proximity, yet they are construed together on account of their denotations being correlated, in accordance with the law that 'when the denotation of one term is connected with that of another, they should be taken as correlated.' Hence, even though both the terms are in the same (Instrumental) case, yet one (*traividyēna*) may be taken as denoting the object of the other (*svādhyāyēna*) by altering the signification of the case-ending; the phrase '*traividyēna svādhyāyēna*' thus being construed as '*trayāṇām Vedānām* (*traividyasya*) *adhyayanēna* (*svādhyāyēna*),' '*by a thorough study of the three Vedas.*'

'*Traividya*' is the compounded form of '*trayo vēdāḥ*'; the formation of the term being similar to that of such terms as '*chaturvarṇya*' and the rest.

Or, '*svādhyāyēna*' may be taken (as usual) in the sense of the *study of the verbal text of the Vedas,* and '*traividyēna*' in that of the study of their meaning.

'*By Observances*'—by the '*Sāvitra*' and other observances kept by the Religious Student.

'*By Libations*'—*i.e.,* those that are poured at the time of the Initiation,—or the kindling of fire with fuels, which the Religious Student has to do every morning and evening, may

be spoken as '*libation*,' on account of Fire being the receptacle of the act of kindling (just as it is of the act of pouring libations).

"Is not the putting of fuel on the fire really a 'libation'—that you should call it so simply from the said analogy?"

People say that it is not really a 'libation'; because 'libations' and 'offerings' consist only of eatable substances.

"How then does the author himself say (under 2. 186) that 'the Religious Student should, every morning and evening *offer the libation* (*juhuyāt*) of fuels into the Fire'?"

It is only in a figurative sense that the 'laying of fuel' is called '*homa*', 'libation'; the idea being that the fuel for the kindling of fire is thrown into it in the same manner as substances are poured as libations; and it is on the basis of this analogy that the *kindling* is called '*libation*.' In the original injunction (of fire-kindling) the words used are '*samidham-ādadhyat*,' 'should lay the fuel' [where the word '*homa*,' 'libation' is not used]. As for the words (in Manu, 2. 186) '*agnim juhuyāt tābhiḥ*,' ('should offer the libation of fuels into fire'), we shall point out later on that they are purely explanatory (not mandatory), and mean something quite different; and in explanations, figurative expressions are not out of place.

[This is the view of some people]. The right view however is, that the offering of any fit and proper substance constitutes the acts of '*Yāga*' (Sacrifice) and '*Homa*' (Libation). It is only in this sense that we can rightly comprehend several injunctions. For instance, we have the injunction '*sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*,' where '*praharati*,' is taken to mean 'offer in sacrifice' and '*prastaram*' ('bed of Kusha-grass') is taken as the substance offered [and certainly the 'Kusha-bed' is not an *eatable* substance].

"In this particular instance, we have to take the 'sacrifice' as consisting of the offering of the Grass-bed, simply because it is so directly enjoined. And further, *Kusha-grass* also is eatable for some."

"Well, how is it then in the case of the '*Shākala-homa*' (where *pebbles* are offered)?"

"In that case also it has to be done in that way, because of the direct injunction—'one should offer the pebbles'."

What explanation can there be of the case of the '*Graha-yāga*,' where fuels of the *arka* and other plants are offered to each of the Grahas?

From all this it is clear that wherever we have the term '*juhuyāt*' ('should offer libation') and the connection of a Deity also is mentioned, in the original Injunction, the act is to be regarded as '*Homa*,' 'Libation.'

'*By offerings*'—*i.e.*, by offerings to the Gods and *Ṛṣis*.

Up to this point we had the duties of the Religious Student.

Next follow the duties of the Householder.

'*By children*,'—*i.e.*, by the act of begetting children.

'*By the great sacrifices*'—*i.e.*, by the five 'sacrifices,' consisting of *Brahmayajña* and the rest.

'*By sacrifices*,'—*i.e.*, by the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other Vedic Sacrifices.

The question being raised that—"if there were any useful purpose served by these acts, then alone could there be any use for the sacraments which fit a man for these acts,"—the Author says—'*this body is made godly*,' '*brāhmīyaṅkriyatē tanuḥ*.'—'*Brahma*' here stands for the Supreme God, the Creator; and this '*tanu*,' body, is made 'related to God,' '*godly*,'—by all these acts, which are laid down in the Veda and in the *Smṛtis*. '*Godliness*' meant here is that which consists in *being transformed into the very essence of God*; as this is the highest end of man; as for other forms of 'relation to God,' this is already an accomplished fact for all beings,—for the simple reason that God is the Creator of all things; and hence these other relations cannot be anything to be longed for. For this reason it is the attainment of 'Final Release' that must be meant here.

The term '*brāhmī*,' 'godly'—as also the term '*tanu*,' 'body'—refers to the personality ensouling the body; as it is the personality that is consecrated by the sacraments; and it is the personality that attains Final Release; as for the physical body, it entirely perishes.

Others have explained the phrase '*is made godly*' to mean that 'it is made capable of reaching Brahma'; as (they argue) the actual '*becoming Brahman*' is not possible by means of acts alone; Final Release (which is what is meant by 'becoming Brahman') is attainable only by means of *Knowledge* and *Action* conjointly. Hence what the text means is that the man, by the said acts, becomes entitled to meditate upon *Ātman* (Brahman). To this end we have the Vedic text—'O Gārgi, when anyone, without knowing the Imperishable One, sacrifices, pours oblations, performs penances, studies the Veda or gives charities, all this becomes perishable' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 3. 8. 10).

Objection.—"Nowhere in the Veda is the *attaining of Brahman* declared to be the reward of the actions here enumerated. For instance, (A) as for the *compulsory* acts, they are prescribed as being without rewards. If we were to assume rewards, such an assumption would be purely human in its source (and as such not authoritative). And since the Veda has declared them to be *compulsory* by means of such phrases 'throughout one's life' and the like, there can be no justification for applying the principle of the *Vishvajit* sacrifice (and assume the reward to consist in the attaining of heaven). If it were argued that—'from the present verse of Manu itself we learn that the said Acts bring the mentioned rewards,'—then it would come to this that only such persons are entitled to these acts as long for Final Release; which would deprive them of their compulsory character; and this would be contrary to what has been declared in the Veda. It may be argued that—'inasmuch as no one ever undertakes a fruitless act, (if no rewards were mentioned) the

laying down of the acts would be futile.' But there may be no performance at all; that does not matter; the use of a 'source of knowledge' lies in making things known; if it has succeeded in doing this, its purpose has been served; and the present verse does clearly indicate some acts as to be done; and if this indication is accomplished (the purpose of the scriptural injunction has been served); if people do not perform those acts, they transgress the behests of the scripture, and thereby incur sin. All old writers have explained the sense of the Injunctive etc., on these lines. If a servant does not perform his duty, as he is ordered to do by his master, either he does not obtain his wages, or he incurs sin. Now as regards the compulsory acts, since *no* rewards are mentioned (in the form of wages), the evil that follows is not in the form of losing the reward, but in the form of suffering pain. It is only in this manner that we can explain the fact of *all men* being required to perform the compulsory acts. From all this it follows that in the case of compulsory acts there is no reward. (B) As regards the *optional* acts, other results have boen declared as following from them, and not *Fin l Release* (the one mentioned here). How then could this Final Release be such an end of man as is accomplished by the mere performance of acts?"

It is just in view of these considerations that the text has been explained as a mere '*arthavāda*,' meant to eulogise the injunction of the Sacraments.

Some people have taken the expression '*brahmī*', 'godly' figuratively—on some basis or other—to mean 'capable of reciting the Veda and of performing the acts prescribed in the Veda'; '*brahma*' being taken as equivalent to 'Veda.'

"How is it then that Gautama (8. 8) has spoken of 'forty sacraments'? There the *Soma-sacrifice* also has been mentioned as a *sacrament*; and certainly a primary sacrifice (as the Soma-sacrifice undoubtedly is) can never have the character of a mere consecratory sacrament. Nor is it possible to take this part of Gautama's Sutra as an *arthavāda*; as all the forty sacraments are spoken of as being on the same footing."

As a matter of fact, the statement of Gautama is purely commendatory, the Soma-sacrifice being spoken as a 'sacrament' in the sense that it brings about in the performer's soul a peculiar aptitude.

Similarly in the present context real Sacraments have been mentioned along with non-sacraments with a view to indicate that both equally lead to the same result; and the purpose served by this is to show that the performance of all of them is necessary. It is thus not necesary to take the verse as apart from the section dealing with Sacraments.

Then again, the term *'is made'* is meant to be commendatory, as is shown by the fact that we have the present tense, and not the injunctive affix. So that there is nothing to justify the idea that 'the attaining of Brahman' is the reward (of what is enjoined). In fact the present verse does not enjoin any actions; and hence there cannot arise any desire on our part to know their result, which could justify the assumption that the present tense has the force of the Injunctive; as has been done in the case of the *Rātrīsatra*, in connection with which even though we have the present tense in the term *'pratit ṣṭhanti'* ('obtain a standing'), yet it is taken as laying down the result following from the Rātrisatra.

From all this it follows that all that is said in the verse is for the eulogising of the Sacraments.

Some people interpret the verse by breaking it up into two parts—taking it to mean that 'the attaining of Brahman is the reward of the compulsory acts, and of the optional acts the rewards are such as are actually mentioned in the Veda along with these acts.'

But there is no authority for this; because the entire verse is purely commendatory: specially as it has been already explained that the compulosry acts are performed without the idea of any rewards. It is in view of this that our Author has said (under 2.2) that 'it is not right to be absorbed in desires.'—(28)

Dharmaśāstra
Smṛtis
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